太空时代的信息安全:英国的天网卫星通信计划和现代指挥控制网络的演变

IF 1.3 2区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Journal of Strategic Studies Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI:10.1080/01402390.2023.2265072
Aaron Bateman
{"title":"太空时代的信息安全:英国的天网卫星通信计划和现代指挥控制网络的演变","authors":"Aaron Bateman","doi":"10.1080/01402390.2023.2265072","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTBritain initiated its Skynet satellite communications program in 1966 to provide assured connectivity with its forces across the world. Using recently declassified documents, this article reframes the history of British space activities by elucidating how the requirements for flexible and secure defense communications shaped U.K. space policy during the Cold War. Although Skynet inaugurated a communications revolution, it was the product of the longstanding British priority of possessing global information networks under sovereign control. In the Space Age, however, Britain had to reconcile its desire for an autonomous satellite communications network with the reality that American assistance was vital.KEYWORDS: Information networksinformation securityspacealliance management Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 ‘Annex A’ in ‘Outline Defence Communications Network Plan 1968–72, February 1, 1967, FCO 19/9, TNA.2 For an overview of submarine cables and the British Empire, see Paul Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914’, The English Historical Review, vol. 86, no. 341 (1971); Daniel Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Bruce Hunt, Imperial Science: Cable Telegraphy and Electrical Physics in the Victorian British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).3 As will be detailed below, Skynet functioned, in effect, as the British segment of the American defense satellite communications network. Skynet satellites were interoperable with American hardware.4 These difficulties were not unique to satellite communications. John Krige has detailed the complexities of Anglo-American cooperation in centrifuge technologies, see John Krige, ‘Hybrid Knowledge: The Transnational Co-Production of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment in the 1960s’, British Journal for the History of Science vol. 45, no. 3 (2012) and John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016), 119–149.5 Charles Hill, A Vertical Empire: The History of the UK Rocket and Space Programme 1950–1971 (London: Imperial College Press, 2001). For works on the early history of U.K. space policy see, Neil Whyte and Philip Gummett, ‘The Military and Early United Kingdom Space Policy’, Contemporary Record, vol. 8 no. 2 (1994); Neil Whyte and Philip Gummett, ‘Far Beyond the Bounds of Science: The Making of the United Kingdom’s First Space Policy’, Minerva, vol. 35, nol. 2 (1997).6 For an overview of the role of national security space technologies in Anglo-American relations, see Aaron Bateman, ‘Keeping the Technological Edge: The Space Arms Race and Anglo-American Relations in the 1980s’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 33, no. 2 (2022).7 Information security here encompasses the physical infrastructure for securely transmitting sensitive data as well as encryption.8 For background see Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914’, and Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, 75–78.9 Quoted in Whyte and Gummett, UK Space Policy, 142.10 Matthew Jones, The Official History of the U.K. Nuclear Deterrent (Volume I): From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964 (New York: Routledge, 2017), 444.11 Whyte and Gummet, UK Space Policy, 14212 Ibid., 14813 Ibid., 15214 Hill, A Vertical Empire, 93–107.15 ‘TAT-1 Opening Ceremony, September 25, 1956’, History of the Atlantic & Undersea Communications, https://atlantic-cable.com/Cables/1956TAT–1/.16 David J. Whalen, The Origins of Satellite Communications: 1945–1965 (Washington D.C. – Smithsonian Press, 2002), 46–48.17 Hugh Slotten, Beyond Sputnik and the Space Race: The Origins of Global Satellite Communications (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022), 63.18 Ibid., 7719 Ibid., 15120 Ibid., 15221 Ibid22 Quoted in a lecture entitled, ‘Telegraphic Communications’, 1937, MS. Marconi 240, Marconi Archives, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University.23 For an overview of the role of cables in U.K. defense strategy in WWI, see Jonathan Winkler, ‘Information Warfare in World War I’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 73, no. 3 (2009).24 For a comprehensive history of U.K. codebreaking in WWII, see John Ferris, Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020), 223–264.25 For a history of Britain’s secure speech system, see Richard Aldrich, ‘Whitehall Wiring: The Communications-Electronics Security Group and the Struggle for Secure Speech, Public Policy and Administration, vol. 28, no. 2 (2012).26 ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) Defence Satellite Communications’, July 27, 1973, DEFE 13/669, TNA.27 The British Joint Intelligence Committee had determined in 1959 that the Soviet Union possessed the capabilities to interfere with submarine cable communications and to jam wireless transmissions. See Michael Goodman and Huw Dylan, ‘British Intelligence and the Fear of a Soviet Attack on Allied Communications. Cryptologia, 4, vol. 40, no. 1 (2016).28 The U.S. government created the Defense Communications Agency in 1960 to centrally manage U.S. strategic communications networks, see ‘The Creation of DCA: 1947–1960’, DISA, https://www.disa.mil/about/our-history.29 ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) Defence Satellite Communications’, July 27, 1973, DEFE 13/669, TNA.30 ‘Annex – proposed amendments to CISG (61)23’, undated, CAB 21/5408, U.K. National Archives (TNA hereafter).31 Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 75–78.32 David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar: The U.S. Air Force and the Challenges of Military Satellite Communications’, in Beyond the Ionosphere, ed. Andrew Butrica (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 67.33 Note by MoD and MOA in consultation with GPO, ‘Feasibility of Using Intelsat for Military Communications’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.34 Spires and Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar’, 67.35 A satellite could provide eleven tactical-quality voice circuits or five commercial-quality voice circuits, see Spires and Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar’, 67.36 ‘Letter from McNamara to Thorneycroft’, October 14, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.37 Memo from Healey to the PM, ‘Strategic Implications of Space’, November 6, 1964, CAB 21/5445, TNA.38 ‘Report of the Space Review Committee’, September 1965, DEFE 68/83, TNA.39 Notably, the Bondi report underscored Britain’s limited ambitions in space. Clearly, due to the enormous costs