{"title":"人际效用比较的视角:对选定模型的分析","authors":"A. Gandjour","doi":"10.46298/jpe.11271","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Recently, new models for comparing the strength of individual preferences have been proposed. This perspective article discusses these models within the context of different accounts of how people attribute mental states to others. The paper highlights that the new models share a common shortcoming with Harsanyi’s Equiprobability Model of Moral Value Judgments, which is the inability to facilitate interpersonal comparisons of preference strengths.","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":"96 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Perspectives on interpersonal utility comparisons: an analysis of selected models\",\"authors\":\"A. Gandjour\",\"doi\":\"10.46298/jpe.11271\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Recently, new models for comparing the strength of individual preferences have been proposed. This perspective article discusses these models within the context of different accounts of how people attribute mental states to others. The paper highlights that the new models share a common shortcoming with Harsanyi’s Equiprobability Model of Moral Value Judgments, which is the inability to facilitate interpersonal comparisons of preference strengths.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41686,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Philosophical Economics\",\"volume\":\"96 13\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Philosophical Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11271\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.11271","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Perspectives on interpersonal utility comparisons: an analysis of selected models
Recently, new models for comparing the strength of individual preferences have been proposed. This perspective article discusses these models within the context of different accounts of how people attribute mental states to others. The paper highlights that the new models share a common shortcoming with Harsanyi’s Equiprobability Model of Moral Value Judgments, which is the inability to facilitate interpersonal comparisons of preference strengths.