技术官僚还是党派内阁大臣?有区别吗?来自官僚机构认可实验的证据

IF 3.6 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE European Journal of Political Research Pub Date : 2023-12-17 DOI:10.1111/1475-6765.12649
MARIANA BATISTA
{"title":"技术官僚还是党派内阁大臣?有区别吗?来自官僚机构认可实验的证据","authors":"MARIANA BATISTA","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12649","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article analyses how high-level bureaucrats evaluate the leadership of technocrat and partisan cabinet ministers in different roles of policymaking. The argument is that bureaucrats perceive ministers with policy expertise to have a central role in policymaking, especially in policy-directing tasks. Despite their essential contribution to coalition formation, ministers with political experience are negatively evaluated in all policymaking roles. The article presents evidence based on an endorsement experiment conducted with the high-level bureaucracy in Brazil. The results show that ministers with policy experience receive positive evaluations from the bureaucracy in policy formulation and implementation roles but not to carry out political coordination activities with the presidency or the legislature. Ministers with a partisan profile receive negative evaluations in all tasks of the policy process. Exploring the mechanism, we show that the negative assessment of ministers with a partisan profile is maintained even when the profile of the bureaucrat is considered. These results show the negative attitudes of high-level bureaucrats towards partisan ministers in contexts of substantial patronage and corruption and contribute to the debate on ministerial appointments and their implications for policymaking.</p>","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":"63 3","pages":"997-1021"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Technocrat or partisan cabinet ministers: Does it make a difference? Evidence from an endorsement experiment with the bureaucracy\",\"authors\":\"MARIANA BATISTA\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/1475-6765.12649\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This article analyses how high-level bureaucrats evaluate the leadership of technocrat and partisan cabinet ministers in different roles of policymaking. The argument is that bureaucrats perceive ministers with policy expertise to have a central role in policymaking, especially in policy-directing tasks. Despite their essential contribution to coalition formation, ministers with political experience are negatively evaluated in all policymaking roles. The article presents evidence based on an endorsement experiment conducted with the high-level bureaucracy in Brazil. The results show that ministers with policy experience receive positive evaluations from the bureaucracy in policy formulation and implementation roles but not to carry out political coordination activities with the presidency or the legislature. Ministers with a partisan profile receive negative evaluations in all tasks of the policy process. Exploring the mechanism, we show that the negative assessment of ministers with a partisan profile is maintained even when the profile of the bureaucrat is considered. These results show the negative attitudes of high-level bureaucrats towards partisan ministers in contexts of substantial patronage and corruption and contribute to the debate on ministerial appointments and their implications for policymaking.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48273,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Journal of Political Research\",\"volume\":\"63 3\",\"pages\":\"997-1021\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Journal of Political Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.12649\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Political Research","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.12649","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了高层官僚如何评价技术官僚和党派内阁部长在不同决策角色中的领导力。文章的论点是,官僚们认为具有政策专业知识的部长在决策中,尤其是在政策指导任务中发挥着核心作用。尽管具有政治经验的部长对联盟的形成做出了重要贡献,但他们在所有决策角色中的评价都是负面的。文章根据对巴西高层官僚机构进行的认可实验提出了证据。实验结果表明,具有政策经验的部长在政策制定和实施过程中会得到官僚机构的积极评价,但在与总统或立法机构开展政治协调活动时则不会。具有党派背景的部长在政策过程的所有任务中都会受到负面评价。通过对这一机制的探索,我们发现,即使考虑到官僚的情况,对具有党派背景的部长的负面评价也会保持不变。这些结果表明,在存在大量庇护和腐败的情况下,高层官僚对有党派背景的部长持负面态度,这有助于就部长任命及其对决策的影响展开讨论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Technocrat or partisan cabinet ministers: Does it make a difference? Evidence from an endorsement experiment with the bureaucracy

This article analyses how high-level bureaucrats evaluate the leadership of technocrat and partisan cabinet ministers in different roles of policymaking. The argument is that bureaucrats perceive ministers with policy expertise to have a central role in policymaking, especially in policy-directing tasks. Despite their essential contribution to coalition formation, ministers with political experience are negatively evaluated in all policymaking roles. The article presents evidence based on an endorsement experiment conducted with the high-level bureaucracy in Brazil. The results show that ministers with policy experience receive positive evaluations from the bureaucracy in policy formulation and implementation roles but not to carry out political coordination activities with the presidency or the legislature. Ministers with a partisan profile receive negative evaluations in all tasks of the policy process. Exploring the mechanism, we show that the negative assessment of ministers with a partisan profile is maintained even when the profile of the bureaucrat is considered. These results show the negative attitudes of high-level bureaucrats towards partisan ministers in contexts of substantial patronage and corruption and contribute to the debate on ministerial appointments and their implications for policymaking.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
5.70%
发文量
67
期刊介绍: European Journal of Political Research specialises in articles articulating theoretical and comparative perspectives in political science, and welcomes both quantitative and qualitative approaches. EJPR also publishes short research notes outlining ongoing research in more specific areas of research. The Journal includes the Political Data Yearbook, published as a double issue at the end of each volume.
期刊最新文献
Issue Information Issue Information Correction to (When) do electoral mandates set the agenda? Government capacity and mandate responsiveness in Germany Issue Information Patterns of democracy and democratic satisfaction: Results from a comparative conjoint experiment
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1