Pub Date : 2024-05-17DOI: 10.1017/s0012217324000192
Yanick Laverdière
Afin d'encourager la réflexion sur l'impact de la résistance interne dans la théorie du mouvement au XIVe siècle, je propose d'examiner ici l’évolution du concept chez l'universitaire parisien Nicole Oresme. Dans sa Physique, le penseur présente une position qui ne paraît pas tout à fait aboutie et qui soulève quelques questions en lien avec les qualités motrices des différents éléments constituant les mobiles. Cette situation devient d'autant plus évidente lorsque sa position change, plus tard, dans ses questions sur le traité Du ciel. Oresme semble alors encore moins enclin à accepter l'idée d'une résistance interne dans le mouvement.
{"title":"La résistance interne chez Nicole Oresme. Étude sur sa Physique et son commentaire latin au traité Du ciel","authors":"Yanick Laverdière","doi":"10.1017/s0012217324000192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217324000192","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Afin d'encourager la réflexion sur l'impact de la résistance interne dans la théorie du mouvement au XIVe siècle, je propose d'examiner ici l’évolution du concept chez l'universitaire parisien Nicole Oresme. Dans sa Physique, le penseur présente une position qui ne paraît pas tout à fait aboutie et qui soulève quelques questions en lien avec les qualités motrices des différents éléments constituant les mobiles. Cette situation devient d'autant plus évidente lorsque sa position change, plus tard, dans ses questions sur le traité Du ciel. Oresme semble alors encore moins enclin à accepter l'idée d'une résistance interne dans le mouvement.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"45 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140966057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-19DOI: 10.1017/s0012217324000167
Byeong D. Lee
Alberto Voltolini advocates a syncretistic account of fictional entities, asserting that it satisfies all the desiderata for a suitable account of fictional entities. This article presents an alternative account of fictional characters that meets these criteria, while circumventing the problems with Voltolini's account. On my Leibnizian antirealist account, a fictional character can be identified by the collection of predicates attributed to its name. And this account offers the benefit of the bundle theory, avoiding the issue of bearers of fictional names, while also explaining why a fictional character is more than just a collection of predicates.
{"title":"A Leibnizian Antirealist Account of Fictional Characters","authors":"Byeong D. Lee","doi":"10.1017/s0012217324000167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217324000167","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Alberto Voltolini advocates a syncretistic account of fictional entities, asserting that it satisfies all the desiderata for a suitable account of fictional entities. This article presents an alternative account of fictional characters that meets these criteria, while circumventing the problems with Voltolini's account. On my Leibnizian antirealist account, a fictional character can be identified by the collection of predicates attributed to its name. And this account offers the benefit of the bundle theory, avoiding the issue of bearers of fictional names, while also explaining why a fictional character is more than just a collection of predicates.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":" 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140685017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-04DOI: 10.1017/s0012217324000155
Guillaume Bucchioni, Alexandre Declos
David Chalmers argues that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality. In one of its readings, this “virtual realism” states that virtual entities ontologically depend on real digital entities. This article explores that suggestion and offers a novel account of the dependence of the virtual on the digital. Drawing on Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution, we contend that virtual objects should be seen as constituted by digital objects, when these are placed in certain favourable circumstances. We explore the rationale and implications of this view, which we see as a promising form of virtual realism.
{"title":"The Constitution of Virtual Objects","authors":"Guillaume Bucchioni, Alexandre Declos","doi":"10.1017/s0012217324000155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217324000155","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 David Chalmers argues that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality. In one of its readings, this “virtual realism” states that virtual entities ontologically depend on real digital entities. This article explores that suggestion and offers a novel account of the dependence of the virtual on the digital. Drawing on Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution, we contend that virtual objects should be seen as constituted by digital objects, when these are placed in certain favourable circumstances. We explore the rationale and implications of this view, which we see as a promising form of virtual realism.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140741956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-02DOI: 10.1017/s0012217324000118
Camille Ternier
John Rawls est souvent perçu comme un partisan de politiques redistributives visant à apaiser les conséquences d'une économie capitaliste qu'il ne remettrait pas en cause. Cet article montre qu'il s'agit là d'un préjugé et donne un aperçu de la transformation du paysage des entreprises qu'impliquerait une société juste aux yeux de Rawls. Nous commentons les régimes économiques qu'il esquisse dans son œuvre et rappelons que le libéralisme égalitaire a en vérité des implications profondes et souvent insoupçonnées en ce qui concerne la propriété et la gestion des entreprises. Pour Rawls, la démocratie de propriétaires implique que les citoyens possèdent tout au long de leur vie des parts sociales dans les entreprises tandis que le socialisme libéral suppose la nationalisation des moyens de production et la socialisation de leur gestion.
