{"title":"可再生能源社区激励的最优投资与公平分担规则","authors":"Almendra Awerkin, Paolo Falbo, Tiziano Vargiolu","doi":"arxiv-2311.12055","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The focus on Renewable Energy Communities (REC) is fastly growing after the\nEuropean Union (EU) has introduced a dedicated regulation in 2018. The idea of\ncreating local groups of citizens, small- and medium-sized companies, and\npublic institutions, which self-produce and self-consume energy from renewable\nsources is at the same time a way to save money for the participants, increase\nefficiency of the energy system, and reduce CO$_2$ emissions. Member states\ninside the EU are fixing more detailed regulations, which describe, how public\nincentives are measured. A natural objective for the incentive policies is of\ncourse to promote the self-consumption of a REC. A sophisticated incentive\npolicy is that based on the so called 'virtual framework'. Under this framework\nall the energy produced by a REC is sold to the market, and all the energy\nconsumed must be paid to retailers: self-consumption occurs only 'virtually',\nthanks a money compensation (paid by a central authority) for every MWh\nproduced and consumed by the REC in the same hour. In this context, two\nproblems have to be solved: the optimal investment in new technologies and a\nfair division of the incentive among the community members. We address these\nproblems by considering a particular type of REC, composed by a representative\nhousehold and a biogas producer, where the potential demand of the community is\ngiven by the household's demand, while both members produce renewable energy.\nWe set the problem as a leader-follower problem: the leader decide how to share\nthe incentive for the self-consumed energy, while the followers decide their\nown optimal installation strategy. We solve the leader's problem by searching\nfor a Nash bargaining solution for the incentive's fair division, while the\nfollower problem is solved by finding the Nash equilibria of a static\ncompetitive game between the members.","PeriodicalId":501487,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - QuantFin - Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal Investment and Fair Sharing Rules of the Incentives for Renewable Energy Communities\",\"authors\":\"Almendra Awerkin, Paolo Falbo, Tiziano Vargiolu\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2311.12055\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The focus on Renewable Energy Communities (REC) is fastly growing after the\\nEuropean Union (EU) has introduced a dedicated regulation in 2018. The idea of\\ncreating local groups of citizens, small- and medium-sized companies, and\\npublic institutions, which self-produce and self-consume energy from renewable\\nsources is at the same time a way to save money for the participants, increase\\nefficiency of the energy system, and reduce CO$_2$ emissions. Member states\\ninside the EU are fixing more detailed regulations, which describe, how public\\nincentives are measured. A natural objective for the incentive policies is of\\ncourse to promote the self-consumption of a REC. A sophisticated incentive\\npolicy is that based on the so called 'virtual framework'. Under this framework\\nall the energy produced by a REC is sold to the market, and all the energy\\nconsumed must be paid to retailers: self-consumption occurs only 'virtually',\\nthanks a money compensation (paid by a central authority) for every MWh\\nproduced and consumed by the REC in the same hour. In this context, two\\nproblems have to be solved: the optimal investment in new technologies and a\\nfair division of the incentive among the community members. We address these\\nproblems by considering a particular type of REC, composed by a representative\\nhousehold and a biogas producer, where the potential demand of the community is\\ngiven by the household's demand, while both members produce renewable energy.\\nWe set the problem as a leader-follower problem: the leader decide how to share\\nthe incentive for the self-consumed energy, while the followers decide their\\nown optimal installation strategy. We solve the leader's problem by searching\\nfor a Nash bargaining solution for the incentive's fair division, while the\\nfollower problem is solved by finding the Nash equilibria of a static\\ncompetitive game between the members.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501487,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - QuantFin - Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - QuantFin - Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2311.12055\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - QuantFin - Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2311.12055","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Optimal Investment and Fair Sharing Rules of the Incentives for Renewable Energy Communities
The focus on Renewable Energy Communities (REC) is fastly growing after the
European Union (EU) has introduced a dedicated regulation in 2018. The idea of
creating local groups of citizens, small- and medium-sized companies, and
public institutions, which self-produce and self-consume energy from renewable
sources is at the same time a way to save money for the participants, increase
efficiency of the energy system, and reduce CO$_2$ emissions. Member states
inside the EU are fixing more detailed regulations, which describe, how public
incentives are measured. A natural objective for the incentive policies is of
course to promote the self-consumption of a REC. A sophisticated incentive
policy is that based on the so called 'virtual framework'. Under this framework
all the energy produced by a REC is sold to the market, and all the energy
consumed must be paid to retailers: self-consumption occurs only 'virtually',
thanks a money compensation (paid by a central authority) for every MWh
produced and consumed by the REC in the same hour. In this context, two
problems have to be solved: the optimal investment in new technologies and a
fair division of the incentive among the community members. We address these
problems by considering a particular type of REC, composed by a representative
household and a biogas producer, where the potential demand of the community is
given by the household's demand, while both members produce renewable energy.
We set the problem as a leader-follower problem: the leader decide how to share
the incentive for the self-consumed energy, while the followers decide their
own optimal installation strategy. We solve the leader's problem by searching
for a Nash bargaining solution for the incentive's fair division, while the
follower problem is solved by finding the Nash equilibria of a static
competitive game between the members.