我们对病人的责任是:要么保持能力,要么停止行医。

IF 1.7 Q2 EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES AEM Education and Training Pub Date : 2023-11-22 DOI:10.1002/aet2.10916
Sally A. Santen MD, PhD, Robin R. Hemphill MD, MPH, Martin Pusic MD, PhD, Stephen John Cico MD, MEd, Meg Wolff MD, MHPE, Chris Merritt MD, MHPE
{"title":"我们对病人的责任是:要么保持能力,要么停止行医。","authors":"Sally A. Santen MD, PhD,&nbsp;Robin R. Hemphill MD, MPH,&nbsp;Martin Pusic MD, PhD,&nbsp;Stephen John Cico MD, MEd,&nbsp;Meg Wolff MD, MHPE,&nbsp;Chris Merritt MD, MHPE","doi":"10.1002/aet2.10916","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>On March 30, 1981, after President Reagan was shot in the chest by John Hinckley, he was taken to the hospital and required a chest tube. Rumor has it, a department chair stepped up to perform the procedure, hitting the intercostal artery in the process, necessitating a blood transfusion. As well-trained interns know, you place a chest tube above the rib; when you go below the rib, you may hit the intercostal artery. Although, this story may be urban legend, it resonates because it speaks to an important lesson—if you need a procedure, you want the person who does it the most frequently—the senior resident, junior attending, or specialized consultant. Most likely you do not want the department chair, associate dean, physician-scientist, part-time physician moving to retirement, or others with less clinical practice. Medical errors are common. Procedural complications are an important cause of adverse events, resulting in patient discomfort, longer hospital stays, and higher costs.<span><sup>1</sup></span> These complications result in nearly 10% of hospital-wide adverse events; nearly half are considered preventable.<span><sup>2</sup></span></p><p>For the past several years, our emergency medicine (EM) clinical practice has been about 20% of our time, less than 1 day a week. While we may be reluctant to admit it, the last lumbar puncture any of us performed was over a year ago, our last intubation was perhaps years ago, and a cricothyrotomy was in residency over 25 years ago. We practice in teaching hospitals, and have supervised these procedures, but have not recently performed them. While we believe that we are in equipoise, providing excellent patient care based on years of experience and balancing infrequent procedural performance, could we still do these procedures? Probably yes, maybe not perfectly, and at what risk to the patient? Yet, we still practice, and we accept the responsibility to provide optimal care for our patients. Moreover, our identity as competent emergency physicians is important and contributes to our professional credibility.</p><p>Emergency physicians have a continuous responsibility to maintain competency. Yet medical care is rapidly changing; new procedures such as ultrasound-guided nerve blocks become standard of care. There are new diseases such as COVID and new treatments such as thrombectomy for stroke. Further, about half of patients' medications did not exist in medical school and may not know the interactions and side effects. In addition, there are numerous high-acuity low opportunity (HALO) procedures (e.g., thoracotomy, lateral canthotomy, and transvenous pacer)<span><sup>3</sup></span> and HALO patient presentations (e.g., neonatal shock, thyroid storm). So how do EM physicians maintain their knowledge and competencies, much less extend these into emerging procedures, medications, diseases, and treatments?</p><p>Maintenance of skills is important; crucial questions remain unanswered. <i>What must EM physicians be competent in</i>,<span><sup>4</sup></span> <i>for how long, and how?</i> Where an expansive range of competencies are considered centrally important, it is clear not every practitioner maintains every competency. Achieving, assuring, and maintaining competency comes at a cost in time, effort, and perseverance for the individual and the system.</p><p>Medical training cycles through periods of rapid learning with large gains in performance and expertise, especially during transitions to clerkship, residency, and practice (Figure 1).<span><sup>5, 6</sup></span> Learning is accelerated by spaced repetition,<span><sup>7</sup></span> interleaving,<span><sup>8</sup></span> deliberate practice with feedback,<span><sup>9</sup></span> and metacognitive techniques such as informed self-assessment<span><sup>10</sup></span> and deep reflection.<span><sup>11</sup></span> When formal training ceases, expert performance can eventually degrade. The rate of forgetting depends on a number of factors including the skill complexity, opportunities for practice, and system support.<span><sup>5, 6</sup></span> Strong learning techniques can delay or lessen the forgetting curve, as does continued exposure through practice.</p><p>Training for adaptive expertise mitigates some of forgetting effects. Educational designs emphasizing deep mechanistic understanding and an ability to cope with meaningful variation in patient care allows a physician to more ably approach problems for which they do not have a fully routinized approach.<span><sup>12</sup></span> This acknowledges that a procedure that one provider has fully routinized, another provider might need to invoke their ability to innovate in the moment (i.e., adapt).<span><sup>6</sup></span> However, while experience may provide better adaptive approaches, this can only take them so far, as our President Reagan chest tube story shows.</p><p>In this perspective we raise questions of forgetting curves and the responsibility of managing procedural skills and clinical competency. Can the balance tip in a way that results in harm for patients? And what can we do to mitigate and protect? We propose four approaches.