竞争性奖金会破坏异质团队中的合作吗?

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI:10.1111/jems.12573
E. Glenn Dutcher, Regine Oexl, Dmitry Ryvkin, Timothy C. Salmon
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在实践中,管理者们争论的一个问题是,在团队生产中使用合作激励还是竞争激励。竞争激励可能会推动个人努力,但也可能导致帮助减少、破坏增多,整体后果不明,尤其是在团队成员能力不同的情况下。通过实验室实验,我们研究了当团队组成发生变化时,增加竞争激励对绩效的影响。我们发现,竞争性激励通常低于非竞争性激励,而更多的奖金并不能产生足够的努力来弥补帮助的损失。我们的研究结果有助于更好地理解如何平衡个人奖励与团队奖励,以及当员工能力不同时,企业如何构建团队。
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Do competitive bonuses ruin cooperation in heterogeneous teams?
A debate among practicing managers is whether to use cooperative or competitive incentives for team production. While competitive incentives may drive individual effort higher, they may also lead to less help and more sabotage, with unclear consequences overall, especially when team members' abilities differ. Using a lab experiment, we examine how increasing competitive incentives affects performance as team composition changes. We find that competitive incentives generally under-perform noncompetitive incentives and a larger bonus does not generate enough effort to compensate for a loss in help. Our results help understand better how to balance out individual versus team rewards and how firms could structure teams when employees have heterogeneous abilities.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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