高层管理团队激励分散对非美国通用会计准则报告的影响

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI:10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100396
Hannah E. Richards , Yuan Shi , Hongkang Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了薪酬绩效敏感度(PPS)在高层管理团队(TMT)中的分布是否会影响公司披露非美国通用会计准则(Non-GAAP)收益的可能性以及非美国通用会计准则(Non-GAAP)收益的质量。管理层薪酬合同旨在激励高管团队成员的个人和整体表现。通过构建这些具有相似 PPS 的合同,负责治理的人员可以加强 TMT 之间的合作。然而,这种合作可能会演变成 TMT 相互串通,做出能为 TMT 带来最高薪酬的公司决策。因此,PPS 的更大分散性可以减少合谋。我们发现,当 PPS 的分散度较高时,公司报告非 GAAP 收益的可能性会降低,非 GAAP 收益披露的质量会提高。这些发现表明,受股价暂时上涨激励较小的高管,会抑制其他高管通过披露非美国通用会计准则盈利和发布低质量的非美国通用会计准则盈利来引起公司审查。此外,我们发现这些对非公认会计原则收益的影响更有可能发生在治理较弱的公司和管理团队合作时间较短的公司。总之,我们的研究为 TMT PPS 的分散性与非 GAAP 盈利决策之间的关联提供了证据。
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The impact of top management team incentive dispersion on Non-GAAP reporting

We examine whether the dispersion of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) amongst the top management team (TMT) impacts the likelihood of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings and the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Management compensation contracts are designed to incentivize executive team members individually and in the aggregate. By structuring these contracts to have similar PPS, those charged with governance can increase collaboration amongst the TMT. However, this collaboration can turn into the TMT colluding to make firm decisions that result in the highest compensation for the TMT. Thus, a greater dispersion of PPS can lead to less collusion. We find that the likelihood of firms reporting non-GAAP earnings decreases and the quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures increases when there is a higher dispersion of PPS. These findings are consistent with executives that are less incentivized by temporary stock price increases suppressing other executives from eliciting firm scrutiny by disclosing non-GAAP earnings and releasing low-quality non-GAAP earnings. Additionally, we find these effects on non-GAAP earnings are more likely to occur in firms with weaker governance and when the management team has a shorter tenure of working together. Overall, our research provides evidence of the association between the dispersion of TMT PPS and non-GAAP earnings decisions.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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