</p><p>First, there is the external mandate for lifelong learning, continuing medical education credits for renewal of licensure, and the sticky problem of maintenance of certification and recertification examinations.<span><sup>13</sup></span> While these are often unpopular and potentially ineffective, the underlying principle is solid. Physicians will forget what is not used, need to refresh core knowledge, and must learn the new knowledge and skills. Essential in this process is that physicians become master adaptive learners<span><sup>14, 15</sup></span> who must recognize what they do not know, identify gaps, plan, and implement effective learning. Beyond mandatory CME and recertification, EM physicians have a responsibility to continue to learn for the benefit of their patients.</p><p>The second approach invokes the responsibility of <i>all</i> physicians to maintain competency by retraining specifically for HALO and new procedures. Simulation is widely available but may not be used by practicing physicians and may not be considered part of a simulation centers' budget and mission. These opportunities allow physicians to refresh their procedural memory as well as develop familiarity with new equipment and methods. Some departments have faculty- specific voluntary procedural training or mandate training, such as annual procedural sedation certification.<span><sup>16, 17</sup></span> There are national EM courses in domains such as airway, ultrasound, and trauma that facilitate learning.</p><p>The third approach is that physicians can choose to limit their practice by working in settings where there is less exposure to the procedures or content in which they are no longer expert. EM physicians can work in lower acuity areas or locations with double coverage with reliance on colleagues as needed, locations with support of a procedural or ED/intensive care unit team, or adult hospitals (allow pediatric skills to decay). These options leverage alignment with systems-based approaches that maximize collective competence.<span><sup>18</sup></span> The optimal solution is likely to differ between settings and EM providers.<span><sup>19</sup></span></p><p>Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the twin-mirror of self-assessment and reflection. Self-assessment can be poor, as shown by Dunning and Kruger's paper “Unskilled and unaware: How difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments.”<span><sup>20</sup></span> Physicians may not realize or admit that they have lost competency. This threat to our professional identity—that of the competent physician—creates internal conflict. Emergency physicians must seek external metrics to provide informed self-assessment.<span><sup>10, 21</sup></span> This requires us to understand how we ascend to expertise—the time, practice, and self-challenge that achieves peak performance. We must then also understand that when we cease to do the things that maintain that expertise, our experience can take us only so far, and performance may decline unless deliberate retraining steps are taken.</p><p>In the face of forgetting curves, HALO procedures and cases, and expanding knowledge there is a responsibility of the medical profession to ensure that patients come first.<span><sup>22</sup></span> We must place patient safety first and take this responsibility to self-assess and self-reflect—and importantly, to <i>change</i>—either ourselves or our practice if we recognize that the safety of patients is threatened by our decay in competence.</p><p>More importantly, data-informed systems must be created to ensure that the patient safety/physician competency tension is not driven solely by the individual. Most of us know a colleague whose care we do not trust for patients or our family members or who we dread signing out to.<span><sup>23-25</sup></span> The system must be intentional about identifying these providers and working to improve their care (Table 1). The chair in the opening story should not have been in the situation to place a chest tube if he had not performed them regularly. Health care systems need to develop proactive processes of continuous review of physician competency such as errors, near-miss, peer concerns, low volume of specific cases, safety events, complications, patient-reported outcomes, and patient and staff complaints. These metrics might launch a more extensive review of practice including peer assessments, direct observation, chart review, knowledge analysis, cognitive testing, procedural testing, and other methods of competency assessment.<span><sup>26</sup></span> The challenge is that this may feel punitive<span><sup>27</sup></span> and colleagues and systems are hesitant to trigger such a review out of collegial compassion and concern that there is not sufficient “evidence.” We need a proactive system that faces these issues directly with regular reviews of practice or mandatory competency assessments. Beyond surveillance, the health system must provide proactive, individualized, transparent training opportunities that mitigate skill attrition before it takes hold. Further, there must be recognition of the time and resources it takes to retain skills and this should be supported by health systems. Our responsibility is to maintain competency. The locus of responsibility for ensuring competency must be shared between the individual and the health system to provide safe and effective care for patients.</p><p>The authors declare no conflicts of interest. Robin Hemphill is an employee of the Veteran's Health Administration (VHA). These views are her own and do not represent the views of the VHA.