{"title":"遵守宪法的民族国家基础","authors":"Peter Grajzl, Jerg Gutmann, Stefan Voigt","doi":"10.1007/s10602-023-09427-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We bring attention to a previously overlooked determinant of de jure-de facto constitutional gaps: a polity’s transition to a nation-state. We argue that nation-statehood, predicated on the formation of a strong sense of national identity, lowers the government’s incentive to violate constitutional provisions. To test our theory, we use a recently released longitudinal database on constitutional compliance and exploit variation in the timing of countries’ attainment of nation-statehood. Our empirical findings substantiate our hypothesis. Based on our preferred estimation approach, nation-statehood bolsters both overall constitutional compliance and constitutional compliance within the subdomains of basic rights, civil rights, and property rights & the rule of law. The estimated long-run effects of nation-statehood on constitutional compliance are considerable in size. Our analysis, thus, illuminates the foundational role of nation-statehood in fostering constitutional compliance.</p>","PeriodicalId":44897,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Political Economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The nation-state foundations of constitutional compliance\",\"authors\":\"Peter Grajzl, Jerg Gutmann, Stefan Voigt\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10602-023-09427-8\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We bring attention to a previously overlooked determinant of de jure-de facto constitutional gaps: a polity’s transition to a nation-state. We argue that nation-statehood, predicated on the formation of a strong sense of national identity, lowers the government’s incentive to violate constitutional provisions. To test our theory, we use a recently released longitudinal database on constitutional compliance and exploit variation in the timing of countries’ attainment of nation-statehood. Our empirical findings substantiate our hypothesis. Based on our preferred estimation approach, nation-statehood bolsters both overall constitutional compliance and constitutional compliance within the subdomains of basic rights, civil rights, and property rights & the rule of law. The estimated long-run effects of nation-statehood on constitutional compliance are considerable in size. Our analysis, thus, illuminates the foundational role of nation-statehood in fostering constitutional compliance.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44897,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Constitutional Political Economy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Constitutional Political Economy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-023-09427-8\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Constitutional Political Economy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-023-09427-8","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
The nation-state foundations of constitutional compliance
We bring attention to a previously overlooked determinant of de jure-de facto constitutional gaps: a polity’s transition to a nation-state. We argue that nation-statehood, predicated on the formation of a strong sense of national identity, lowers the government’s incentive to violate constitutional provisions. To test our theory, we use a recently released longitudinal database on constitutional compliance and exploit variation in the timing of countries’ attainment of nation-statehood. Our empirical findings substantiate our hypothesis. Based on our preferred estimation approach, nation-statehood bolsters both overall constitutional compliance and constitutional compliance within the subdomains of basic rights, civil rights, and property rights & the rule of law. The estimated long-run effects of nation-statehood on constitutional compliance are considerable in size. Our analysis, thus, illuminates the foundational role of nation-statehood in fostering constitutional compliance.
期刊介绍:
Constitutional Political Economy is a forum for research in the broad area of constitutional analysis, which lies at the intersection of several approaches in modern economics, sharing a common interest in the systematic integration of the institutional dimension - the study of political, legal and moral institutions - into economic analysis.
While its primary discipline is economics, Constitutional Political Economy is explicitly interdisciplinary, aiming to encourage an exchange between the various social sciences, including law, philosophy, political science and sociology. Theoretical and empirical research, as well as contributions to constitutional policy issues, are considered for publication.
Officially cited as: Const Polit Econ