Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献

In this paper, I examine Kenneth Silver’s (Journal of Business Ethics, 159, 253-265, 2019) defense of the claim that it is possible to attribute moral standing to corporations because they are sentient. I argue that corporations have moral standing, but not in virtue of being sentient. Following others in the philosophy of mind and the theory of wellbeing, I argue that consciousness is not normatively significant in the way that sentience theorists claim; sentience is not necessary for moral standing. Instead, I argue that computational intelligence tied to preferences is the ground of moral standing. Corporations are intelligent systems with preferences, and therefore, corporations deserve moral standing.

The pragmatic encroachment thesis is the claim that pragmatic factors are relevant in determining whether a subject knows that p. Starting from the much-discussed Bank and Train Cases, Wolfgang Barz has argued that the examples used to illustrate, and so support the existence of, pragmatic encroachment, are misdescribed. Barz proposes that we do not have, as has been assumed, two subjects, A and B, who have the same evidence for a proposition, p, where A knows that p, and B, in a situation involving some different pragmatic factor, does not know that p. Rather, A knows one proposition, and B does not know another, different, proposition. Against Barz, I argue that there are serious problems involved with the specification of the pairs of propositions that Barz proposes to deal with the apparent pragmatic encroachment in the example cases he discusses. In addition, Barz’s account would force us to an untenable view of full retractions of knowledge claims made in the face of changed pragmatic conditions. Had Barz been right, pragmatic encroachment would not exist, and, in addition, he would have provided the basis for a very strong argument against contextualism.

Analytic truths are necessary but rather insubstantial, given that analytic sentences are true no matter how things are. It is nowadays a commonplace that there are also substantial metaphysical truths the necessity of which derives from things necessarily being one way rather than another. Theoretical identifications and certain suitably conditionalized identity statements count as paradigmatic examples of sentences expressing such necessary facts. Although there is no shortage of attempts to deflate these examples, this paper proposes another deflationary analysis. Based on this analysis, I shall try to defend a perhaps paradoxically sounding thesis: even under the interpretation under which the sentences in question turn out to be necessarily true, they merely state contingent facts.

What is inference? This paper discusses a recent account that aims to answer this question—Susanna Siegel’s Response Hypothesis. The hallmark of inference, on Siegel’s account, is the epistemic dependence of a mental transition’s output state(s) on its input state(s). In this paper, I argue that some alleged non-inferential transitions exhibit the kind of epistemic dependence that Siegel’s account takes to be characteristic of inference. More precisely, I argue that some associative transitions exhibit this kind of epistemic dependence—a problematic conclusion, since Siegel takes inference and association to be mutually exclusive kinds of mental transitions. I then suggest a way out of this problem: to reject the assumption that association and inference are mutually exclusive. This may be considered a bold move, for associative transitions are often considered a paradigm example of non-inferential transitions. So, I end up discussing the motivation behind the move and arguing that it opens up an attractive niche for the development of some philosophical projects. 

Buck-passing analyses of normative concepts in terms of normative reasons face the so-called ‘wrong kind of reason’ (WKR) problem. Most work on this topic has focused either (i) on the WKR problem for the buck-passing account of value or (ii) more generally as an issue for ‘reasons fundamentalists’ (those that hold that all normative concepts can be analysed into normative reasons). This paper concerns the buck-passing analysis of deontic concepts, in particular the concept of wrongness, understood as an analysis into normative reasons for action. I first address the question of whether wrong kind reasons for action are possible in the first place, before examining and rejecting some accounts of the WKR/RKR for action. I end with a suggestion which points to a positive account of the distinction, and I explain one way in which appealing to this distinction can help to resolve the WKR problem.

A number of commentators have argued that epistemic contextualism faces the factivity problem, which is the problem that contextualism, together with some plausible epistemic principles, will lead to a contradiction. In this paper, I argue that on three variants of contextualism, two of the premises of the factivity problem are incompatible. Thus, the factivity problem is dissolved in the sense that contextualism does not lead to such a contradiction.

In this paper, we examine an overlooked answer to the Special Composition Question (SCQ), termed “Mereological Anti-Conservatism.” This view posits that extraordinary objects exist but that ordinary objects do not. For example, while tables and chairs do not exist, the mereological sums of these items do correspond to real objects. Although such a claim may initially seem absurd, we argue that (i) it is entirely derived from the claims and commitments of traditional rival theories—Nihilism, Universalism, and Conservatism; (ii) it resolves several issues that plague Conservatism, such as problems of vagueness, change and persistence, and the shortcomings of common sense; and (iii) it offers a more plausible perspective than Conservatism when considering the vast scale of possible worlds with differently segmented realities. Ultimately, we contend that if Anti-Conservatism is deemed implausible, then Conservatism must be as well, for structurally similar reasons.

Parfit (2011, 2017) denies that committing to the existence of reasons is ontologically costly. To motivate his denial, Mintz-Woo (2018) thinks Parfit forwards two arguments: the plural senses argument from elimination and the argument from empty ontology. Mintz-Woo believes he has “debunked” both arguments. In what follows, we do three things. First, we argue that his objections to the arguments fail or at best miss the point. Second, we argue that even if our independent responses fail, his responses meet an unfortunate dilemma. Lastly, we address his concerns about the relationship between Parfit’s ontology and truth.

There has been considerable debate among scholars as to whether maps can play an inferential role. The debate has focused on whether maps possess the representational format required for logical transitions. This paper addresses a distinct challenge, namely whether maps can satisfy the taking condition, which has been proposed as a necessary condition for inference. In doing so, the focus of the discussion is slightly shifted by analyzing not only the representational structure of maps but also the rational transitions within them. Given that one of the main reasons for the use of maps is navigation, a dynamic notion of inference is proposed which takes into account practical reasoning. According to this view, logical theoretical inferences are just one type of many different kinds of inferential processes.

Some think normative properties like being good are basic: they cannot be explained in only non-normative terms. Moreover, some think these properties are instantiated—things are good. Others have argued the instantiation of basic normativity (with some plausible assumptions about grounding) implies pannormism, roughly the view that some atoms (and sub-atoms, and sub-sub…) and their behavior is also either good or bad. All the way down the levels of reality, normativity lurks. For example, if a seizure is bad, then the atomic behavior (and sub-atomic behavior, and so on) explaining it is also bad. These same philosophers believe pannormism could be taken as a reductio against basic normativity and normative realism. I’ll argue that with plausible additional premises, the argument for pannormism implies all atomic (and sub-atomic, and so on) behavior (and every atom, sub-atom, and so on) is normative. I’ll then explore whether this stronger pannormism, along with the weaker one, should be thought of as a reductio. My conclusion is that it isn’t clear what is absurd about pannormism, partly because the intuitions supporting the alleged reductio are surprisingly similar to those supporting basic normativity. This means believers in basic normativity and normative realism shouldn’t be as worried about their view implying pannormism as some suggest they should, and in fact, it might be antipannormism that’s absurd.