</p>","PeriodicalId":37032,"journal":{"name":"AEM Education and Training","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10664403/pdf/","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Our responsibility to patients: Maintain competency or … stop practicing\",\"authors\":\"Sally A. Santen MD, PhD,&nbsp;Robin R. Hemphill MD, MPH,&nbsp;Martin Pusic MD, PhD,&nbsp;Stephen John Cico MD, MEd,&nbsp;Meg Wolff MD, MHPE,&nbsp;Chris Merritt MD, MHPE\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/aet2.10916\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>On March 30, 1981, after President Reagan was shot in the chest by John Hinckley, he was taken to the hospital and required a chest tube. Rumor has it, a department chair stepped up to perform the procedure, hitting the intercostal artery in the process, necessitating a blood transfusion. As well-trained interns know, you place a chest tube above the rib; when you go below the rib, you may hit the intercostal artery. Although, this story may be urban legend, it resonates because it speaks to an important lesson—if you need a procedure, you want the person who does it the most frequently—the senior resident, junior attending, or specialized consultant. Most likely you do not want the department chair, associate dean, physician-scientist, part-time physician moving to retirement, or others with less clinical practice. Medical errors are common. Procedural complications are an important cause of adverse events, resulting in patient discomfort, longer hospital stays, and higher costs.<span><sup>1</sup></span> These complications result in nearly 10% of hospital-wide adverse events; nearly half are considered preventable.<span><sup>2</sup></span></p><p>For the past several years, our emergency medicine (EM) clinical practice has been about 20% of our time, less than 1 day a week. While we may be reluctant to admit it, the last lumbar puncture any of us performed was over a year ago, our last intubation was perhaps years ago, and a cricothyrotomy was in residency over 25 years ago. We practice in teaching hospitals, and have supervised these procedures, but have not recently performed them. While we believe that we are in equipoise, providing excellent patient care based on years of experience and balancing infrequent procedural performance, could we still do these procedures? Probably yes, maybe not perfectly, and at what risk to the patient? Yet, we still practice, and we accept the responsibility to provide optimal care for our patients. Moreover, our identity as competent emergency physicians is important and contributes to our professional credibility.</p><p>Emergency physicians have a continuous responsibility to maintain competency. Yet medical care is rapidly changing; new procedures such as ultrasound-guided nerve blocks become standard of care. There are new diseases such as COVID and new treatments such as thrombectomy for stroke. Further, about half of patients' medications did not exist in medical school and may not know the interactions and side effects. In addition, there are numerous high-acuity low opportunity (HALO) procedures (e.g., thoracotomy, lateral canthotomy, and transvenous pacer)<span><sup>3</sup></span> and HALO patient presentations (e.g., neonatal shock, thyroid storm). So how do EM physicians maintain their knowledge and competencies, much less extend these into emerging procedures, medications, diseases, and treatments?</p><p>Maintenance of skills is important; crucial questions remain unanswered. <i>What must EM physicians be competent in</i>,<span><sup>4</sup></span> <i>for how long, and how?</i> Where an expansive range of competencies are considered centrally important, it is clear not every practitioner maintains every competency. Achieving, assuring, and maintaining competency comes at a cost in time, effort, and perseverance for the individual and the system.</p><p>Medical training cycles through periods of rapid learning with large gains in performance and expertise, especially during transitions to clerkship, residency, and practice (Figure 1).<span><sup>5, 6</sup></span> Learning is accelerated by spaced repetition,<span><sup>7</sup></span> interleaving,<span><sup>8</sup></span> deliberate practice with feedback,<span><sup>9</sup></span> and metacognitive techniques such as informed self-assessment<span><sup>10</sup></span> and deep reflection.<span><sup>11</sup></span> When formal training ceases, expert performance can eventually degrade. The rate of forgetting depends on a number of factors including the skill complexity, opportunities for practice, and system support.<span><sup>5, 6</sup></span> Strong learning techniques can delay or lessen the forgetting curve, as does continued exposure through practice.</p><p>Training for adaptive expertise mitigates some of forgetting effects. Educational designs emphasizing deep mechanistic understanding and an ability to cope with meaningful variation in patient care allows a physician to more ably approach problems for which they do not have a fully routinized approach.<span><sup>12</sup></span> This acknowledges that a procedure that one provider has fully routinized, another provider might need to invoke their ability to innovate in the moment (i.e., adapt).<span><sup>6</sup></span> However, while experience may provide better adaptive approaches, this can only take them so far, as our President Reagan chest tube story shows.</p><p>In this perspective we raise questions of forgetting curves and the responsibility of managing procedural skills and clinical competency. Can the balance tip in a way that results in harm for patients? And what can we do to mitigate and protect? We propose four approaches.</p><p>First, there is the external mandate for lifelong learning, continuing medical education credits for renewal of licensure, and the sticky problem of maintenance of certification and recertification examinations.