{"title":"报告信念会改变信念吗？","authors":"Joep Sonnemans","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102174","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Does reporting beliefs change beliefs? This question may seem impossible to answer, because one cannot compare the beliefs of participants who did or did not report their beliefs: we cannot know beliefs that we don't measure. In an experiment, participants first answer trivia questions, and are then asked to estimate how many questions they have answered right. In the two treatments the payoff function is skewed: either over or underestimations are punished more severe. This manipulation causes a difference in report between the two treatments and the main question is whether that changes actual beliefs. In the third part participants rate per question how likely their answer is right, and in the final part participants choose between payment per correctly answered question or a tournament. The ratings per question differ only marginally between the treatments, and no effect was found on behavior.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000144/pdfft?md5=8cd5c07d6e822b25ae14dd2182d3aae0&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324000144-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does reporting beliefs change beliefs?\",\"authors\":\"Joep Sonnemans\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102174\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Does reporting beliefs change beliefs? This question may seem impossible to answer, because one cannot compare the beliefs of participants who did or did not report their beliefs: we cannot know beliefs that we don't measure. In an experiment, participants first answer trivia questions, and are then asked to estimate how many questions they have answered right. In the two treatments the payoff function is skewed: either over or underestimations are punished more severe. This manipulation causes a difference in report between the two treatments and the main question is whether that changes actual beliefs. In the third part participants rate per question how likely their answer is right, and in the final part participants choose between payment per correctly answered question or a tournament. The ratings per question differ only marginally between the treatments, and no effect was found on behavior.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51637,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000144/pdfft?md5=8cd5c07d6e822b25ae14dd2182d3aae0&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324000144-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000144\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000144","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Does reporting beliefs change beliefs? This question may seem impossible to answer, because one cannot compare the beliefs of participants who did or did not report their beliefs: we cannot know beliefs that we don't measure. In an experiment, participants first answer trivia questions, and are then asked to estimate how many questions they have answered right. In the two treatments the payoff function is skewed: either over or underestimations are punished more severe. This manipulation causes a difference in report between the two treatments and the main question is whether that changes actual beliefs. In the third part participants rate per question how likely their answer is right, and in the final part participants choose between payment per correctly answered question or a tournament. The ratings per question differ only marginally between the treatments, and no effect was found on behavior.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.
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