associated with space technologies, U.K. officials preferred to leverage Britain’s relationship with the United States to get access to space services.40 Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.41 Britain would retain its relay station in Nairobi until 1966, see memo from chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘Collaboration with the Americans in Military Satellite Communications’, October 26, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.42 Memo from CDS to secretary of state for defence, ‘Military Satellite Communications’, October 20, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.43 G. Plowden, ‘Report of the Bondi Committee’, August 10, 1965, CAB 21/5445, TNA.44 Ibid45 ‘Wireless and Cables’, December 3, year illegible, MS. Marconi 240, Marconi Archives, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University. For an overview of the Imperial Wireless Chain, see Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 130.46 Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.47 Ibid; letter from Healey to McNamara, ‘Military satellite Communications’, November 9, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA; ‘Memorandum for Secretary of State’, March 23, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.48 Memorandum for P.D. Nairne, ‘Background Notes’, February 24, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA. Notably, McNamara was the key U.S. official overseeing negotiations with Britain concerning defense satellite communications. It is not clear to what extent, if any, other senior officials in the Johnson administration were involved.49 ‘Memorandum for secretary of state’, March 23, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.50 Memorandum for the PM, ‘Commonwealth Telecommunications Conference’, May 22, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.51 ‘Memorandum from Tilling (GPO) to 10 Downing’, June 1, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.52 Slotten, Beyond Sputnik, 15053 ‘Letter from G.H. Green to the private secretary for the secretary of state for defence’, October 15, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.54 Letter from Healey to McNamara, ‘Satellite Communications’, January 6, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.55 ‘Letter from McNamara to Healey’, January 27, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.56 Memorandum for the secretary of state, ‘US/UK satellite communications talking points’, April 26, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.57 Note on the Negotiations in Washington 21st/24th March, 1966, April 20, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.58 ‘Note on the Negotiations in Washington 21st/24th March, 1966’, April 20, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.59 Ibid60 ‘Interim U.K. Defence Satellite Communications System’, June 7, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.61 For an overview of de Gaulle’s decision, see Garret Martin, ‘The 1967 Withdrawal from NATO – A Cornerstone of de Gaulle’s Grand Strategy’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, 232–243 (2011).62 For background on the British rationale for withdrawal from ELDO, see John Krige, Angelina Long Callahan, and Ashok Maharaj, NASA in the World: Fifty Years of Collaboration in Space (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 59–63.63 Britain’s pull back from space cooperation with European allies after its failed attempts to enter the European Economic Community in 1963 and 1967 made partnering with the United States on space projects even more vital.64 John Krige details the U.S. aim to use space cooperation as a means of ‘positive disarmament’. See chapter 4 in John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe: U.S. Technological Collaboration and Non-Proliferation (Cambridge: MIT, 2016).65 ‘Editorial Note’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues.66 Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe, 116.67 Ibid68 ‘Report on US/UK Discussions on UK Military Communications Satellite Requirements’, March 21–28, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.69 ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defense Communications Satellite Project’, June 2, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.70 Jonathan Winkler, Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 195–19771 ‘UK/US Satellite Communications Talking Points, undated, DEFE, 13/389, TNA.72 Memorandum by the secretary of state for defence, ‘Draft Overseas Policy and Defence Committee Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, June 17, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.73 ‘Annex A’ in ‘Outline Defence Communications Network Plan 1968–72, February 1, 1967, FCO 19/9, TNA.74 Ibid75 William James, ‘Global Britain’s Strategic Problem East of Suez’, European Journal of International Security, 6, 2021, 180.76 Ibid77 Ibid., 17978 ‘Minutes from Parliament’, March 7, 1966, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1966/mar/07/defence.79 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Policy Staff, ‘The Requirements for Satellite Communications’, October 10, 1969, DEFE 34/130, TNA.80 Ibid81 Ibid82 James, ‘Global Britain’s Strategic Problem East of Suez’, 172.83 Ibid. Secure encrypted voice communications required bandwidth that could not be met by existing high-frequency communications systems.84 Background, ‘European Space Cooperation’, February 19, 1969, FCO 55/348, TNA.85 Ibid86 Ibid87 Ibid88 ‘Defence Satellite Communications − 1974 to 1978’, March 11, 1975, DEFE 72/56, TNA.89 ‘Skynet II replenishment: Brief on the current situation’, May 17, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA. U.K. firms carried out 45% of the development work associated with Skynet-II sub-systems, see ‘Defence Satellite Communications − 1974 to 1978’, March 11, 1975, DEFE 72/56, TNA.90 ‘Airbus’ Golden Jubilee for Skynet Secure Satellite Communications’, Airbus, November 22, 2019, https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2019–11-airbus-golden-jubilee-for-skynet-secure-satellite-communications.91 Minute for defence secretary, ‘Communications Satellites’, undated, DEFE 72/56, TNA.92 Letter from Weinstock to D. G. Rayner, ‘Skynet III’, May 18, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA.93 Ibid94 Note of a meeting in CSA’s room, ‘Satellite Communications’, November 10, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA.95 ‘Satellite Communications’, July 31, 1980, DEFE 19/221, TNA.96 Study for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘The Relative Merits of Satellite and Submarine Cable Communications for Government Long-Distance Communications’, April 11, 1963, DEFE 5/137, TNA.97 Ibid98 Memorandum from BG T Stanbridge, ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) – Defence Satellite Communications’, May 30, 1973, DEFE 72/56, TNA.99 For a history of