<span><sup>13</sup></span> While these are often unpopular and potentially ineffective, the underlying principle is solid. Physicians will forget what is not used, need to refresh core knowledge, and must learn the new knowledge and skills. Essential in this process is that physicians become master adaptive learners<span><sup>14, 15</sup></span> who must recognize what they do not know, identify gaps, plan, and implement effective learning. Beyond mandatory CME and recertification, EM physicians have a responsibility to continue to learn for the benefit of their patients.</p><p>The second approach invokes the responsibility of <i>all</i> physicians to maintain competency by retraining specifically for HALO and new procedures. Simulation is widely available but may not be used by practicing physicians and may not be considered part of a simulation centers' budget and mission. These opportunities allow physicians to refresh their procedural memory as well as develop familiarity with new equipment and methods. Some departments have faculty- specific voluntary procedural training or mandate training, such as annual procedural sedation certification.<span><sup>16, 17</sup></span> There are national EM courses in domains such as airway, ultrasound, and trauma that facilitate learning.</p><p>The third approach is that physicians can choose to limit their practice by working in settings where there is less exposure to the procedures or content in which they are no longer expert. EM physicians can work in lower acuity areas or locations with double coverage with reliance on colleagues as needed, locations with support of a procedural or ED/intensive care unit team, or adult hospitals (allow pediatric skills to decay). These options leverage alignment with systems-based approaches that maximize collective competence.<span><sup>18</sup></span> The optimal solution is likely to differ between settings and EM providers.<span><sup>19</sup></span></p><p>Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the twin-mirror of self-assessment and reflection. Self-assessment can be poor, as shown by Dunning and Kruger's paper “Unskilled and unaware: How difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments.”<span><sup>20</sup></span> Physicians may not realize or admit that they have lost competency. This threat to our professional identity—that of the competent physician—creates internal conflict. Emergency physicians must seek external metrics to provide informed self-assessment.<span><sup>10, 21</sup></span> This requires us to understand how we ascend to expertise—the time, practice, and self-challenge that achieves peak performance. We must then also understand that when we cease to do the things that maintain that expertise, our experience can take us only so far, and performance may decline unless deliberate retraining steps are taken.</p><p>In the face of forgetting curves, HALO procedures and cases, and expanding knowledge there is a responsibility of the medical profession to ensure that patients come first.<span><sup>22</sup></span> We must place patient safety first and take this responsibility to self-assess and self-reflect—and importantly, to <i>change</i>—either ourselves or our practice if we recognize that the safety of patients is threatened by our decay in competence.</p><p>More importantly, data-informed systems must be created to ensure that the patient safety/physician competency tension is not driven solely by the individual. Most of us know a colleague whose care we do not trust for patients or our family members or who we dread signing out to.<span><sup>23-25</sup></span> The system must be intentional about identifying these providers and working to improve their care (Table 1). The chair in the opening story should not have been in the situation to place a chest tube if he had not performed them regularly. Health care systems need to develop proactive processes of continuous review of physician competency such as errors, near-miss, peer concerns, low volume of specific cases, safety events, complications, patient-reported outcomes, and patient and staff complaints. These metrics might launch a more extensive review of practice including peer assessments, direct observation, chart review, knowledge analysis, cognitive testing, procedural testing, and other methods of competency assessment.<span><sup>26</sup></span> The challenge is that this may feel punitive<span><sup>27</sup></span> and colleagues and systems are hesitant to trigger such a review out of collegial compassion and concern that there is not sufficient “evidence.” We need a proactive system that faces these issues directly with regular reviews of practice or mandatory competency assessments. Beyond surveillance, the health system must provide proactive, individualized, transparent training opportunities that mitigate skill attrition before it takes hold. Further, there must be recognition of the time and resources it takes to retain skills and this should be supported by health systems. Our responsibility is to maintain competency. The locus of responsibility for ensuring competency must be shared between the individual and the health system to provide safe and effective care for patients.</p><p>The authors declare no conflicts of interest. Robin Hemphill is an employee of the Veteran's Health Administration (VHA). These views are her own and do not represent the views of the VHA.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":37032,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"AEM Education and Training\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10664403/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"AEM Education and Training\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/aet2.10916\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AEM Education and Training","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/aet2.10916","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

