管理者是否会通过投资税务职能来应对避税动机?来自税务部门的证据

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI:10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100401
John Li
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引用次数: 0

摘要

虽然之前的文献研究了某些激励机制在促使高层管理者(首席执行官和首席财务官)参与公司避税活动中的作用,但有关管理者针对这些激励机制所采取的具体行动的证据却很少。基于管理者可以通过将资源导向税务职能部门来影响公司税务活动这一前提,我研究了之前文献中研究过的四种特定避税激励机制(财务约束、股权风险激励、对冲基金干预和分析师现金流预测)是否会促使管理者在招聘公司税务部门人员时进行投资。利用从职业网络网站 LinkedIn 收集到的税务部门员工数据集,我发现有证据表明,每种激励措施都与税务部门员工人数的增加有显著关联。这种关联在级别较高的员工和有过税务部门工作经验的员工中普遍较强。总体而言,我的研究结果与管理者在受到避税激励时向税务部门投入资源的前提是一致的。我的研究还在一定程度上保证了之前研究中记录的避税激励与实际税率之间的关联是有意避税行为的反映。
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Do managers respond to tax avoidance incentives by investing in the tax function? Evidence from tax departments

While prior literature examines the role of certain incentives in motivating top managers (CEOs and CFOs) to engage in corporate tax avoidance, there is little evidence on the specific actions that managers take in response to these incentives. Motivated by the premise that a manager can influence a firm’s tax activities by directing resources towards the tax function, I investigate whether four specific tax avoidance incentives studied in prior literature (financial constraints, equity risk incentives, hedge fund interventions, and analyst cash flow forecasts) induce managers to make investments in hiring personnel within the firm’s tax department. Using a dataset of tax department employees collected from the professional networking website LinkedIn, I find evidence that each incentive is significantly associated with an increase in the number of individuals employed within the tax department. This association is generally stronger among higher ranked employees and employees with prior tax department experience. Overall, my findings are consistent with the premise that managers invest resources in the tax function when they are incentivized to avoid taxes. My study also provides some assurance that the association between tax avoidance incentives and effective tax rates documented in prior studies is reflective of intentional tax avoidance behavior.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
期刊最新文献
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