Corporate, see Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War (New York: Routledge, 2005) and Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 2: War and Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2004).100 Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 81.101 According to a U.S. report, Britain was using 21 communications channels on the American DSCS network. See Memorandum from the acting Director of the Defense communications Agency (Layman) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, ‘US Communications Satellite Support to UK Naval Forces’, April 9, 1982, Foreign Relations of the United States 1981–1988, vol. XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984.102 Memorandum from B.C. Farrer, ‘MoD Working Party on the Way Ahead in Space’, July 5, 1983, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.103 Ilaria Parisi, ‘France’s Reaction Towards the SDI: Transforming a Strategic Threat into a Technological Opportunity’, in NATO and the Strategic Defence Initiative, ed. Luc-Andre Brunet (New York: Routledge, 2022), 121–124.104 ‘Policy for the Use of Space for Defence’, April 22, 1981, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.105 Background paper attached to minute ‘Space-Forthcoming Meeting Between S of S and Ministers of State, DTI’, sent from W. D. Reeves, November 12, 1984, DEFE 13/2066, TNA.106 For more details concerning Zircon, see Ferris, Behind the Enigma, 322. Through Zircon the British would have also demonstrated to their U.S. counterparts that they could develop space-based intelligence systems that could contribute to their intelligence partnership.107 Even though Skynet-3 had been cancelled, the MoD designated the new series the fourth generation since the technology was now more advanced than that planned for Skynet-3.108 A review of U.K. military requirements called for ‘greater operational capability in the mid-1980s, including EHF [extremely high frequency], SHF [super high frequency], UHF [ultra high frequency], and resistance to ECM [electronic counter measures]’. This is to be met by a ten-year (1985–95) British Skynet IV project’. See ‘Policy for the Use of Space for Defence’, April 22, 1981, DEFE 69/1204, TNA. For a detailed explanation of the rationale for a third Skynet-4 satellite, see ‘NGASR 7123 – Skynet 4 Stage 1 Programme: Procurement of Third Satellite (Skynet 4C)’, June 12, 1983, DEFE 13/2066, TNA and ‘Skynet 4C: Operational Justification’, November 28, 1984, DEFE 24/2905, TNA.109 Memorandum from E.J. Risness, ‘Defence Space Policy’, August 23, 1982, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.110 Ibid111 ‘Defence Space Policy (draft)’, August, 1982, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.112 Ibid113 ‘NGASR 7123 – Skynet 4 Stage 1 Programme: Procurement of Third Satellite (Skynet 4C)’, June 12, 1983, DEFE 13/2066, TNA.114 Minute from Howe to Thatcher, ‘Launcher for Skynet 4’, December 12, 1983, PREM 19/2067, TNA.115 Ibid116 Ibid117 ‘Skynet 5: A Proven and Trusted Partnership’, Airbus, https://www.airbus.com/en/products-services/defence/milsatcom/skynet-5. There are plans underway for the sixth generation as well, see ‘MoD Contracts Airbus for Skynet Telecoms Satellite’, BBC, July 20, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-53476881.Additional informationNotes on contributorsAaron BatemanAaron Bateman is an assistant professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University. He is the author of the forthcoming book Weapons in Space: Technology, Politics, and the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative (MIT Press, 2024).","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Information security in the space age: Britain’s Skynet satellite communications program and the evolution of modern command and control networks\",\"authors\":\"Aaron Bateman\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/01402390.2023.2265072\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACTBritain initiated its Skynet satellite communications program in 1966 to provide assured connectivity with its forces across the world. Using recently declassified documents, this article reframes the history of British space activities by elucidating how the requirements for flexible and secure defense communications shaped U.K. space policy during the Cold War. Although Skynet inaugurated a communications revolution, it was the product of the longstanding British priority of possessing global information networks under sovereign control. In the Space Age, however, Britain had to reconcile its desire for an autonomous satellite communications network with the reality that American assistance was vital.KEYWORDS: Information networksinformation securityspacealliance management Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 ‘Annex A’ in ‘Outline Defence Communications Network Plan 1968–72, February 1, 1967, FCO 19/9, TNA.2 For an overview of submarine cables and the British Empire, see Paul Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914’, The English Historical Review, vol. 86, no. 341 (1971); Daniel Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Bruce Hunt, Imperial Science: Cable Telegraphy and Electrical Physics in the Victorian British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).3 As will be detailed below, Skynet functioned, in effect, as the British segment of the American defense satellite communications network. Skynet satellites were interoperable with American hardware.4 These difficulties were not unique to satellite communications. John Krige has detailed the complexities of Anglo-American cooperation in centrifuge technologies, see John Krige, ‘Hybrid Knowledge: The Transnational Co-Production of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment in the 1960s’, British Journal for the History of Science vol. 45, no. 3 (2012) and John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016), 119–149.5 Charles Hill, A Vertical Empire: The History of the UK Rocket and Space Programme 1950–1971 (London: Imperial College Press, 2001). For works on the early history of U.K. space policy see, Neil Whyte and Philip Gummett, ‘The Military and Early United Kingdom Space Policy’, Contemporary Record, vol. 8 no. 2 (1994); Neil Whyte and Philip Gummett, ‘Far Beyond the Bounds of Science: The Making of the United Kingdom’s First Space Policy’, Minerva, vol. 35, nol. 2 (1997).6 For an overview of the role of national security space technologies in Anglo-American relations, see Aaron Bateman, ‘Keeping the Technological Edge: The Space Arms Race and Anglo-American Relations in the 1980s’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 33, no. 2 (2022).7 Information security here encompasses the physical infrastructure for securely transmitting sensitive data as well as encryption.8 For background see Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914’, and Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, 75–78.9 Quoted