宽大通货膨胀，卡特尔损害赔偿和刑事定罪

IF 0.8 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1007/s11151-023-09920-2

Catarina Marvão, Giancarlo Spagnolo

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引用次数: 4

摘要

摘要本文回顾了欧盟引入卡特尔犯罪的利弊。我们记录了最近欧盟的“宽大通胀”，即越来越多(或全部)卡特尔成员获得宽大，这软化了“法院竞争”效应。再加上对宽大申请人的损害赔偿保护不足(2014年损害赔偿指令)，这可能导致宽大申请和卡特尔定罪的减少。鉴于目前的罚款水平，可能不得不引入刑事定罪。然后，我们探讨了美国刑事制裁(1990-2015)，以突出欧盟政策制定者关注的潜在领域，其中累犯似乎是一个重要领域。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, and Criminalization

Abstract We revisit the pros and cons of introducing cartel criminalization in the EU. We document the recent EU “leniency inflation”, whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many (or all) cartel members, which softens the “courthouse race” effect. Coupled with the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damages (2014 Damages Directive), it may have led to a decrease in leniency applications and cartel convictions. Given the current level of fines, criminalization may have to be introduced. We then explore US criminal sanctions (1990–2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for EU policymakers, of which recidivism appears to be a significant one.

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来源期刊

Review of Industrial Organization Multiple-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： New Online Manuscript Submission System The Review of Industrial Organization publishes research papers on all aspects of industrial organization, broadly defined. A main focus is on competition and monopoly, in their many forms and processes and their effects on efficiency, innovation, and social conditions. Topics may range from the internal organization of enterprises to wide international comparisons. The Review is also increasing its interest in papers on public policies such as antitrust, regulation, deregulation, public enterprise, and privatization. Papers may deal with any economic sectors and any developed economies. The Review continues its primary interest in ideas that can be verified by econometric evidence, case studies, or other real conditions. But the Review also seeks papers that advance significant theories of industrial organization and policy. Papers using abstract techniques and econometric tests should present the methods and analysis in plain enough English so that non-specialist readers can evaluate the content. The Review welcomes submissions from any source, and the Editors will make every effort to have papers reviewed quickly and to give prompt decisions. The Editors will also seek to arrange symposia on specific topics, and they are open to proposals for grouped papers. They also welcome shorter notes and commentaries on topics of interest to the profession. Officially cited as: Rev Ind Organ

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