1981年3月30日,里根总统被约翰·欣克利射中胸部,被送往医院,需要插胸管。有传言说,一位系主任在进行手术时,伤到了肋间动脉,需要输血。训练有素的实习生都知道,在肋骨上方插一根胸管;当你进入肋骨下方时,你可能会碰到肋间动脉。虽然这个故事可能是都市传说,但它却引起了人们的共鸣,因为它告诉了我们一个重要的教训——如果你需要一个手术,你应该找做得最多的人——高级住院医生、初级主治医生或专业顾问。最有可能的是,你不希望系主任、副院长、内科科学家、兼职医生退休,或者其他临床实践较少的人。医疗事故很常见。手术并发症是不良事件的重要原因,会导致患者不适、住院时间延长和费用增加这些并发症导致近10%的全院不良事件;近一半被认为是可以预防的。在过去的几年里,我们的急诊医学(EM)临床实践约占我们时间的20%,每周不到1天。虽然我们可能不愿意承认,但我们最后一次做腰椎穿刺是在一年前,我们最后一次插管可能是在几年前,环状甲状腺切开术是在25年前。我们在教学医院实习,并监督这些程序,但最近没有实施过。虽然我们相信我们处于平衡状态,根据多年的经验提供出色的患者护理,并平衡不常见的手术表现,但我们还能做这些手术吗?也许是,也许不完全是,对病人有什么风险?然而,我们仍然在实践,我们接受为病人提供最佳护理的责任。此外,我们作为称职的急诊医生的身份很重要,有助于我们的专业信誉。急诊医生有持续的责任来保持能力。然而,医疗保健正在迅速改变;超声引导神经阻滞等新手术成为标准治疗方法。有新疾病,如COVID,也有新的治疗方法,如中风的血栓切除术。此外,约有一半患者的药物在医学院不存在,可能不知道相互作用和副作用。此外,还有许多高灵敏度低机会(HALO)手术(例如,开胸、侧眦切开术和经静脉起搏器)3和HALO患者的表现(例如,新生儿休克、甲状腺风暴)。那么,急诊医生如何保持他们的知识和能力,更不用说将这些知识和能力扩展到新兴的程序、药物、疾病和治疗中了?保持技能很重要;关键问题仍未得到解答。急诊医生必须胜任哪些工作,胜任多长时间,以及如何胜任?当广泛的能力范围被认为是中心重要的时候,很明显不是每个从业者都保持每一种能力。对个人和系统而言,实现、保证和维持能力需要付出时间、努力和毅力的代价。通过快速学习的医学培训周期,在表现和专业知识方面取得了巨大的进步,特别是在向见习、住院医师和实习过渡的过程中(图1)。通过间隔重复、穿插练习、有反馈的刻意练习9和元认知技术,如知情的自我评估10和深度反思,可以加速学习当正式训练停止时,专家的表现最终会下降。遗忘的速度取决于许多因素,包括技能的复杂性、练习的机会和系统支持。强大的学习技巧可以延迟或减少遗忘曲线,就像通过练习持续接触一样。适应性专业技能培训减轻了一些遗忘效应。教育设计强调深刻的机械理解和处理病人护理中有意义的变化的能力,使医生能够更熟练地处理他们没有完全常规方法的问题这承认一个提供者已经完全常规化的过程,另一个提供者可能需要调用他们的创新能力(即,适应)然而,尽管经验可能会提供更好的适应性方法,但这也只能到此为止,正如我们的里根总统胸管故事所显示的那样。从这个角度来看,我们提出了遗忘曲线和管理程序技能和临床能力的责任的问题。天平的倾斜会对病人造成伤害吗?我们能做些什么来减轻和保护?我们提出了四种方法。 首先,存在终身学习的外部任务,继续医学教育学分用于更新执照,以及维持认证和重新认证考试的棘手问题虽然这些通常不受欢迎,而且可能无效,但基本原则是坚实的。医生会忘记没有用过的东西,需要更新核心知识,并且必须学习新的知识和技能。