in Whyte and Gummett, UK Space Policy, 142.10 Matthew Jones, The Official History of the U.K. Nuclear Deterrent (Volume I): From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964 (New York: Routledge, 2017), 444.11 Whyte and Gummet, UK Space Policy, 14212 Ibid., 14813 Ibid., 15214 Hill, A Vertical Empire, 93–107.15 ‘TAT-1 Opening Ceremony, September 25, 1956’, History of the Atlantic & Undersea Communications, https://atlantic-cable.com/Cables/1956TAT–1/.16 David J. Whalen, The Origins of Satellite Communications: 1945–1965 (Washington D.C. – Smithsonian Press, 2002), 46–48.17 Hugh Slotten, Beyond Sputnik and the Space Race: The Origins of Global Satellite Communications (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022), 63.18 Ibid., 7719 Ibid., 15120 Ibid., 15221 Ibid22 Quoted in a lecture entitled, ‘Telegraphic Communications’, 1937, MS. Marconi 240, Marconi Archives, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University.23 For an overview of the role of cables in U.K. defense strategy in WWI, see Jonathan Winkler, ‘Information Warfare in World War I’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 73, no. 3 (2009).24 For a comprehensive history of U.K. codebreaking in WWII, see John Ferris, Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020), 223–264.25 For a history of Britain’s secure speech system, see Richard Aldrich, ‘Whitehall Wiring: The Communications-Electronics Security Group and the Struggle for Secure Speech, Public Policy and Administration, vol. 28, no. 2 (2012).26 ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) Defence Satellite Communications’, July 27, 1973, DEFE 13/669, TNA.27 The British Joint Intelligence Committee had determined in 1959 that the Soviet Union possessed the capabilities to interfere with submarine cable communications and to jam wireless transmissions. See Michael Goodman and Huw Dylan, ‘British Intelligence and the Fear of a Soviet Attack on Allied Communications. Cryptologia, 4, vol. 40, no. 1 (2016).28 The U.S. government created the Defense Communications Agency in 1960 to centrally manage U.S. strategic communications networks, see ‘The Creation of DCA: 1947–1960’, DISA, https://www.disa.mil/about/our-history.29 ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) Defence Satellite Communications’, July 27, 1973, DEFE 13/669, TNA.30 ‘Annex – proposed amendments to CISG (61)23’, undated, CAB 21/5408, U.K. National Archives (TNA hereafter).31 Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 75–78.32 David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar: The U.S. Air Force and the Challenges of Military Satellite Communications’, in Beyond the Ionosphere, ed. Andrew Butrica (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 67.33 Note by MoD and MOA in consultation with GPO, ‘Feasibility of Using Intelsat for Military Communications’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.34 Spires and Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar’, 67.35 A satellite could provide eleven tactical-quality voice circuits or five commercial-quality voice circuits, see Spires and Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar’, 67.36 ‘Letter from McNamara to Thorneycroft’, October 14, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.37 Memo from Healey to the PM, ‘Strategic Implications of Space’, November 6, 1964, CAB 21/5445, TNA.38 ‘Report of the Space Review Committee’, September 1965, DEFE 68/83, TNA.39 Notably, the Bondi report underscored Britain’s limited ambitions in space. Clearly, due to the enormous costs associated with space technologies, U.K. officials preferred to leverage Britain’s relationship with the United States to get access to space services.40 Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.41 Britain would retain its relay station in Nairobi until 1966, see memo from chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘Collaboration with the Americans in Military Satellite Communications’, October 26, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.42 Memo from CDS to secretary of state for defence, ‘Military Satellite Communications’, October 20, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.43 G. Plowden, ‘Report of the Bondi Committee’, August 10, 1965, CAB 21/5445, TNA.44 Ibid45 ‘Wireless and Cables’, December 3, year illegible, MS. Marconi 240, Marconi Archives, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University. For an overview of the Imperial Wireless Chain, see Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 130.46 Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.47 Ibid; letter from Healey to McNamara, ‘Military satellite Communications’, November 9, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA; ‘Memorandum for Secretary of State’, March 23, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.48 Memorandum for P.D. Nairne, ‘Background Notes’, February 24, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA. Notably, McNamara was the key U.S. official overseeing negotiations with Britain concerning defense satellite communications. It is not clear to what extent, if any, other senior officials in the Johnson administration were involved.49 ‘Memorandum for secretary of state’, March 23, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.50 Memorandum for the PM, ‘Commonwealth Telecommunications Conference’, May 22, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.51 ‘Memorandum from Tilling (GPO) to 10 Downing’, June 1, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.52 Slotten, Beyond Sputnik, 15053 ‘Letter from G.H. Green to the private secretary for the secretary of state for defence’, October 15, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.54 Letter from Healey to McNamara, ‘Satellite Communications’, January 6, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.55 ‘Letter from McNamara to Healey’, January 27, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.56 Memorandum for the secretary of state, ‘US/UK satellite communications talking points’, April 26, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.57 Note on the Negotiations in Washington 21st/24th March, 1966, April 20, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.58 ‘Note on the Negotiations in Washington 21st/24th March, 1966’, April 20, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.59 Ibid60 ‘Interim U.K. Defence Satellite Communications System’, June 7, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.61 For an overview of de Gaulle’s decision, see Garret Martin, ‘The 1967 Withdrawal from NATO – A Cornerstone of de Gaulle’s Grand Strategy’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, 232–243 (2011).62 For background on the British rationale for withdrawal from ELDO, see John Krige, Angelina Long Callahan, and Ashok Maharaj, NASA in the World: Fifty Years of Collaboration in Space (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 59–63.63 