{"title":"当权的民粹主义及其杂交","authors":"Paula Diehl","doi":"10.1177/01914537231219941","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to the authors of Populism and Civil Society, ‘populism is situated within the democratic imaginary’ but its logic is authoritarian. This article agrees with the first but challenges the second argument by focussing on the question of representation. In the case of ‘populism as government’ the tensions between bottom-up and top-down articulations seem to be more or less resolved by the repression of bottom-up organization, but in so doing, so the argument of this article, populism is mutating into something else. Furthermore, ‘populist dictatorship’ seems to be closer to a dictatorship strategically using populist tools than to an intrinsic populist logic. While I agree with the authors on the authoritarian cases of populism in government, my argument diverges from the book when it comes to populism as government and introduces a discussion about the nature of populism. To this purpose, I first propose a complex definition of populism which understands populism not as the essence, but as one component of hybrid authoritarian formations, thus enabling the disentanglement of populism, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. Second, I examine two components of populism that Arato and Cohen lay out in the book: the specific representation pars pro toto and embodiment. Building on Lefort, I argue that these components are not populist but totalitarian and that the empirical manifestations of populism are always hybrid, mixing populist and authoritarian or even totalitarian components.","PeriodicalId":339635,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Social Criticism","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Populism in power and its hybridizations\",\"authors\":\"Paula Diehl\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/01914537231219941\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"According to the authors of Populism and Civil Society, ‘populism is situated within the democratic imaginary’ but its logic is authoritarian. This article agrees with the first but challenges the second argument by focussing on the question of representation. In the case of ‘populism as government’ the tensions between bottom-up and top-down articulations seem to be more or less resolved by the repression of bottom-up organization, but in so doing, so the argument of this article, populism is mutating into something else. Furthermore, ‘populist dictatorship’ seems to be closer to a dictatorship strategically using populist tools than to an intrinsic populist logic. While I agree with the authors on the authoritarian cases of populism in government, my argument diverges from the book when it comes to populism as government and introduces a discussion about the nature of populism. To this purpose, I first propose a complex definition of populism which understands populism not as the essence, but as one component of hybrid authoritarian formations, thus enabling the disentanglement of populism, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. Second, I examine two components of populism that Arato and Cohen lay out in the book: the specific representation pars pro toto and embodiment. Building on Lefort, I argue that these components are not populist but totalitarian and that the empirical manifestations of populism are always hybrid, mixing populist and authoritarian or even totalitarian components.\",\"PeriodicalId\":339635,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy & Social Criticism\",\"volume\":\"43 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy & Social Criticism\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231219941\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy & Social Criticism","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231219941","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
民粹主义与公民社会》一书的作者认为,"民粹主义位于民主的想象之中",但其逻辑是专制的。本文同意第一种观点,但通过关注代表性问题对第二种观点提出质疑。在 "作为政府的民粹主义 "中,自下而上和自上而下的表述之间的紧张关系似乎或多或少地通过压制自下而上的组织得到了解决,但在这样做的过程中,本文认为,民粹主义正在变异为另一种东西。此外,"民粹主义独裁 "似乎更接近于策略性地使用民粹主义工具的独裁,而非内在的民粹主义逻辑。虽然我同意作者关于民粹主义在政府中的专制案例的观点,但我的论点在涉及作为政府的民粹主义时与书中的观点有所不同,并引入了关于民粹主义本质的讨论。为此,我首先提出了一个复杂的民粹主义定义,该定义将民粹主义理解为混合专制形式的一个组成部分,而非其本质,从而将民粹主义、专制主义和极权主义割裂开来。其次,我研究了阿拉托和科恩在书中阐述的民粹主义的两个组成部分:具体的表述方式(the specific representation pars pro toto)和体现(embodiment)。在莱福特的基础上,我认为这些组成部分不是民粹主义而是极权主义,民粹主义的经验表现总是混合的,混合了民粹主义和专制主义甚至极权主义的成分。
According to the authors of Populism and Civil Society, ‘populism is situated within the democratic imaginary’ but its logic is authoritarian. This article agrees with the first but challenges the second argument by focussing on the question of representation. In the case of ‘populism as government’ the tensions between bottom-up and top-down articulations seem to be more or less resolved by the repression of bottom-up organization, but in so doing, so the argument of this article, populism is mutating into something else. Furthermore, ‘populist dictatorship’ seems to be closer to a dictatorship strategically using populist tools than to an intrinsic populist logic. While I agree with the authors on the authoritarian cases of populism in government, my argument diverges from the book when it comes to populism as government and introduces a discussion about the nature of populism. To this purpose, I first propose a complex definition of populism which understands populism not as the essence, but as one component of hybrid authoritarian formations, thus enabling the disentanglement of populism, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. Second, I examine two components of populism that Arato and Cohen lay out in the book: the specific representation pars pro toto and embodiment. Building on Lefort, I argue that these components are not populist but totalitarian and that the empirical manifestations of populism are always hybrid, mixing populist and authoritarian or even totalitarian components.