{"title":"Propriété et gestion des entreprises chez Rawls. L’ébauche rawlsienne des entreprises sous la démocratie de propriétaires et sous le socialisme démocratique","authors":"Camille Ternier","doi":"10.1017/s0012217324000118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217324000118","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 John Rawls est souvent perçu comme un partisan de politiques redistributives visant à apaiser les conséquences d'une économie capitaliste qu'il ne remettrait pas en cause. Cet article montre qu'il s'agit là d'un préjugé et donne un aperçu de la transformation du paysage des entreprises qu'impliquerait une société juste aux yeux de Rawls. Nous commentons les régimes économiques qu'il esquisse dans son œuvre et rappelons que le libéralisme égalitaire a en vérité des implications profondes et souvent insoupçonnées en ce qui concerne la propriété et la gestion des entreprises. Pour Rawls, la démocratie de propriétaires implique que les citoyens possèdent tout au long de leur vie des parts sociales dans les entreprises tandis que le socialisme libéral suppose la nationalisation des moyens de production et la socialisation de leur gestion.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"68 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140751561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-02DOI: 10.1017/s0012217324000143
Jacques-Louis Lantoine
L'opposition entre contrainte et libre nécessité a conduit nombre de commentateurs de Spinoza à concevoir la libération éthique comme une reconquête de soi contre les aliénations causées par l'extériorité, et à confondre plus ou moins explicitement contrainte et contrariété de la puissance d'agir. L'analyse du mot coactus dans le texte spinoziste montre que les modes finis ne peuvent être et ne peuvent se libérer que par et dans la contrainte, qui n'est pas forcément contrariante. Une telle analyse rejoint celles des sociologues Émile Durkheim et Pierre Bourdieu.
约束与自由必然性之间的对立导致斯宾诺莎的许多注释者将伦理解放构想为自我对外在性所造成的异化的重新征服，并或多或少地明确混淆了行为能力的约束性与对抗性。对斯宾诺莎文本中 coactus 一词的分析表明，有限模式只能通过约束才能获得解放，而且只能通过约束获得解放，而约束并不一定是对抗性的。这一分析与社会学家埃米尔-杜克海姆（Émile Durkheim）和皮埃尔-布尔迪厄（Pierre Bourdieu）的分析是一致的。
{"title":"La contrainte faite vertu. Sens et enjeux du mot coactus chez Spinoza","authors":"Jacques-Louis Lantoine","doi":"10.1017/s0012217324000143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217324000143","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 L'opposition entre contrainte et libre nécessité a conduit nombre de commentateurs de Spinoza à concevoir la libération éthique comme une reconquête de soi contre les aliénations causées par l'extériorité, et à confondre plus ou moins explicitement contrainte et contrariété de la puissance d'agir. L'analyse du mot coactus dans le texte spinoziste montre que les modes finis ne peuvent être et ne peuvent se libérer que par et dans la contrainte, qui n'est pas forcément contrariante. Une telle analyse rejoint celles des sociologues Émile Durkheim et Pierre Bourdieu.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"39 21","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140752369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-02DOI: 10.1017/s0012217324000131
Laura Berchielli
Dans la Lettre sur les aveugles, Denis Diderot décrit, en se basant sur la physique mathématique, une méthode pour l’évaluation des hypothèses dans des situations où la certitude ne peut pas être atteinte. La thèse de cet article est que l'auteur de la Lettre étend cette méthode aux questions métaphysiques du finalisme et de l'idéalisme. Diderot présente les positions antagonistes de manière telle que la personne lisant le texte est invitée à peser et soupeser les arguments et à choisir celle qui lui paraît la meilleure, ou la plus probable.
{"title":"Comment choisir son camp. Interroger l'expérience et évaluer les hypothèses dans la Lettre sur les aveugles de Diderot","authors":"Laura Berchielli","doi":"10.1017/s0012217324000131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217324000131","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Dans la Lettre sur les aveugles, Denis Diderot décrit, en se basant sur la physique mathématique, une méthode pour l’évaluation des hypothèses dans des situations où la certitude ne peut pas être atteinte. La thèse de cet article est que l'auteur de la Lettre étend cette méthode aux questions métaphysiques du finalisme et de l'idéalisme. Diderot présente les positions antagonistes de manière telle que la personne lisant le texte est invitée à peser et soupeser les arguments et à choisir celle qui lui paraît la meilleure, ou la plus probable.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"189 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140751348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.1017/s0012217323000379
Sophia Moreau
In this Reply to Critics, I respond to essays by Professors Alysia Blackham, Jessica Eisen, Pablo Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Dale Smith, Iyiola Solanke, and Daniel Viehoff on the theory of wrongful discrimination developed in my book, Faces of Inequality. Among the topics I discuss are: the relationship between equality and discrimination, the role of social subordination in my theory of wrongful discrimination, and methodology in discrimination theory.
