人际效用比较的视角:对选定模型的分析

IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS Journal of Philosophical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI:10.46298/jpe.11271
A. Gandjour
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引用次数: 0

摘要

最近,人们提出了比较个人偏好强度的新模型。这篇视角独特的文章从人们如何将心理状态归因于他人的不同角度讨论了这些模型。文章强调,新模型与哈桑尼的道德价值判断等概率模型有一个共同的缺点,即无法促进人际间的偏好强度比较。
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Perspectives on interpersonal utility comparisons: an analysis of selected models
Recently, new models for comparing the strength of individual preferences have been proposed. This perspective article discusses these models within the context of different accounts of how people attribute mental states to others. The paper highlights that the new models share a common shortcoming with Harsanyi’s Equiprobability Model of Moral Value Judgments, which is the inability to facilitate interpersonal comparisons of preference strengths.
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CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
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