{"title":"克服危机的秘密外交:慕尼黑奥运会袭击后的西德和以色列情报部门","authors":"Aviva Guttmann","doi":"10.1162/jcws_a_01172","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"What happens among intelligence communities when two countries face a diplomatic crisis? This article looks at the interactions between the West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and Israel's Mossad in a multilateral liaison called the Club de Berne after the Munich Olympics attack in September 1972. The article shows that these covert links were a means to overcome the crisis and served different functions for each side. For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which had been severely criticized after giving in to terrorist pressure, the BfV tried to prove to Israel its value as a security asset. For Israel, the Club de Berne allowed Mossad to send a covert message that aimed to pressure the FRG into a no-negotiation line. For both, the agencies could build on preexisting relations based on trust in the Club de Berne, which helped with the normalization process after the crisis. Although diplomatic and domestic policies after the Munich attack are well known, the intelligence dimension has thus far not been explored. The article offers a new way of thinking about covert diplomacy in theory and practice.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Covert Diplomacy to Overcome a Crisis: West German and Israeli Intelligence after the Munich Olympics Attack\",\"authors\":\"Aviva Guttmann\",\"doi\":\"10.1162/jcws_a_01172\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"What happens among intelligence communities when two countries face a diplomatic crisis? This article looks at the interactions between the West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and Israel's Mossad in a multilateral liaison called the Club de Berne after the Munich Olympics attack in September 1972. The article shows that these covert links were a means to overcome the crisis and served different functions for each side. For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which had been severely criticized after giving in to terrorist pressure, the BfV tried to prove to Israel its value as a security asset. For Israel, the Club de Berne allowed Mossad to send a covert message that aimed to pressure the FRG into a no-negotiation line. For both, the agencies could build on preexisting relations based on trust in the Club de Berne, which helped with the normalization process after the crisis. Although diplomatic and domestic policies after the Munich attack are well known, the intelligence dimension has thus far not been explored. The article offers a new way of thinking about covert diplomacy in theory and practice.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45551,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Cold War Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Cold War Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01172\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Cold War Studies","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01172","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
当两个国家面临外交危机时,情报部门之间会发生什么?本文探讨了 1972 年 9 月慕尼黑奥运会袭击事件后,西德联邦安全情报局(BfV)与以色列摩萨德(Mossad)在名为 "伯尔尼俱乐部"(Club de Berne)的多边联络中的互动。文章指出,这些秘密联系是克服危机的一种手段,对每一方来说都有不同的作用。德意志联邦共和国(FRG)在屈服于恐怖分子的压力后受到了严厉批评,因此德意志联邦共和国试图向以色列证明其作为安全资产的价值。对以色列来说,伯尔尼俱乐部允许摩萨德发出秘密信息,旨在向联邦德国施压,使其采取不谈判路线。对这两个机构来说,它们都可以建立在对伯尔尼俱乐部的信任基础上的原有关系,这有助于危机后的正常化进程。尽管慕尼黑袭击事件后的外交和国内政策已广为人知,但情报方面的问题迄今尚未得到探讨。文章为秘密外交的理论和实践提供了一种新的思路。
Covert Diplomacy to Overcome a Crisis: West German and Israeli Intelligence after the Munich Olympics Attack
What happens among intelligence communities when two countries face a diplomatic crisis? This article looks at the interactions between the West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and Israel's Mossad in a multilateral liaison called the Club de Berne after the Munich Olympics attack in September 1972. The article shows that these covert links were a means to overcome the crisis and served different functions for each side. For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which had been severely criticized after giving in to terrorist pressure, the BfV tried to prove to Israel its value as a security asset. For Israel, the Club de Berne allowed Mossad to send a covert message that aimed to pressure the FRG into a no-negotiation line. For both, the agencies could build on preexisting relations based on trust in the Club de Berne, which helped with the normalization process after the crisis. Although diplomatic and domestic policies after the Munich attack are well known, the intelligence dimension has thus far not been explored. The article offers a new way of thinking about covert diplomacy in theory and practice.