在这个过程中,医生必须成为适应性学习的大师14,15,他们必须认识到自己不知道的东西,找出差距,计划并实施有效的学习。除了强制性的CME和重新认证,急诊医生有责任继续学习,以造福患者。第二种方法要求所有医生都有责任通过对HALO和新程序进行再培训来保持能力。模拟是广泛可用的,但可能不被执业医生使用,也可能不被认为是模拟中心预算和任务的一部分。这些机会使医生能够刷新他们的程序记忆,并熟悉新的设备和方法。有些院系有专门针对教员的自愿程序性培训或强制性培训,如年度程序性镇静认证。16,17在气道,超声和创伤等领域有国家EM课程,以促进学习。第三种方法是,医生可以选择限制他们的实践,在他们不再擅长的程序或内容较少接触的环境中工作。急诊医生可以在低视力区域或双重覆盖的地方工作,根据需要依靠同事,有手术或急诊科/重症监护室团队支持的地方,或成人医院(允许儿科技能衰退)。这些选择利用基于系统的方法来最大化集体能力最佳解决方案可能因设置和EM提供商而异。最后,或许也是最重要的一点,是自我评价和自我反省的“双镜”。自我评估可能很差,正如邓宁和克鲁格的论文《缺乏技能和不了解:认识到自己的无能是如何导致自我评估膨胀的》所显示的那样。医生可能没有意识到或承认他们已经失去了能力。这种对我们专业身份的威胁——对称职医生身份的威胁——造成了内部冲突。急诊医生必须寻求外部指标来提供知情的自我评估。10,21这就要求我们了解如何提升专业技能——时间、练习和自我挑战,从而达到最佳表现。我们还必须明白,当我们停止做那些保持专长的事情时,我们的经验只能带我们到此为止,除非采取深思熟虑的再培训步骤,否则表现可能会下降。面对遗忘曲线,HALO程序和病例,以及不断扩大的知识,医疗专业人员有责任确保病人是第一位的我们必须把病人的安全放在第一位,承担起自我评估和自我反省的责任——更重要的是,如果我们认识到病人的安全受到我们能力衰退的威胁,我们就必须改变我们自己或我们的做法。更重要的是,必须建立基于数据的系统,以确保患者安全/医生能力的紧张关系不只是由个人驱动的。我们大多数人都认识这样的同事,我们不信任他对病人或家人的照顾,或者我们害怕与他签约。23-25系统必须有意识地识别这些提供者,并努力改善他们的护理(表1)。如果开场故事中的主席没有定期执行胸管,他就不应该处于放置胸管的情况。卫生保健系统需要制定积极主动的流程,对医生的能力进行持续审查,如错误、侥幸、同行关注、特定病例数量少、安全事件、并发症、患者报告的结果以及患者和工作人员的投诉。这些度量可能会启动对实践的更广泛的审查,包括同行评估、直接观察、图表审查、知识分析、认知测试、程序测试,以及其他能力评估的方法挑战在于,这可能会让人感觉受到惩罚,而同事和系统出于对学院的同情和对没有足够“证据”的担忧,对触发这样的审查犹豫不决。我们需要一个积极主动的系统,通过定期审查实践或强制能力评估直接面对这些问题。除了监测之外,卫生系统还必须提供主动、个性化、透明的培训机会,在技能流失形成之前减轻其影响。此外,必须认识到保留技能所需的时间和资源,这应得到卫生系统的支持。 我们的责任是保持竞争力。确保能力的责任点必须由个人和卫生系统共同承担,以便为患者提供安全有效的护理。作者声明无利益冲突。罗宾·亨普希尔是退伍军人健康管理局(VHA)的一名雇员。这些观点是她自己的,不代表VHA的观点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

