温和现实主义意识形态批判

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI:10.1111/ejop.12929
Rebecca L. Clark
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引用次数: 0

摘要

现实主义意识形态批判(RIC)是政治现实主义的一个分支,是最近针对现实主义偏向现状的担忧而发展起来的。现实主义意识形态批判旨在通过揭示个人认为某一社会制度是合法的这一信念是由该制度造成的,从而揭穿这一信念。尽管现实主义日益突出,但却很少受到批评界的关注。在本文中,我将逆流而上。首先,我澄清了现实主义推理的地位和动机推理的作用,从而改进了当代关于现实主义推理的论述。其次,我指出现实主义意识形态批评者面临着一个两难选择:要么他们的论述在认识论上做出了极其难以置信的假设,要么他们对认识论进行了修正,但代价是使其失去了意义。我依次论证了这两种情况,然后根据现实主义认识论的基本假设,对现实主义认识论的不同强度进行了新颖的区分,从而揭示了这一困境的虚假性。我提出了适度的 RIC 作为解决方案:当发现你认为某个社会机构合法的一个原因很可能是恶性的认识论循环时,这个信念就应该接受进一步的认识论检验。我将对三种潜在的反对意见做出回应,并提出温和的 RIC 将成为政治理论家方法论工具包中富有成效的补充。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Moderate realist ideology critique

Realist ideology critique (RIC) is a strand of political realism recently developed in response to concerns that realism is biased toward the status quo. RIC aims to debunk an individual's belief that a social institution is legitimate by revealing that the belief is caused by that very same institution. Despite its growing prominence, RIC has received little critical attention. In this article, I buck this trend. First, I improve on contemporary accounts of RIC by clarifying its status and the role of motivated reasoning. Second, I show that realist ideology critics face a dilemma: either their account makes deeply implausible epistemological assumptions, or they temper its epistemology at the expense of rendering it toothless. I argue for each horn in turn before revealing the dilemma to be a false one by making a novel distinction between varying strengths of RIC based on their underlying epistemological assumptions. I propose Moderate RIC as a solution: upon discovering that one reason for your belief that a social institution is legitimate is likely malignantly epistemically circular, the belief should undergo further epistemic testing. I respond to three potential objections and suggest that Moderate RIC would make a fruitful addition to political theorists' methodological toolkit.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
11.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: ''Founded by Mark Sacks in 1993, the European Journal of Philosophy has come to occupy a distinctive and highly valued place amongst the philosophical journals. The aim of EJP has been to bring together the best work from those working within the "analytic" and "continental" traditions, and to encourage connections between them, without diluting their respective priorities and concerns. This has enabled EJP to publish a wide range of material of the highest standard from philosophers across the world, reflecting the best thinking from a variety of philosophical perspectives, in a way that is accessible to all of them.''
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