{"title":"关于近期形式主义对洞穴论证的回应的一些评论","authors":"Tushar Menon, James Read","doi":"10.1007/s10701-023-00746-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a recent article, Halvorson and Manchak (Br J Philos Sci, Forthcoming) claim that there is no basis for the Hole Argument, because (in a certain sense) hole isometries are unique. This raises two important questions: (a) does their argument succeed?; (b) how does this formalist response to the Hole Argument relate to other recent responses to the Hole Argument in the same tradition—in particular, that of Weatherall (Br J Philos Sci 69(2):329–350, 2018)? In this article, <i>ad</i> (a), we argue that Halvorson and Manchak’s claim does not go through; <i>ad</i> (b), we argue that although one <i>prima facie</i> plausible reading would see Halvorson and Manchak as filling an important hole (no pun intended) in Weatherall’s argument, in fact this reading is implausible; there is no need to supplement Weatherall’s work with Halvorson and Manchak’s results.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":569,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Physics","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10701-023-00746-2.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Some Remarks on Recent Formalist Responses to the Hole Argument\",\"authors\":\"Tushar Menon, James Read\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10701-023-00746-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In a recent article, Halvorson and Manchak (Br J Philos Sci, Forthcoming) claim that there is no basis for the Hole Argument, because (in a certain sense) hole isometries are unique. This raises two important questions: (a) does their argument succeed?; (b) how does this formalist response to the Hole Argument relate to other recent responses to the Hole Argument in the same tradition—in particular, that of Weatherall (Br J Philos Sci 69(2):329–350, 2018)? In this article, <i>ad</i> (a), we argue that Halvorson and Manchak’s claim does not go through; <i>ad</i> (b), we argue that although one <i>prima facie</i> plausible reading would see Halvorson and Manchak as filling an important hole (no pun intended) in Weatherall’s argument, in fact this reading is implausible; there is no need to supplement Weatherall’s work with Halvorson and Manchak’s results.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":569,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Foundations of Physics\",\"volume\":\"54 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10701-023-00746-2.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Foundations of Physics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"101\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10701-023-00746-2\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"物理与天体物理\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Foundations of Physics","FirstCategoryId":"101","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10701-023-00746-2","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"物理与天体物理","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Some Remarks on Recent Formalist Responses to the Hole Argument
In a recent article, Halvorson and Manchak (Br J Philos Sci, Forthcoming) claim that there is no basis for the Hole Argument, because (in a certain sense) hole isometries are unique. This raises two important questions: (a) does their argument succeed?; (b) how does this formalist response to the Hole Argument relate to other recent responses to the Hole Argument in the same tradition—in particular, that of Weatherall (Br J Philos Sci 69(2):329–350, 2018)? In this article, ad (a), we argue that Halvorson and Manchak’s claim does not go through; ad (b), we argue that although one prima facie plausible reading would see Halvorson and Manchak as filling an important hole (no pun intended) in Weatherall’s argument, in fact this reading is implausible; there is no need to supplement Weatherall’s work with Halvorson and Manchak’s results.
期刊介绍:
The conceptual foundations of physics have been under constant revision from the outset, and remain so today. Discussion of foundational issues has always been a major source of progress in science, on a par with empirical knowledge and mathematics. Examples include the debates on the nature of space and time involving Newton and later Einstein; on the nature of heat and of energy; on irreversibility and probability due to Boltzmann; on the nature of matter and observation measurement during the early days of quantum theory; on the meaning of renormalisation, and many others.
Today, insightful reflection on the conceptual structure utilised in our efforts to understand the physical world is of particular value, given the serious unsolved problems that are likely to demand, once again, modifications of the grammar of our scientific description of the physical world. The quantum properties of gravity, the nature of measurement in quantum mechanics, the primary source of irreversibility, the role of information in physics – all these are examples of questions about which science is still confused and whose solution may well demand more than skilled mathematics and new experiments.
Foundations of Physics is a privileged forum for discussing such foundational issues, open to physicists, cosmologists, philosophers and mathematicians. It is devoted to the conceptual bases of the fundamental theories of physics and cosmology, to their logical, methodological, and philosophical premises.
The journal welcomes papers on issues such as the foundations of special and general relativity, quantum theory, classical and quantum field theory, quantum gravity, unified theories, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, cosmology, and similar.