Britain’s pull back from space cooperation with European allies after its failed attempts to enter the European Economic Community in 1963 and 1967 made partnering with the United States on space projects even more vital.64 John Krige details the U.S. aim to use space cooperation as a means of ‘positive disarmament’. See chapter 4 in John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe: U.S. Technological Collaboration and Non-Proliferation (Cambridge: MIT, 2016).65 ‘Editorial Note’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues.66 Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe, 116.67 Ibid68 ‘Report on US/UK Discussions on UK Military Communications Satellite Requirements’, March 21–28, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.69 ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defense Communications Satellite Project’, June 2, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.70 Jonathan Winkler, Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 195–19771 ‘UK/US Satellite Communications Talking Points, undated, DEFE, 13/389, TNA.72 Memorandum by the secretary of state for defence, ‘Draft Overseas Policy and Defence Committee Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, June 17, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.73 ‘Annex A’ in ‘Outline Defence Communications Network Plan 1968–72, February 1, 1967, FCO 19/9, TNA.74 Ibid75 William James, ‘Global Britain’s Strategic Problem East of Suez’, European Journal of International Security, 6, 2021, 180.76 Ibid77 Ibid., 17978 ‘Minutes from Parliament’, March 7, 1966, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1966/mar/07/defence.79 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Policy Staff, ‘The Requirements for Satellite Communications’, October 10, 1969, DEFE 34/130, TNA.80 Ibid81 Ibid82 James, ‘Global Britain’s Strategic Problem East of Suez’, 172.83 Ibid. Secure encrypted voice communications required bandwidth that could not be met by existing high-frequency communications systems.84 Background, ‘European Space Cooperation’, February 19, 1969, FCO 55/348, TNA.85 Ibid86 Ibid87 Ibid88 ‘Defence Satellite Communications − 1974 to 1978’, March 11, 1975, DEFE 72/56, TNA.89 ‘Skynet II replenishment: Brief on the current situation’, May 17, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA. U.K. firms carried out 45% of the development work associated with Skynet-II sub-systems, see ‘Defence Satellite Communications − 1974 to 1978’, March 11, 1975, DEFE 72/56, TNA.90 ‘Airbus’ Golden Jubilee for Skynet Secure Satellite Communications’, Airbus, November 22, 2019, https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2019–11-airbus-golden-jubilee-for-skynet-secure-satellite-communications.91 Minute for defence secretary, ‘Communications Satellites’, undated, DEFE 72/56, TNA.92 Letter from Weinstock to D. G. Rayner, ‘Skynet III’, May 18, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA.93 Ibid94 Note of a meeting in CSA’s room, ‘Satellite Communications’, November 10, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA.95 ‘Satellite Communications’, July 31, 1980, DEFE 19/221, TNA.96 Study for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘The Relative Merits of Satellite and Submarine Cable Communications for Government Long-Distance Communications’, April 11, 1963, DEFE 5/137, TNA.97 Ibid98 Memorandum from BG T Stanbridge, ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) – Defence Satellite Communications’, May 30, 1973, DEFE 72/56, TNA.99 For a history of Corporate, see Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War (New York: Routledge, 2005) and Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 2: War and Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2004).100 Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 81.101 According to a U.S. report, Britain was using 21 communications channels on the American DSCS network. See Memorandum from the acting Director of the Defense communications Agency (Layman) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, ‘US Communications Satellite Support to UK Naval Forces’, April 9, 1982, Foreign Relations of the United States 1981–1988, vol. XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984.102 Memorandum from B.C. Farrer, ‘MoD Working Party on the Way Ahead in Space’, July 5, 1983, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.103 Ilaria Parisi, ‘France’s Reaction Towards the SDI: Transforming a Strategic Threat into a Technological Opportunity’, in NATO and the Strategic Defence Initiative, ed. Luc-Andre Brunet (New York: Routledge, 2022), 121–124.104 ‘Policy for the Use of Space for Defence’, April 22, 1981, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.105 Background paper attached to minute ‘Space-Forthcoming Meeting Between S of S and Ministers of State, DTI’, sent from W. D. Reeves, November 12, 1984, DEFE 13/2066, TNA.106 For more details concerning Zircon, see Ferris, Behind the Enigma, 322. Through Zircon the British would have also demonstrated to their U.S. counterparts that they could develop space-based intelligence systems that could contribute to their intelligence partnership.107 Even though Skynet-3 had been cancelled, the MoD designated the new series the fourth generation since the technology was now more advanced than that planned for Skynet-3.108 A review of U.K. military requirements called for ‘greater operational capability in the mid-1980s, including EHF [extremely high frequency], SHF [super high frequency], UHF [ultra high frequency], and resistance to ECM [electronic counter measures]’. This is to be met by a ten-year (1985–95) British Skynet IV project’. See ‘Policy for the Use of Space for Defence’, April 22, 1981, DEFE 69/1204, TNA. For a detailed explanation of the rationale for a third Skynet-4 satellite, see ‘NGASR 7123 – Skynet 4 Stage 1 Programme: Procurement of Third Satellite (Skynet 4C)’, June 12, 1983, DEFE 13/2066, TNA and ‘Skynet 4C: Operational Justification’, November 28, 1984, DEFE 24/2905, TNA.109 Memorandum from E.J. Risness, ‘Defence Space Policy’, August 23, 1982, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.110 Ibid111 ‘Defence Space Policy (draft)’, August, 1982, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.112 Ibid113 ‘NGASR 7123 – Skynet 4 Stage 1 Programme: Procurement of Third Satellite (Skynet 4C)’, June 12, 1983, DEFE 13/2066, TNA.114 Minute from Howe to Thatcher, ‘Launcher for Skynet 4’, December 12, 1983, PREM 19/2067, TNA.115 Ibid116 Ibid117 ‘Skynet 5: A Proven and Trusted Partnership’, Airbus, https://www.airbus.com/en/products-services/defence/milsatcom/skynet-5. There are plans underway for the sixth generation as well, see ‘MoD Contracts Airbus for Skynet Telecoms Satellite’, BBC, July 20, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-53476881.Additional informationNotes on contributorsAaron BatemanAaron Bateman is an assistant professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

