{"title":"逻辑不熟悉?如何破解逻辑现实主义的麦克斯维尼难题","authors":"Matteo Baggio","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00583-6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Logical realism is the metaphysical view asserting that the facts of logic exist and are mind-and-language independent. McSweeney argues that if logical realism is true, we encounter a dilemma. Either we cannot determine which of the two logically equivalent theories holds a fundamental status, or neither theory can be considered fundamental. These two conclusions together constitute what is known as the <i>Unfamiliarity Dilemma</i>, which poses significant challenges to our understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical features of logic. In this article, I present two strategies to address McSweeney’s dilemma. If these arguments prove effective, they would demonstrate that our knowledge of logic is not susceptible to the skeptical concerns raised by McSweeney’s hypothesis.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"39 3","pages":"439 - 465"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism\",\"authors\":\"Matteo Baggio\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s12136-024-00583-6\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Logical realism is the metaphysical view asserting that the facts of logic exist and are mind-and-language independent. McSweeney argues that if logical realism is true, we encounter a dilemma. Either we cannot determine which of the two logically equivalent theories holds a fundamental status, or neither theory can be considered fundamental. These two conclusions together constitute what is known as the <i>Unfamiliarity Dilemma</i>, which poses significant challenges to our understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical features of logic. In this article, I present two strategies to address McSweeney’s dilemma. If these arguments prove effective, they would demonstrate that our knowledge of logic is not susceptible to the skeptical concerns raised by McSweeney’s hypothesis.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44390,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition\",\"volume\":\"39 3\",\"pages\":\"439 - 465\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-024-00583-6\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"文学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-024-00583-6","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism
Logical realism is the metaphysical view asserting that the facts of logic exist and are mind-and-language independent. McSweeney argues that if logical realism is true, we encounter a dilemma. Either we cannot determine which of the two logically equivalent theories holds a fundamental status, or neither theory can be considered fundamental. These two conclusions together constitute what is known as the Unfamiliarity Dilemma, which poses significant challenges to our understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical features of logic. In this article, I present two strategies to address McSweeney’s dilemma. If these arguments prove effective, they would demonstrate that our knowledge of logic is not susceptible to the skeptical concerns raised by McSweeney’s hypothesis.
期刊介绍:
Acta Analytica is an international journal for philosophy in the analytical tradition covering a variety of philosophical topics including philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Special attention is devoted to cognitive science. The journal aims to promote a rigorous, argument-based approach in philosophy. Acta Analytica is a peer reviewed journal, published quarterly, with authors from all over the world.