摘要图片

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Our responsibility to patients: Maintain competency or … stop practicing

On March 30, 1981, after President Reagan was shot in the chest by John Hinckley, he was taken to the hospital and required a chest tube. Rumor has it, a department chair stepped up to perform the procedure, hitting the intercostal artery in the process, necessitating a blood transfusion. As well-trained interns know, you place a chest tube above the rib; when you go below the rib, you may hit the intercostal artery. Although, this story may be urban legend, it resonates because it speaks to an important lesson—if you need a procedure, you want the person who does it the most frequently—the senior resident, junior attending, or specialized consultant. Most likely you do not want the department chair, associate dean, physician-scientist, part-time physician moving to retirement, or others with less clinical practice. Medical errors are common. Procedural complications are an important cause of adverse events, resulting in patient discomfort, longer hospital stays, and higher costs.1 These complications result in nearly 10% of hospital-wide adverse events; nearly half are considered preventable.2

For the past several years, our emergency medicine (EM) clinical practice has been about 20% of our time, less than 1 day a week. While we may be reluctant to admit it, the last lumbar puncture any of us performed was over a year ago, our last intubation was perhaps years ago, and a cricothyrotomy was in residency over 25 years ago. We practice in teaching hospitals, and have supervised these procedures, but have not recently performed them. While we believe that we are in equipoise, providing excellent patient care based on years of experience and balancing infrequent procedural performance, could we still do these procedures? Probably yes, maybe not perfectly, and at what risk to the patient? Yet, we still practice, and we accept the responsibility to provide optimal care for our patients. Moreover, our identity as competent emergency physicians is important and contributes to our professional credibility.

Emergency physicians have a continuous responsibility to maintain competency. Yet medical care is rapidly changing; new procedures such as ultrasound-guided nerve blocks become standard of care. There are new diseases such as COVID and new treatments such as thrombectomy for stroke. Further, about half of patients' medications did not exist in medical school and may not know the interactions and side effects. In addition, there are numerous high-acuity low opportunity (HALO) procedures (e.g., thoracotomy, lateral canthotomy, and transvenous pacer)3 and HALO patient presentations (e.g., neonatal shock, thyroid storm). So how do EM physicians maintain their knowledge and competencies, much less extend these into emerging procedures, medications, diseases, and treatments?

Maintenance of skills is important; crucial questions remain unanswered. What must EM physicians be competent in,4 for how long, and how? Where an expansive range of competencies are considered centrally important, it is clear not every practitioner maintains every competency. Achieving, assuring, and maintaining competency comes at a cost in time, effort, and perseverance for the individual and the system.

Medical training cycles through periods of rapid learning with large gains in performance and expertise, especially during transitions to clerkship, residency, and practice (Figure 1).5, 6 Learning is accelerated by spaced repetition,7 interleaving,8 deliberate practice with feedback,9 and metacognitive techniques such as informed self-assessment10 and deep reflection.11 When formal training ceases, expert performance can eventually degrade. The rate of forgetting depends on a number of factors including the skill complexity, opportunities for practice, and system support.5, 6 Strong learning techniques can delay or lessen the forgetting curve, as does continued exposure through practice.

Training for adaptive expertise mitigates some of forgetting effects. Educational designs emphasizing deep mechanistic understanding and an ability to cope with meaningful variation in patient care allows a physician to more ably approach problems for which they do not have a fully routinized approach.12 This acknowledges that a procedure that one provider has fully routinized, another provider might need to invoke their ability to innovate in the moment (i.e., adapt).6 However, while experience may provide better adaptive approaches, this can only take them so far, as our President Reagan chest tube story shows.

In this perspective we raise questions of forgetting curves and the responsibility of managing procedural skills and clinical competency. Can the balance tip in a way that results in harm for patients? And what can we do to mitigate and protect? We propose four approaches.