英国于1966年启动了其天网卫星通信计划,为其在世界各地的部队提供可靠的连接。本文利用最近解密的文件,通过阐明灵活和安全的国防通信需求如何影响了冷战期间英国的太空政策,重新构建了英国太空活动的历史。尽管天网开启了一场通信革命,但它是英国长期以来优先考虑将全球信息网络置于主权控制之下的产物。然而,在太空时代,英国不得不在建立自主卫星通信网络的愿望与美国援助至关重要的现实之间进行协调。关键词:信息网络信息安全空间联盟管理披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。注1 1967年2月1日,FCO 19/9, tna,“国防通信网络计划大纲1968-72”中的“附件A”。2关于海底电缆和大英帝国的概述,见Paul Kennedy,“帝国电缆通信和战略,1870-1914”,英国历史评论,第86卷,第86期。341 (1971);丹尼尔·海德里克,《隐形武器:电信与国际政治,1851-1945》(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2012);布鲁斯·亨特,帝国科学:维多利亚时代大英帝国的电缆电报和电气物理学(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,2022)下面将详细说明,天网的功能,实际上,作为美国国防卫星通信网络的英国部分。天网卫星可以与美国的硬件进行互操作这些困难并非卫星通信所独有。约翰·克里格详细介绍了英美在离心机技术方面合作的复杂性,见约翰·克里格,“混合知识:20世纪60年代铀浓缩气体离心机的跨国合作生产”,英国科学史杂志第45卷,第45期。查尔斯·希尔:《垂直帝国:1950-1971年英国火箭和太空计划的历史》(伦敦:帝国理工学院出版社,2001年)。有关英国太空政策早期历史的著作,见尼尔·怀特和菲利普·古米特,“军事与早期英国太空政策”,当代记录,卷8号。2 (1994);Neil Whyte和Philip Gummett,“远远超出科学的界限:英国第一个太空政策的制定”,Minerva,第35卷,第1期。2(1997)。6关于国家安全空间技术在英美关系中的作用的概述,见亚伦·贝特曼,“保持技术优势:20世纪80年代的太空军备竞赛和英美关系”,《外交与治国方略》,第33卷,第33期。2 (2022) 7这里的信息安全包括用于安全传输敏感数据和加密的物理基础设施有关背景资料,见肯尼迪,“帝国电报通信和战略,1870-1914”,和海德里克,“隐形武器,75-78.9”,引用于怀特和Gummett,英国太空政策,142.10马修·琼斯,英国核威慑的官方历史(卷一):从v轰炸机时代到北极星的到来,1945-1964(纽约:Routledge, 2017), 444.11 Whyte和Gummet,英国太空政策,14212同上,14813同上,15214 Hill,一个垂直帝国,93-107.15“塔特-1开幕式,1956年9月25日”,大西洋和海底通信的历史,https://atlantic-cable.com/Cables/1956TAT -1 / 16 David J. Whalen,卫星通信的起源:1945-1965(华盛顿特区-史密森尼出版社,2002),46-48.17休·斯洛滕,超越人造卫星和太空竞赛:《全球卫星通信的起源》(巴尔的摩:约翰霍普金斯大学出版社,2022年),63.18同上,7719同上,15120同上,15221同上,引用于题为“电报通信”的讲座,1937年,马可尼女士240,马可尼档案馆,牛津大学博德利图书馆。23关于第一次世界大战中电缆在英国国防战略中的作用的概述,见乔纳森温克尔,“第一次世界大战中的信息战”,军事历史杂志,第73卷,第22号。3(2009)。关于二战中英国密码破译的全面历史,见约翰·费里斯,谜机背后:英国秘密网络情报机构GCHQ的授权历史(纽约:布鲁姆斯伯里出版社,2020),226 - 264.25。关于英国安全语音系统的历史,见理查德·奥尔德里奇,“白厅布线:通信电子安全组和安全语音的斗争”,公共政策与管理,第28卷,第28期。2(2012)。英国联合情报委员会在1959年确定苏联拥有干扰海底电缆通信和干扰无线传输的能力。《计划分析和审查(PAR)国防卫星通信》,1973年7月27日。 军事需求要求“在1980年代中期更大的作战能力,包括EHF[极高频率]、SHF[超高频]、UHF[超高频率]和抗ECM[电子对抗措施]”。这将由一个为期十年(1985-95)的英国天网IV项目来满足。见1981年4月22日,DEFE 69/1204, TNA“用于防御的空间政策”。关于第三颗天网-4卫星的详细解释,请参见1983年6月12日的“NGASR 7123 -天网-4第一阶段计划:第三颗卫星(天网4C)的采购”,DEFE 13/2066, TNA和“天网4C”:为了保护行动的理由”,1984年11月28日,24/2905,TNA.109备忘录从E.J. Risness,“国防空间政策”,8月23日,1982年,国防69/1204,TNA.110 Ibid111“国防空间政策(草案)”,1982年8月,国防69/1204,TNA.112 Ibid113”NGASR 7123 -天网4阶段1项目:采购第三卫星(天网4 c)”,1983年6月12日,国防13/2066,TNA.114分钟从豪到撒切尔夫人,”发射器天网4”,12月12日,1983年,PREM 19/2067 TNA.115 Ibid116 Ibid117“天网5:经过验证和值得信赖的伙伴关系”,空中客车,https://www.airbus.com/en/products-services/defence/milsatcom/skynet-5。第六代的计划也在进行中,参见“国防部与空中客车公司签订的天网电信卫星合同”,英国广播公司,2020年7月20日,https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-53476881.Additional信息撰稿人说明aaron Bateman是乔治华盛顿大学历史和国际事务助理教授。他是即将出版的《太空武器:技术、政治和战略防御计划的兴衰》一书的作者(麻省理工学院出版社,2024年)。
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Information security in the space age: Britain’s Skynet satellite communications program and the evolution of modern command and control networks
ABSTRACTBritain initiated its Skynet satellite communications program in 1966 to provide assured connectivity with its forces across the world. Using recently declassified documents, this article reframes the history of British space activities by elucidating how the requirements for flexible and secure defense communications shaped U.K. space policy during the Cold War. Although Skynet inaugurated a communications revolution, it was the product of the longstanding British priority of possessing global information networks under sovereign control. In the Space Age, however, Britain had to reconcile its desire for an autonomous satellite communications network with the reality that American assistance was vital.KEYWORDS: Information networksinformation securityspacealliance management Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 ‘Annex A’ in ‘Outline Defence Communications Network Plan 1968–72, February 1, 1967, FCO 19/9, TNA.2 For an overview of submarine cables and the British Empire, see Paul Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914’, The English Historical Review, vol. 86, no. 341 (1971); Daniel Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Bruce Hunt, Imperial Science: Cable Telegraphy and Electrical Physics in the Victorian British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).3 As will be detailed below, Skynet functioned, in effect, as the British segment of the American defense satellite communications network. Skynet satellites were interoperable with American hardware.4 These difficulties were not unique to satellite communications. John Krige has detailed the complexities of Anglo-American cooperation in centrifuge technologies, see John Krige, ‘Hybrid Knowledge: The Transnational Co-Production of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment in the 1960s’, British Journal for the History of Science vol. 45, no. 3 (2012) and John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016), 119–149.5 Charles Hill, A Vertical Empire: The History of the UK Rocket and Space Programme 1950–1971 (London: Imperial College Press, 2001). For works on the early history of U.K. space policy see, Neil Whyte and Philip Gummett, ‘The Military and Early United Kingdom Space Policy’, Contemporary Record, vol. 8 no. 2 (1994); Neil Whyte and Philip Gummett, ‘Far Beyond the Bounds of Science: The Making of the United Kingdom’s First Space Policy’, Minerva, vol. 35, nol. 2 (1997).6 For an overview of the role of national security space technologies in Anglo-American relations, see Aaron Bateman, ‘Keeping the Technological Edge: The Space Arms Race and Anglo-American Relations in the 1980s’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 33, no. 2 (2022).7 Information security here encompasses the physical infrastructure for securely transmitting sensitive data as well as encryption.8 For background see Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914’, and Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, 75–78.9 Quoted in Whyte and Gummett, UK Space Policy, 142.10 Matthew Jones, The Official History of the U.K. Nuclear Deterrent (Volume I): From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964 (New York: Routledge, 2017), 444.11 Whyte and Gummet, UK Space Policy, 14212 Ibid., 14813 Ibid., 15214 Hill, A Vertical Empire, 93–107.15 ‘TAT-1 Opening Ceremony, September 25, 1956’, History of the Atlantic & Undersea Communications, https://atlantic-cable.com/Cables/1956TAT–1/.16 David J. Whalen, The Origins of Satellite Communications: 1945–1965 (Washington D.C. – Smithsonian Press, 2002), 46–48.17 Hugh Slotten, Beyond Sputnik and the Space Race: The Origins of Global Satellite Communications (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022), 63.18 Ibid., 7719 Ibid., 15120 Ibid., 15221 Ibid22 Quoted in a lecture entitled, ‘Telegraphic Communications’, 1937, MS. Marconi 240, Marconi Archives, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University.23 For an overview of the role of cables in U.K. defense strategy in WWI, see