羡慕和爱慕

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI:10.1111/ejop.12927
Luke Brunning
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引用次数: 0

摘要

当你蓬勃发展时,你是希望你的朋友、家人和合作伙伴羡慕你,还是钦佩你?很多人都希望自己被人钦佩,因此我们常常努力抑制自己的嫉妒心。然而,最近萨拉-普罗塔西(Sara Protasi)为 "模仿性嫉妒 "做了一个耐人寻味的辩护。我认为她的说法难以令人信服,并在本文中为爱的钦佩辩护。在第 2 节中,我总结了普罗塔西关于嫉妒的细微论述。在第 2 节中,我论证了无论我们如何分析一般情感,我们都可以认为优先培养某些情感比培养其他情感更可取。在第 4 节中,我对普罗塔西关于爱与嫉妒之间亲和力的假设提出质疑。我的核心论点在第 5 节,我将探讨嫉妒对嫉妒者、被嫉妒者和人际关系的影响。妒忌阻碍了与羡慕者生活中的物品和目标之间的真实关系,疏远了被羡慕者,并扼杀了共同行动。从所有角度来看,钦佩通常都更胜一筹。在第 6 节中,我简要地考虑了 "钦佩可能会妨碍爱情 "这一反对意见,然后在第 7 节中得出结论,在我们的亲密关系中,钦佩应该比模仿性嫉妒更受欢迎。
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Emulative envy and loving admiration
Would you rather your friends, family, and partners envy you, or admire you, when you flourish? Many people would prefer to be admired, and so we often strive to tame our envy. Recently, however, Sara Protasi offered an intriguing defence of “emulative envy” which apparently improves us and our relationships, and is compatible with love. I find her account unconvincing, and defend loving admiration in this article. In Section 2, I summarize Protasi's nuanced account of envy. In Section 2, I argue that irrespective of how we analyze emotions in general we can argue that it is preferable to prioritize the cultivation of some emotions over others. In Section 4, I challenge Protasi's assumptions about the affinity between love and envy. My core argument is in Section 5 where I examine envy's impact on the envier, the envied, and relationships. Envy impedes an authentic relationship to the goods and goals in the envier's life, alienates the envied, and stifles joint-action. From all perspectives admiration typically fares better. After briefly considering the objection that admiration may impede love in Section 6, I conclude, in section seven, that admiration should be preferred to emulative envy in our intimate relationships.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
11.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: ''Founded by Mark Sacks in 1993, the European Journal of Philosophy has come to occupy a distinctive and highly valued place amongst the philosophical journals. The aim of EJP has been to bring together the best work from those working within the "analytic" and "continental" traditions, and to encourage connections between them, without diluting their respective priorities and concerns. This has enabled EJP to publish a wide range of material of the highest standard from philosophers across the world, reflecting the best thinking from a variety of philosophical perspectives, in a way that is accessible to all of them.''
期刊最新文献
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