First, there is the external mandate for lifelong learning, continuing medical education credits for renewal of licensure, and the sticky problem of maintenance of certification and recertification examinations.13 While these are often unpopular and potentially ineffective, the underlying principle is solid. Physicians will forget what is not used, need to refresh core knowledge, and must learn the new knowledge and skills. Essential in this process is that physicians become master adaptive learners14, 15 who must recognize what they do not know, identify gaps, plan, and implement effective learning. Beyond mandatory CME and recertification, EM physicians have a responsibility to continue to learn for the benefit of their patients.

The second approach invokes the responsibility of all physicians to maintain competency by retraining specifically for HALO and new procedures. Simulation is widely available but may not be used by practicing physicians and may not be considered part of a simulation centers' budget and mission. These opportunities allow physicians to refresh their procedural memory as well as develop familiarity with new equipment and methods. Some departments have faculty- specific voluntary procedural training or mandate training, such as annual procedural sedation certification.16, 17 There are national EM courses in domains such as airway, ultrasound, and trauma that facilitate learning.

The third approach is that physicians can choose to limit their practice by working in settings where there is less exposure to the procedures or content in which they are no longer expert. EM physicians can work in lower acuity areas or locations with double coverage with reliance on colleagues as needed, locations with support of a procedural or ED/intensive care unit team, or adult hospitals (allow pediatric skills to decay). These options leverage alignment with systems-based approaches that maximize collective competence.18 The optimal solution is likely to differ between settings and EM providers.19

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the twin-mirror of self-assessment and reflection. Self-assessment can be poor, as shown by Dunning and Kruger's paper “Unskilled and unaware: How difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments.”20 Physicians may not realize or admit that they have lost competency. This threat to our professional identity—that of the competent physician—creates internal conflict. Emergency physicians must seek external metrics to provide informed self-assessment.10, 21 This requires us to understand how we ascend to expertise—the time, practice, and self-challenge that achieves peak performance. We must then also understand that when we cease to do the things that maintain that expertise, our experience can take us only so far, and performance may decline unless deliberate retraining steps are taken.

In the face of forgetting curves, HALO procedures and cases, and expanding knowledge there is a responsibility of the medical profession to ensure that patients come first.22 We must place patient safety first and take this responsibility to self-assess and self-reflect—and importantly, to change—either ourselves or our practice if we recognize that the safety of patients is threatened by our decay in competence.

More importantly, data-informed systems must be created to ensure that the patient safety/physician competency tension is not driven solely by the individual. Most of us know a colleague whose care we do not trust for patients or our family members or who we dread signing out to.23-25 The system must be intentional about identifying these providers and working to improve their care (Table 1). The chair in the opening story should not have been in the situation to place a chest tube if he had not performed them regularly. Health care systems need to develop proactive processes of continuous review of physician competency such as errors, near-miss, peer concerns, low volume of specific cases, safety events, complications, patient-reported outcomes, and patient and staff complaints. These metrics might launch a more extensive review of practice including peer assessments, direct observation, chart review, knowledge analysis, cognitive testing, procedural testing, and other methods of competency assessment.26 The challenge is that this may feel punitive27 and colleagues and systems are hesitant to trigger such a review out of collegial compassion and concern that there is not sufficient “evidence.” We need a proactive system that faces these issues directly with regular reviews of practice or mandatory competency assessments. Beyond surveillance, the health system must provide proactive, individualized, transparent training opportunities that mitigate skill attrition before it takes hold. Further, there must be recognition of the time and resources it takes to retain skills and this should be supported by health systems. Our responsibility is to maintain competency. The locus of responsibility for ensuring competency must be shared between the individual and the health system to provide safe and effective care for patients.

The authors declare no conflicts of interest. Robin Hemphill is an employee of the Veteran's Health Administration (VHA). These views are her own and do not represent the views of the VHA.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
AEM Education and Training
AEM Education and Training Nursing-Emergency Nursing
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
22.20%
发文量
89
期刊最新文献
Evaluating ExpandED: Evaluating the effectiveness of a serious game expansion pack in teaching health professional students about interprofessional care Faculty consensus on competitiveness for the new competency-based emergency medicine standardized letter of evaluation Issue Information Development and implementation of just-in-time curricula for on-shift teaching during times of boarding Educator's blueprint: A how-to guide for creating high-quality slides
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1