{"title":"检察官会诱使无辜者认罪吗？","authors":"Alexander Lundberg","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13203","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Next, partial bans on plea bargaining reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions, and the reduction rises with the strength of the ban. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13203","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?\",\"authors\":\"Alexander Lundberg\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ecin.13203\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Next, partial bans on plea bargaining reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions, and the reduction rises with the strength of the ban. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51380,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economic Inquiry\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13203\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economic Inquiry\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.13203\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Inquiry","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.13203","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?
The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Next, partial bans on plea bargaining reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions, and the reduction rises with the strength of the ban. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions.
期刊介绍：
Published since 1962, (formerly Western Economic Journal), EI is widely regarded as one of the top scholarly journals in its field. Besides containing research on all economics topic areas, a principal objective is to make each article understandable to economists who are not necessarily specialists in the article topic area. Nine Nobel laureates are among EI long list of prestigious authors.
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