最终报价仲裁下的提案趋同与结算

IF 0.9 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-07 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2023.106179
Amy Farmer , Paul Pecorino
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在最终报价仲裁(FOA)下,争议的每一方向仲裁员提交一份提案,如果未能达成协议,仲裁员必须从提交的两份提案中选择一份。关于FOA的一长列研究假设,提交给仲裁员的建议是争议各方的最终谈判立场。这一假设的一个后果是关注提交给仲裁员的建议是否会彼此趋同。然而,目前的做法意味着将和解谈判与提交仲裁员的建议分开。我们使用一个简单的设置来显示提案收敛可以与争议的增加、争议的减少或对争议率没有影响相一致。为了得到充分评价,必须将导致提案趋同的机制嵌入争端内生产生的模型中。理解FOA很重要,因为它是一个广泛使用的程序。这些用途包括美国和加拿大电信行业的劳资纠纷以及价格纠纷。
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Proposal convergence and settlement under final offer arbitration

Under final offer arbitration (FOA), each party to the dispute submits a proposal to the arbitrator who must choose one of the two submitted proposals in the event an agreement is not reached. A long line of research on FOA has assumed that the submitted proposals to the arbitrator are the final bargaining positions of the parties to the dispute. One consequence of this assumption has been a focus on whether proposals submitted to the arbitrator converge towards one another. However, current practice implies a separation between settlement negotiations and proposals submitted to the arbitrator. We use a simple setting to show that proposal convergence can be consistent with an increase in disputes, a decrease in disputes or no effect on the dispute rate. In order to be fully evaluated, mechanisms which lead to proposal convergence must be embedded in a model in which disputes arise endogenously. Understanding FOA is important because it is a widely used procedure. These uses include labor disputes as well as pricing disputes in the telecommunications industries of the United States and Canada.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
18.20%
发文量
38
审稿时长
48 days
期刊介绍: The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.
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