什么算作弊?可推导性、想象力和玛丽案例

IF 0.5 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-01-18 DOI:10.1007/s11406-024-00717-5
Amy Kind
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在《意识的问题》一书中,托林-阿尔特在对弗兰克-杰克逊著名的知识论进行深入讨论和辩护时,驳斥了一些反对意见,理由是它们是作弊的案例。虽然知识论证的一些反对者提出了各种玛丽可能在房间里就知道看到红色是什么样子的情况,但阿尔特认为,提出的这些情况都是无关紧要的。他认为,提出玛丽的案例是为了捍卫现象事实不能先验地从物理事实中推导出来的说法。因此,只有在提出玛丽在房间里的学习是通过对物理事实的先验推导而产生的情况下,提议的情景才构成对知识论证的反对。这就是可演绎性标准。在下文中,我将探讨一系列相关案例,以澄清这一标准。这样做能让我们更好地理解在这种情况下应该如何评估作弊行为,从而也能更清楚地了解围绕玛丽案的争论辩证法。
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What Counts as Cheating? Deducibility, Imagination, and the Mary Case

In The Matter of Consciousness, in the course of his extended discussion and defense of Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Torin Alter dismisses some objections on the grounds that they are cases of cheating. Though some opponents of the knowledge argument offer various scenarios in which Mary might come to know what seeing red is like while still in the room, Alter argues that the proposed scenarios are irrelevant. In his view, the Mary case is offered to defend the claim that phenomenal facts cannot be a priori deduced from physical facts. Thus, a proposed scenario constitutes an objection to the knowledge argument only if it presents a case in which Mary’s learning inside the room comes about via a priori deduction from physical facts. Call this the deducibility standard. In what follows, I’ll explore a series of relevant cases in an effort to clarify this standard. Doing so enables us to better understand how cheating should be assessed in this context and thereby also to get clearer on the argumentative dialectic surrounding the Mary case.

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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHIA
PHILOSOPHIA PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
20.00%
发文量
141
期刊介绍: Founded in 1971, Philosophia is a much-respected journal that has provided a platform to many well-known philosophers, including Kenneth Arrow, A.J. Ayer, Roderick Chisholm, Bas van Fraassen, William Frankena, P.T. Geach, Alan Gewirth, Jaakko Hintikka, Richard Popkin, W.V.O. Quine, Gilbert Ryle, Marcus Singer, Peter Singer, J.J.C. Smart, P.F. Strawson, and many others. Philosophia also published papers of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap. Philosophia is an international journal in scope, submissions and readership. The journal publishes contributions fitting within various philosophical traditions, but manifests a preference of the analytic tradition in the broad sense of commitment to clarity and responsibility. Besides papers in the traditional subfields of philosophy and its history, Philosophia also publishes work on topical subjects such as racism, silence of God, terrorism, the nature of philosophy, emotion, AIDS, scientific discovery, punishment, modality, and institutional theory of art. Philosophia welcomes a wide range of contributions to academic philosophy, covering all fields of philosophy. Contributions to the journal may take the form of topical papers, philosophical surveys of literature, symposia papers, short discussion notes, puzzles, profiles, book reviews and more extensive critical studies of new books. The journal includes a ''books revisited'' section where a book and its impact are reconsidered a decade or more after its appearance. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.Please read our Editorial Policies carefully before you submit your paper to this journal https://www.springer.com/gp/editorial-policies
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