{"title":"新创企业的信息生产:SPAC 与传统 IPO","authors":"Keiichi Hori , Hiroshi Osano","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102543","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We explore equilibrium allocation and efficiency when private firms are listed by merging with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC), compared with when they are listed through a traditional initial public offering (IPO). We show that a traditional IPO is more informationally efficient than a SPAC, except if the traditional IPO process is significantly long and costly. We also suggest that if the average quality of firms willing to go public decreases, SPAC acquisitions are more likely to occur than traditional IPOs. Our results hold, regardless of whether the measures of underwriters and sponsors are exogenously or endogenously determined.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Information production in start-up firms: SPACs vs. Traditional IPOs\",\"authors\":\"Keiichi Hori , Hiroshi Osano\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102543\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We explore equilibrium allocation and efficiency when private firms are listed by merging with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC), compared with when they are listed through a traditional initial public offering (IPO). We show that a traditional IPO is more informationally efficient than a SPAC, except if the traditional IPO process is significantly long and costly. We also suggest that if the average quality of firms willing to go public decreases, SPAC acquisitions are more likely to occur than traditional IPOs. Our results hold, regardless of whether the measures of underwriters and sponsors are exogenously or endogenously determined.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15525,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924000051\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Corporate Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924000051","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Information production in start-up firms: SPACs vs. Traditional IPOs
We explore equilibrium allocation and efficiency when private firms are listed by merging with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC), compared with when they are listed through a traditional initial public offering (IPO). We show that a traditional IPO is more informationally efficient than a SPAC, except if the traditional IPO process is significantly long and costly. We also suggest that if the average quality of firms willing to go public decreases, SPAC acquisitions are more likely to occur than traditional IPOs. Our results hold, regardless of whether the measures of underwriters and sponsors are exogenously or endogenously determined.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.