Jonathan Winkler, ‘Information Warfare in World War I’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 73, no. 3 (2009).24 For a comprehensive history of U.K. codebreaking in WWII, see John Ferris, Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020), 223–264.25 For a history of Britain’s secure speech system, see Richard Aldrich, ‘Whitehall Wiring: The Communications-Electronics Security Group and the Struggle for Secure Speech, Public Policy and Administration, vol. 28, no. 2 (2012).26 ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) Defence Satellite Communications’, July 27, 1973, DEFE 13/669, TNA.27 The British Joint Intelligence Committee had determined in 1959 that the Soviet Union possessed the capabilities to interfere with submarine cable communications and to jam wireless transmissions. See Michael Goodman and Huw Dylan, ‘British Intelligence and the Fear of a Soviet Attack on Allied Communications. Cryptologia, 4, vol. 40, no. 1 (2016).28 The U.S. government created the Defense Communications Agency in 1960 to centrally manage U.S. strategic communications networks, see ‘The Creation of DCA: 1947–1960’, DISA, https://www.disa.mil/about/our-history.29 ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) Defence Satellite Communications’, July 27, 1973, DEFE 13/669, TNA.30 ‘Annex – proposed amendments to CISG (61)23’, undated, CAB 21/5408, U.K. National Archives (TNA hereafter).31 Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 75–78.32 David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar: The U.S. Air Force and the Challenges of Military Satellite Communications’, in Beyond the Ionosphere, ed. Andrew Butrica (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 67.33 Note by MoD and MOA in consultation with GPO, ‘Feasibility of Using Intelsat for Military Communications’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.34 Spires and Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar’, 67.35 A satellite could provide eleven tactical-quality voice circuits or five commercial-quality voice circuits, see Spires and Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar’, 67.36 ‘Letter from McNamara to Thorneycroft’, October 14, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.37 Memo from Healey to the PM, ‘Strategic Implications of Space’, November 6, 1964, CAB 21/5445, TNA.38 ‘Report of the Space Review Committee’, September 1965, DEFE 68/83, TNA.39 Notably, the Bondi report underscored Britain’s limited ambitions in space. Clearly, due to the enormous costs associated with space technologies, U.K. officials preferred to leverage Britain’s relationship with the United States to get access to space services.40 Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.41 Britain would retain its relay station in Nairobi until 1966, see memo from chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘Collaboration with the Americans in Military Satellite Communications’, October 26, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.42 Memo from CDS to secretary of state for defence, ‘Military Satellite Communications’, October 20, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.43 G. Plowden, ‘Report of the Bondi Committee’, August 10, 1965, CAB 21/5445, TNA.44 Ibid45 ‘Wireless and Cables’, December 3, year illegible, MS. Marconi 240, Marconi Archives, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University. For an overview of the Imperial Wireless Chain, see Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 130.46 Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.47 Ibid; letter from Healey to McNamara, ‘Military satellite Communications’, November 9, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA; ‘Memorandum for Secretary of State’, March 23, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.48 Memorandum for P.D. Nairne, ‘Background Notes’, February 24, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA. Notably, McNamara was the key U.S. official overseeing negotiations with Britain concerning defense satellite communications. It is not clear to what extent, if any, other senior officials in the Johnson administration were involved.49 ‘Memorandum for secretary of state’, March 23, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.50 Memorandum for the PM, ‘Commonwealth Telecommunications Conference’, May 22, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.51 ‘Memorandum from Tilling (GPO) to 10 Downing’, June 1, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.52 Slotten, Beyond Sputnik, 15053 ‘Letter from G.H. Green to the private secretary for the secretary of state for defence’, October 15, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.54 Letter from Healey to McNamara, ‘Satellite Communications’, January 6, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.55 ‘Letter from McNamara to Healey’, January 27, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.56 Memorandum for the secretary of state, ‘US/UK satellite communications talking points’, April 26, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.57 Note on the Negotiations in Washington 21st/24th March, 1966, April 20, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.58 ‘Note on the Negotiations in Washington 21st/24th March, 1966’, April 20, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.59 Ibid60 ‘Interim U.K. Defence Satellite Communications System’, June 7, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.61 For an overview of de Gaulle’s decision, see Garret Martin, ‘The 1967 Withdrawal from NATO – A Cornerstone of de Gaulle’s Grand Strategy’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, 232–243 (2011).62 For background on the British rationale for withdrawal from ELDO, see John Krige, Angelina Long Callahan, and Ashok Maharaj, NASA in the World: Fifty Years of Collaboration in Space (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 59–63.63 Britain’s pull back from space cooperation with European allies after its failed attempts to enter the European Economic Community in 1963 and 1967 made partnering with the United States on space projects even more vital.64 John Krige details the U.S. aim to use space cooperation as a means of ‘positive disarmament’. See chapter 4 in John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe: U.S. Technological Collaboration and Non-Proliferation (Cambridge: MIT, 2016).65 ‘Editorial Note’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues.66 Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe, 116.67 Ibid68 ‘Report on US/UK Discussions on UK Military Communications Satellite Requirements’, March 21–28, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.69 ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defense Communications Satellite Project’, June 2, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.70 Jonathan Winkler, Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 195–19771 ‘UK/US Satellite Communications