照亮黑暗的图案

IF 3 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Journal of Legal Analysis Pub Date : 2021-03-23 DOI:10.1093/jla/laaa006
Jamie Luguri, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

暗模式是设计者故意混淆用户的用户界面,使用户难以表达他们的实际偏好,或操纵用户采取某些行动。他们通常利用认知偏见,促使在线消费者购买他们不想要的商品和服务,或者透露他们不愿透露的个人信息。这篇文章首次公开证明了暗模式的力量。它讨论了作者的两个大规模实验的结果,在这些实验中,美国消费者的代表性样本暴露在黑暗模式下。在第一项研究中,暴露在温和黑暗模式下的用户签约使用可疑服务的可能性是对照组的两倍多,而暴露在强烈黑暗模式下的用户签约的可能性几乎是对照组的四倍。此外,虽然激进的深色图案在消费者中引起了强烈的反弹,但温和的深色图案却没有。受教育程度较低的受试者明显比受教育程度较高的受试者更容易受到轻度黑色模式的影响。第二项研究确定了似乎最有可能促使消费者做出他们可能后悔或误解的决定的黑暗模式。隐藏信息、欺骗问题和阻碍策略尤其有可能成功地操纵消费者。其他使用煽动性语言或产生从众效应的策略效果还算不错,而还有一些策略,如“必须立即行动”的信息,并没有使消费者更有可能购买昂贵的服务。我们的第二项研究也重复了第一个实验的惊人结果,即当使用深色图案时,提供给消费者的服务成本变得无关紧要。驱动消费者购买决策的是决策架构,而不是价格。文章最后通过审查解决黑暗模式的法律框架。许多黑色图案似乎违反了限制在贸易中使用不公平和欺骗性做法的联邦和州法律。此外,在消费者接触到黑暗模式后签订合同的情况下,根据合同法原则,他们的同意可能被视为无效。本文还建议,暗模式审计成为联邦贸易委员会(FTC)的同意令程序的一部分。深色模式的激增可能是因为公司的专有A-B测试显示它们是利润最大化的。我们展示了如何使用类似的A-B测试来识别那些操纵性很强的黑暗模式,这些模式应该被视为非法。
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Shining a Light on Dark Patterns
Dark patterns are user interfaces whose designers knowingly confuse users, make it difficult for users to express their actual preferences, or manipulate users into taking certain actions. They typically exploit cognitive biases and prompt online consumers to purchase goods and services that they do not want or to reveal personal information they would prefer not to disclose. This article provides the first public evidence of the power of dark patterns. It discusses the results of the authors’ two large-scale experiments in which representative samples of American consumers were exposed to dark patterns. In the first study, users exposed to mild dark patterns were more than twice as likely to sign up for a dubious service as those assigned to the control group, and users in the aggressive dark pattern condition were almost four times as likely to subscribe. Moreover, whereas aggressive dark patterns generated a powerful backlash among consumers, mild dark patterns did not. Less educated subjects were significantly more susceptible to mild dark patterns than their well-educated counterparts. The second study identified the dark patterns that seem most likely to nudge consumers into making decisions that they are likely to regret or misunderstand. Hidden information, trick question, and obstruction strategies were particularly likely to manipulate consumers successfully. Other strategies employing loaded language or generating bandwagon effects worked moderately well, while still others such as “must act now” messages did not make consumers more likely to purchase a costly service. Our second study also replicated a striking result in the first experiment, which is that where dark patterns were employed the cost of the service offered to consumers became immaterial. Decision architecture, not price, drove consumer purchasing decisions. The article concludes by examining legal frameworks for addressing dark patterns. Many dark patterns appear to violate federal and state laws restricting the use of unfair and deceptive practices in trade. Moreover, in those instances where consumers enter into contracts after being exposed to dark patterns, their consent could be deemed voidable under contract law principles. The article also proposes that dark pattern audits become part of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s consent decree process. Dark patterns are presumably proliferating because firms’ proprietary A-B testing has revealed them to be profit maximizing. We show how similar A-B testing can be used to identify those dark patterns that are so manipulative that they ought to be deemed unlawful.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
审稿时长
16 weeks
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