{"title":"行为的道义至上?","authors":"Andrew T. Forcehimes","doi":"10.5840/jphil20231201030","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Why ought we to perform the actions that we ought to perform? We can categorize the various answers to this question depending on whether they hold that the oughts governing actions are explained by the oughts governing non-actions. In this essay, I show how a handful of plausible claims from normative ethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of action entail the conclusion that what an agent ought to do is explained by the attitudes she ought to have.","PeriodicalId":51370,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Deontic Primacy of Actions?\",\"authors\":\"Andrew T. Forcehimes\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/jphil20231201030\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Why ought we to perform the actions that we ought to perform? We can categorize the various answers to this question depending on whether they hold that the oughts governing actions are explained by the oughts governing non-actions. In this essay, I show how a handful of plausible claims from normative ethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of action entail the conclusion that what an agent ought to do is explained by the attitudes she ought to have.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51370,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20231201030\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20231201030","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Why ought we to perform the actions that we ought to perform? We can categorize the various answers to this question depending on whether they hold that the oughts governing actions are explained by the oughts governing non-actions. In this essay, I show how a handful of plausible claims from normative ethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of action entail the conclusion that what an agent ought to do is explained by the attitudes she ought to have.
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