{"title":"莱布尼茨的恶人道德心理学","authors":"Evelyn Vargas, Markku Roinila","doi":"10.1017/s0012217323000380","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Our focus in this article concerns Leibniz's views on evil. Our goal is to examine which are the consequences of his conception of moral agency for the moral psychology of the genuinely evil person. For Leibniz, moral failure is an epistemic error since it involves some false practical judgement. Moral maxims may be represented in blind or symbolic cognitions, but then moral agents can misrepresent the evil consequences of their behaviour. Finally, we discuss Leibniz's view on habits that may help virtuous persons strive for perfection but also enable evil persons to continue sinning.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"78 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Leibniz's Moral Psychology of an Evil Person\",\"authors\":\"Evelyn Vargas, Markku Roinila\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/s0012217323000380\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Our focus in this article concerns Leibniz's views on evil. Our goal is to examine which are the consequences of his conception of moral agency for the moral psychology of the genuinely evil person. For Leibniz, moral failure is an epistemic error since it involves some false practical judgement. Moral maxims may be represented in blind or symbolic cognitions, but then moral agents can misrepresent the evil consequences of their behaviour. Finally, we discuss Leibniz's view on habits that may help virtuous persons strive for perfection but also enable evil persons to continue sinning.\",\"PeriodicalId\":11232,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Dialogue\",\"volume\":\"78 4\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Dialogue\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217323000380\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Dialogue","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217323000380","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
Our focus in this article concerns Leibniz's views on evil. Our goal is to examine which are the consequences of his conception of moral agency for the moral psychology of the genuinely evil person. For Leibniz, moral failure is an epistemic error since it involves some false practical judgement. Moral maxims may be represented in blind or symbolic cognitions, but then moral agents can misrepresent the evil consequences of their behaviour. Finally, we discuss Leibniz's view on habits that may help virtuous persons strive for perfection but also enable evil persons to continue sinning.
期刊介绍:
Dialogue is the official journal of the Canadian Philosophical Association. Its purpose is to publish high quality peer-reviewed scholarly articles, book symposia, critical notices, and book reviews in English and in French, in support of the Association"s mandate to promote philosophical scholarship and education. It is open to contributions in all branches of philosophy and from any philosophical perspective. Readers include professional teachers of philosophy, graduate students, and others with an interest in the field. Published for the Canadian Philosophical Association