Abigail Ferguson, Nellie Lew, Michael Lipsitz, Devesh Raval
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Economics at the FTC: Spatial Demand, Veterinary Hospital Mergers, Rulemaking, and Noncompete Agreements
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission enforces federal competition and consumer protection laws that prevent anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices, and works to advance government policies that protect consumers and promote competition. The FTC’s Bureau of Economics performs economic analysis to support both the enforcement and policy activities of the Commission. This article discusses several examples of these activities. We first discuss some work our economists have done on spatial considerations in demand estimation, and then present an analytical approach that has been developed to assess consumer choice between service providers with the use of data on geographic variation in the location of the customers of two merging service providers. We apply this technique in the context of the analysis of the competitive effects of a merger of veterinary hospitals. Next, we discuss an important tool in the FTC’s arsenal: rulemaking. We describe the benefits and costs of rulemaking, the rulemaking process, and the role of economic analysis in that process, and then highlight recent FTC rulemaking activities and the economic analysis of a proposed rulemaking that would ban employers from imposing non-compete clauses in employment contracts.
期刊介绍:
New Online Manuscript Submission System The Review of Industrial Organization publishes research papers on all aspects of industrial organization, broadly defined. A main focus is on competition and monopoly, in their many forms and processes and their effects on efficiency, innovation, and social conditions. Topics may range from the internal organization of enterprises to wide international comparisons.
The Review is also increasing its interest in papers on public policies such as antitrust, regulation, deregulation, public enterprise, and privatization. Papers may deal with any economic sectors and any developed economies.
The Review continues its primary interest in ideas that can be verified by econometric evidence, case studies, or other real conditions. But the Review also seeks papers that advance significant theories of industrial organization and policy. Papers using abstract techniques and econometric tests should present the methods and analysis in plain enough English so that non-specialist readers can evaluate the content.
The Review welcomes submissions from any source, and the Editors will make every effort to have papers reviewed quickly and to give prompt decisions. The Editors will also seek to arrange symposia on specific topics, and they are open to proposals for grouped papers. They also welcome shorter notes and commentaries on topics of interest to the profession.
Officially cited as: Rev Ind Organ