{"title":"美国航空公司对强制披露非财务业绩的回应","authors":"Xiaozhe Gu , Nandu J. Nagarajan , Akin Sayrak , Dhinu Srinivasan","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100394","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper provides evidence on US airlines’ responses to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) mandated disclosure of non-financial performance. We find that while all three DOT measures are associated with customer complaints, airlines are more likely to improve on-time performance rather than mishandled bags and ticket over-sales following poor prior period performance. We also find that on-time performance is the only DOT measure that is associated with future accounting performance and is significantly associated with CEO compensation after controlling for financial performance and load factor. We also provide preliminary results to show that airlines incorporate the more informative component of the on-time measure in CEO compensation. Overall, we provide new understanding of how organizations react to the disclosure of non-financial performance and use incentives to improve these measures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"U.S. airline responses to mandated disclosure of non-financial performance\",\"authors\":\"Xiaozhe Gu , Nandu J. Nagarajan , Akin Sayrak , Dhinu Srinivasan\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100394\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This paper provides evidence on US airlines’ responses to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) mandated disclosure of non-financial performance. We find that while all three DOT measures are associated with customer complaints, airlines are more likely to improve on-time performance rather than mishandled bags and ticket over-sales following poor prior period performance. We also find that on-time performance is the only DOT measure that is associated with future accounting performance and is significantly associated with CEO compensation after controlling for financial performance and load factor. We also provide preliminary results to show that airlines incorporate the more informative component of the on-time measure in CEO compensation. Overall, we provide new understanding of how organizations react to the disclosure of non-financial performance and use incentives to improve these measures.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46693,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566923000449\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566923000449","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本文提供了美国航空公司对美国运输部(DOT)规定的非财务业绩披露的回应证据。我们发现,虽然所有三个 DOT 指标都与客户投诉有关,但航空公司更有可能改善准点率,而不是在前期业绩不佳时改善行李处理不当和机票超售。我们还发现,准点率是唯一一个与未来会计业绩相关的 DOT 指标,并且在控制财务业绩和载客率后,与首席执行官薪酬有显著关联。我们还提供了初步结果,表明航空公司在 CEO 薪酬中选择了准点率指标中信息量更大的部分。总之,我们对企业如何应对非财务绩效的披露以及如何利用激励措施来改进这些指标提供了新的理解。
U.S. airline responses to mandated disclosure of non-financial performance
This paper provides evidence on US airlines’ responses to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) mandated disclosure of non-financial performance. We find that while all three DOT measures are associated with customer complaints, airlines are more likely to improve on-time performance rather than mishandled bags and ticket over-sales following poor prior period performance. We also find that on-time performance is the only DOT measure that is associated with future accounting performance and is significantly associated with CEO compensation after controlling for financial performance and load factor. We also provide preliminary results to show that airlines incorporate the more informative component of the on-time measure in CEO compensation. Overall, we provide new understanding of how organizations react to the disclosure of non-financial performance and use incentives to improve these measures.