{"title":"先天权利、不确定性和官方自由裁量权:康德主义者的困惑","authors":"Paul Garofalo","doi":"10.1007/s10982-023-09483-z","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper poses a puzzle for contemporary Kantian political philosophy. Kantian political philosophers hold that the state’s purpose is to secure the conditions for people’s innate right to equal freedom, while at the same time claiming that innate right does not give a determinate set of conditions that the state is to bring about. Officials, then, have to make decisions in cases where the considerations of innate right provide no further guidance. I argue that, intuitively, in such cases there are (i) some further considerations that officials may appeal to and (ii) some further considerations that officials may not appeal to in order to decide among the options consistent with people’s innate right and then raise difficulties for the ability of current Kantian accounts to explain how they can accept both (i) and (ii). I conclude by suggesting one potential path forward for Kantians to address this puzzle.","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Innate right, indeterminacy, and official discretion: A puzzle for Kantians\",\"authors\":\"Paul Garofalo\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10982-023-09483-z\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper poses a puzzle for contemporary Kantian political philosophy. Kantian political philosophers hold that the state’s purpose is to secure the conditions for people’s innate right to equal freedom, while at the same time claiming that innate right does not give a determinate set of conditions that the state is to bring about. Officials, then, have to make decisions in cases where the considerations of innate right provide no further guidance. I argue that, intuitively, in such cases there are (i) some further considerations that officials may appeal to and (ii) some further considerations that officials may not appeal to in order to decide among the options consistent with people’s innate right and then raise difficulties for the ability of current Kantian accounts to explain how they can accept both (i) and (ii). I conclude by suggesting one potential path forward for Kantians to address this puzzle.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51702,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law and Philosophy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law and Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-023-09483-z\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-023-09483-z","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Innate right, indeterminacy, and official discretion: A puzzle for Kantians
Abstract This paper poses a puzzle for contemporary Kantian political philosophy. Kantian political philosophers hold that the state’s purpose is to secure the conditions for people’s innate right to equal freedom, while at the same time claiming that innate right does not give a determinate set of conditions that the state is to bring about. Officials, then, have to make decisions in cases where the considerations of innate right provide no further guidance. I argue that, intuitively, in such cases there are (i) some further considerations that officials may appeal to and (ii) some further considerations that officials may not appeal to in order to decide among the options consistent with people’s innate right and then raise difficulties for the ability of current Kantian accounts to explain how they can accept both (i) and (ii). I conclude by suggesting one potential path forward for Kantians to address this puzzle.
期刊介绍:
Law and Philosophy is a forum for the publication of work in law and philosophy which is of common interest to members of the two disciplines of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. It is open to all approaches in both fields and to work in any of the major legal traditions - common law, civil law, or the socialist tradition. The editors of Law and Philosophy encourage papers which exhibit philosophical reflection on the law informed by a knowledge of the law, and legal analysis informed by philosophical methods and principles.