{"title":"侵权救济是“民事追索权”吗?","authors":"Smith, Stephen A.","doi":"10.1007/s10982-021-09440-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, I examine John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky’s argument, set out in <i>Recognizing Wrongs</i>, that the ‘principle of civil recourse’ explains much (though not all) of tort law. Specifically, I assess their claim that tort remedies are instances of civil recourse. I argue that while this label fits a variety of damages awards (and fits them better than the leading alternatives), it does not fit two significant tort remedies: injunctions and damages for pecuniary losses.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Are Tort Remedies ‘Civil Recourse’?\",\"authors\":\"Smith, Stephen A.\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10982-021-09440-8\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In this article, I examine John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky’s argument, set out in <i>Recognizing Wrongs</i>, that the ‘principle of civil recourse’ explains much (though not all) of tort law. Specifically, I assess their claim that tort remedies are instances of civil recourse. I argue that while this label fits a variety of damages awards (and fits them better than the leading alternatives), it does not fit two significant tort remedies: injunctions and damages for pecuniary losses.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51702,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law and Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law and Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-021-09440-8\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-021-09440-8","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I examine John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky’s argument, set out in Recognizing Wrongs, that the ‘principle of civil recourse’ explains much (though not all) of tort law. Specifically, I assess their claim that tort remedies are instances of civil recourse. I argue that while this label fits a variety of damages awards (and fits them better than the leading alternatives), it does not fit two significant tort remedies: injunctions and damages for pecuniary losses.
期刊介绍：
Law and Philosophy is a forum for the publication of work in law and philosophy which is of common interest to members of the two disciplines of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. It is open to all approaches in both fields and to work in any of the major legal traditions - common law, civil law, or the socialist tradition. The editors of Law and Philosophy encourage papers which exhibit philosophical reflection on the law informed by a knowledge of the law, and legal analysis informed by philosophical methods and principles.
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