Talking Points, undated, DEFE, 13/389, TNA.72 Memorandum by the secretary of state for defence, ‘Draft Overseas Policy and Defence Committee Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, June 17, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.73 ‘Annex A’ in ‘Outline Defence Communications Network Plan 1968–72, February 1, 1967, FCO 19/9, TNA.74 Ibid75 William James, ‘Global Britain’s Strategic Problem East of Suez’, European Journal of International Security, 6, 2021, 180.76 Ibid77 Ibid., 17978 ‘Minutes from Parliament’, March 7, 1966, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1966/mar/07/defence.79 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Policy Staff, ‘The Requirements for Satellite Communications’, October 10, 1969, DEFE 34/130, TNA.80 Ibid81 Ibid82 James, ‘Global Britain’s Strategic Problem East of Suez’, 172.83 Ibid. Secure encrypted voice communications required bandwidth that could not be met by existing high-frequency communications systems.84 Background, ‘European Space Cooperation’, February 19, 1969, FCO 55/348, TNA.85 Ibid86 Ibid87 Ibid88 ‘Defence Satellite Communications − 1974 to 1978’, March 11, 1975, DEFE 72/56, TNA.89 ‘Skynet II replenishment: Brief on the current situation’, May 17, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA. U.K. firms carried out 45% of the development work associated with Skynet-II sub-systems, see ‘Defence Satellite Communications − 1974 to 1978’, March 11, 1975, DEFE 72/56, TNA.90 ‘Airbus’ Golden Jubilee for Skynet Secure Satellite Communications’, Airbus, November 22, 2019, https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2019–11-airbus-golden-jubilee-for-skynet-secure-satellite-communications.91 Minute for defence secretary, ‘Communications Satellites’, undated, DEFE 72/56, TNA.92 Letter from Weinstock to D. G. Rayner, ‘Skynet III’, May 18, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA.93 Ibid94 Note of a meeting in CSA’s room, ‘Satellite Communications’, November 10, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA.95 ‘Satellite Communications’, July 31, 1980, DEFE 19/221, TNA.96 Study for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘The Relative Merits of Satellite and Submarine Cable Communications for Government Long-Distance Communications’, April 11, 1963, DEFE 5/137, TNA.97 Ibid98 Memorandum from BG T Stanbridge, ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) – Defence Satellite Communications’, May 30, 1973, DEFE 72/56, TNA.99 For a history of Corporate, see Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War (New York: Routledge, 2005) and Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 2: War and Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2004).100 Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 81.101 According to a U.S. report, Britain was using 21 communications channels on the American DSCS network. See Memorandum from the acting Director of the Defense communications Agency (Layman) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, ‘US Communications Satellite Support to UK Naval Forces’, April 9, 1982, Foreign Relations of the United States 1981–1988, vol. XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984.102 Memorandum from B.C. Farrer, ‘MoD Working Party on the Way Ahead in Space’, July 5, 1983, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.103 Ilaria Parisi, ‘France’s Reaction Towards the SDI: Transforming a Strategic Threat into a Technological Opportunity’, in NATO and the Strategic Defence Initiative, ed. Luc-Andre Brunet (New York: Routledge, 2022), 121–124.104 ‘Policy for the Use of Space for Defence’, April 22, 1981, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.105 Background paper attached to minute ‘Space-Forthcoming Meeting Between S of S and Ministers of State, DTI’, sent from W. D. Reeves, November 12, 1984, DEFE 13/2066, TNA.106 For more details concerning Zircon, see Ferris, Behind the Enigma, 322. Through Zircon the British would have also demonstrated to their U.S. counterparts that they could develop space-based intelligence systems that could contribute to their intelligence partnership.107 Even though Skynet-3 had been cancelled, the MoD designated the new series the fourth generation since the technology was now more advanced than that planned for Skynet-3.108 A review of U.K. military requirements called for ‘greater operational capability in the mid-1980s, including EHF [extremely high frequency], SHF [super high frequency], UHF [ultra high frequency], and resistance to ECM [electronic counter measures]’. This is to be met by a ten-year (1985–95) British Skynet IV project’. See ‘Policy for the Use of Space for Defence’, April 22, 1981, DEFE 69/1204, TNA. For a detailed explanation of the rationale for a third Skynet-4 satellite, see ‘NGASR 7123 – Skynet 4 Stage 1 Programme: Procurement of Third Satellite (Skynet 4C)’, June 12, 1983, DEFE 13/2066, TNA and ‘Skynet 4C: Operational Justification’, November 28, 1984, DEFE 24/2905, TNA.109 Memorandum from E.J. Risness, ‘Defence Space Policy’, August 23, 1982, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.110 Ibid111 ‘Defence Space Policy (draft)’, August, 1982, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.112 Ibid113 ‘NGASR 7123 – Skynet 4 Stage 1 Programme: Procurement of Third Satellite (Skynet 4C)’, June 12, 1983, DEFE 13/2066, TNA.114 Minute from Howe to Thatcher, ‘Launcher for Skynet 4’, December 12, 1983, PREM 19/2067, TNA.115 Ibid116 Ibid117 ‘Skynet 5: A Proven and Trusted Partnership’, Airbus, https://www.airbus.com/en/products-services/defence/milsatcom/skynet-5. There are plans underway for the sixth generation as well, see ‘MoD Contracts Airbus for Skynet Telecoms Satellite’, BBC, July 20, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-53476881.Additional informationNotes on contributorsAaron BatemanAaron Bateman is an assistant professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University. He is the author of the forthcoming book Weapons in Space: Technology, Politics, and the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative (MIT Press, 2024).
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.00
自引率
5.30%
发文量
40
期刊介绍: The defining feature of The Journal of Strategic Studies is its commitment to multi-disciplinary approach. The editors welcome articles that challenge our historical understanding of man"s efforts to achieve political ends through the application of military and diplomatic means; articles on contemporary security and theoretical controversies of enduring value; and of course articles that explicitly combine the historical and theoretical approaches to the study of modern warfare, defence policy and modern strategy. In addition to a well-established review section, The Journal of Strategic Studies offers its diverse readership a wide range of "special issues" and "special sections".
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