{"title":"康德之后的生活 \"与乔纳斯和梅洛-庞蒂的其他思想","authors":"Rodrigo Benevides, T. E. Feiten, Anthony Chemero","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.104","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines two twenty-first-century developments in the enactive approach in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. The first is the surging interest in Hans Jonas, which begins with Weber and Varela's 'Life After Kant' (2002) and continues up to the present. The second is\n the 'social turn' that the enactive approach has taken, especially after De Jaegher and Di Paolo's (2007) work on participatory sense-making. We look at these two developments through the lens of the problem of other minds. We argue that they are incompatible due to a residual solipsism in\n Jonasian phenomenology. Ultimately, this leaves enactive theory with a choice between embracing Jonas or embracing the social turn in enactive theory. We recommend replacing Jonasian influences with those from the late work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. We argue that enactivism can evade the problem\n of other minds using Merleau-Ponty's discussion of 'flesh' and 'expression'.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Life After 'Life After Kant' Other Minds with Jonas and Merleau-Ponty\",\"authors\":\"Rodrigo Benevides, T. E. Feiten, Anthony Chemero\",\"doi\":\"10.53765/20512201.30.11.104\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines two twenty-first-century developments in the enactive approach in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. The first is the surging interest in Hans Jonas, which begins with Weber and Varela's 'Life After Kant' (2002) and continues up to the present. The second is\\n the 'social turn' that the enactive approach has taken, especially after De Jaegher and Di Paolo's (2007) work on participatory sense-making. We look at these two developments through the lens of the problem of other minds. We argue that they are incompatible due to a residual solipsism in\\n Jonasian phenomenology. Ultimately, this leaves enactive theory with a choice between embracing Jonas or embracing the social turn in enactive theory. We recommend replacing Jonasian influences with those from the late work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. We argue that enactivism can evade the problem\\n of other minds using Merleau-Ponty's discussion of 'flesh' and 'expression'.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47796,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Consciousness Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Consciousness Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.104\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.104","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Life After 'Life After Kant' Other Minds with Jonas and Merleau-Ponty
This paper examines two twenty-first-century developments in the enactive approach in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. The first is the surging interest in Hans Jonas, which begins with Weber and Varela's 'Life After Kant' (2002) and continues up to the present. The second is
the 'social turn' that the enactive approach has taken, especially after De Jaegher and Di Paolo's (2007) work on participatory sense-making. We look at these two developments through the lens of the problem of other minds. We argue that they are incompatible due to a residual solipsism in
Jonasian phenomenology. Ultimately, this leaves enactive theory with a choice between embracing Jonas or embracing the social turn in enactive theory. We recommend replacing Jonasian influences with those from the late work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. We argue that enactivism can evade the problem
of other minds using Merleau-Ponty's discussion of 'flesh' and 'expression'.