{"title":"Equality, Subordination, and Methodology in Discrimination Theory: A Reply to Critics","authors":"Sophia Moreau","doi":"10.1017/s0012217323000379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217323000379","url":null,"abstract":"In this Reply to Critics, I respond to essays by Professors Alysia Blackham, Jessica Eisen, Pablo Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Dale Smith, Iyiola Solanke, and Daniel Viehoff on the theory of wrongful discrimination developed in my book, Faces of Inequality. Among the topics I discuss are: the relationship between equality and discrimination, the role of social subordination in my theory of wrongful discrimination, and methodology in discrimination theory.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"539 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140782123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.1017/s0012217323000288
I. Solanke
Monism and pluralism are not only used to describe the ways in which international law becomes part of a domestic legal system but can also be applied to scholarship that seeks to explain the messiness of discrimination. According to Sophia Moreau's pluralist theory, the wrongfulness of discrimination can be summarized as three types of treatment: subordination, restriction, and exclusion. In this contribution, I will explore the role that power plays in her theory; while power is explicitly discussed in relation to subordination, it is less apparent from restriction and exclusion. However, as I will argue, power is a crucial element underpinning all forms of discrimination and all protected grounds.
{"title":"Power and the Messiness of Discrimination Law: Reflections on the Role of Power in Sophia Moreau's Faces of Inequality","authors":"I. Solanke","doi":"10.1017/s0012217323000288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217323000288","url":null,"abstract":"Monism and pluralism are not only used to describe the ways in which international law becomes part of a domestic legal system but can also be applied to scholarship that seeks to explain the messiness of discrimination. According to Sophia Moreau's pluralist theory, the wrongfulness of discrimination can be summarized as three types of treatment: subordination, restriction, and exclusion. In this contribution, I will explore the role that power plays in her theory; while power is explicitly discussed in relation to subordination, it is less apparent from restriction and exclusion. However, as I will argue, power is a crucial element underpinning all forms of discrimination and all protected grounds.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"71 20","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140795216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.1017/s0012217323000331
Hugo Cossette-Lefebvre
In this introduction, I briefly summarize Sophia Moreau's Faces of Inequality. I situate her monograph within two highly contemporary bodies of literature — relational egalitarianism and discrimination theory — to show how it provides important insights for understanding both what it means to treat others as equals in society and how to define wrongful discrimination. Moreau's work on discrimination is of great relevance for philosophers and socio-legal theorists alike as the commentaries from the symposium contributors demonstrate, including Dale Smith, Pablo Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Daniel Viehoff, Jessica Eisen, Alysia Blackham, and Iyiola Solanke.
{"title":"Social Equality and Wrongful Discrimination: Introduction to the Special Issue on Moreau's Faces of Inequality","authors":"Hugo Cossette-Lefebvre","doi":"10.1017/s0012217323000331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217323000331","url":null,"abstract":"In this introduction, I briefly summarize Sophia Moreau's Faces of Inequality. I situate her monograph within two highly contemporary bodies of literature — relational egalitarianism and discrimination theory — to show how it provides important insights for understanding both what it means to treat others as equals in society and how to define wrongful discrimination. Moreau's work on discrimination is of great relevance for philosophers and socio-legal theorists alike as the commentaries from the symposium contributors demonstrate, including Dale Smith, Pablo Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Daniel Viehoff, Jessica Eisen, Alysia Blackham, and Iyiola Solanke.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"34 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140770824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.1017/s0012217323000276
Andrea Sangiovanni
Sophia Moreau's wide-ranging and nuanced book defends a pluralist view of wrongful discrimination. I argue three points. First, I argue that Moreau's account of deliberative freedom does not provide a distinct ground for objecting to discrimination. Second, I argue that there is not as wide a gap between her view and expressivism as she makes there out to be. Third, there is an intriguing gap in the argument that deserves further exploration: Moreau never provides us with an account of when and why social subordination is wrong.
{"title":"Discrimination, Pluralism, and Social Subordination: On Moreau's Faces of Inequality","authors":"Andrea Sangiovanni","doi":"10.1017/s0012217323000276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217323000276","url":null,"abstract":"Sophia Moreau's wide-ranging and nuanced book defends a pluralist view of wrongful discrimination. I argue three points. First, I argue that Moreau's account of deliberative freedom does not provide a distinct ground for objecting to discrimination. Second, I argue that there is not as wide a gap between her view and expressivism as she makes there out to be. Third, there is an intriguing gap in the argument that deserves further exploration: Moreau never provides us with an account of when and why social subordination is wrong.","PeriodicalId":11232,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue","volume":"591 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140784460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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