印度首席执行官的权力与股价暴跌风险:内幕交易的调节作用

Ankita Kalia
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摘要

目的 本研究旨在探讨印度首席执行官(CEO)权力与股价暴跌风险之间的关系。在基线分析中,通过集合普通最小二乘法(OLS)回归分析了标普 BSE 500 指数(2014-2023 年)中的 236 家公司。为了提高结果的可靠性,稳健性检查包括其他方法,如固定效应的面板数据回归、二元逻辑回归和贝叶斯回归。此外,还使用了额外的控制变量和其他碰撞风险测量方法。为了解决潜在的内生性问题,我们采用了工具变量技术,如两阶段最小二乘法(IV-2SLS)和差分法(DiD)。研究结果股东理论得到了结果的支持,结果显示首席执行官的权力代理(如首席执行官双重性、地位和董事职位)降低了提前一年的股价暴跌风险,反之亦然。研究发现,内幕交易可以缓和 CEO 权力的某些维度与股价暴跌风险之间的联系。在解决了潜在的内生性问题后,这些发现依然存在,而且在采用其他方法和变量时,结果依然一致。原创性/价值这项研究极大地推动了对股价暴跌风险的研究,尤其是在印度等新兴经济体。这些发现对旨在降低股价暴跌风险的投资者、寻求加强治理措施的公司以及考虑与这一现象相关的经济和福利后果的政策制定者来说都至关重要。
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CEO power and stock price crash risk in India: the moderating effect of insider trades
PurposeThis study aims to explore the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and stock price crash risk in India. Furthermore, it seeks to analyse how insider trades may moderate the impact of CEO power on stock price crash risk.Design/methodology/approachA study of 236 companies from the S&P BSE 500 Index (2014–2023) have been analysed through pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression in the baseline analysis. To enhance the results' reliability, robustness checks include alternative methodologies, such as panel data regression with fixed-effects, binary logistic regression and Bayesian regression. Additional control variables and alternative crash risk measure have also been utilised. To address potential endogeneity, instrumental variable techniques such as two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) and difference-in-difference (DiD) methodologies are utilised.FindingsStakeholder theory is supported by results revealing that CEO power proxies like CEO duality, status and directorship reduce one-year ahead stock price crash risk and vice versa. Insider trades are found to moderate the link between select dimensions of CEO power and stock price crash risk. These findings persist after addressing potential endogeneity concerns, and the results remain consistent across alternative methodologies and variable inclusions.Originality/valueThis study significantly advances research on stock price crash risk, especially in emerging economies like India. The implications of these findings are crucial for investors aiming to mitigate crash risk, for corporations seeking enhanced governance measures and for policymakers considering the economic and welfare consequences associated with this phenomenon.
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