{"title":"外国机构投资者能否改善对董事会的监督?","authors":"Biwesh Neupane , Chandra Thapa , Andrew Marshall , Suman Neupane , Chaman Shrestha","doi":"10.1016/j.intfin.2024.101962","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Exploiting the global financial crisis of 2007–08 as an exogenous shock that resulted in a significant decline in the ownership of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in the Indian equity market, we find evidence of a causal link between FIIs’ ownership and different dimensions of board monitoring. Specifically, the empirical results suggest that higher FIIs ownership leads to lower board size, busyness, network size, CEO power, CEO pay, and improved board diligence. However, we also document a negative link between FIIs’ ownership and board independence, indicating that FIIs do not view independent directors as effective monitors. In terms of implications, our results suggest that improved board monitoring, induced by higher FIIs’ ownership, leads to higher firm valuation and innovation activities.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48119,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 101962"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443124000283/pdfft?md5=5d7fa52d830d6d80d796c2079ff1eebe&pid=1-s2.0-S1042443124000283-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do foreign institutional investors improve board monitoring?\",\"authors\":\"Biwesh Neupane , Chandra Thapa , Andrew Marshall , Suman Neupane , Chaman Shrestha\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.intfin.2024.101962\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Exploiting the global financial crisis of 2007–08 as an exogenous shock that resulted in a significant decline in the ownership of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in the Indian equity market, we find evidence of a causal link between FIIs’ ownership and different dimensions of board monitoring. Specifically, the empirical results suggest that higher FIIs ownership leads to lower board size, busyness, network size, CEO power, CEO pay, and improved board diligence. However, we also document a negative link between FIIs’ ownership and board independence, indicating that FIIs do not view independent directors as effective monitors. In terms of implications, our results suggest that improved board monitoring, induced by higher FIIs’ ownership, leads to higher firm valuation and innovation activities.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48119,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money\",\"volume\":\"91 \",\"pages\":\"Article 101962\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443124000283/pdfft?md5=5d7fa52d830d6d80d796c2079ff1eebe&pid=1-s2.0-S1042443124000283-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443124000283\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443124000283","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do foreign institutional investors improve board monitoring?
Exploiting the global financial crisis of 2007–08 as an exogenous shock that resulted in a significant decline in the ownership of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in the Indian equity market, we find evidence of a causal link between FIIs’ ownership and different dimensions of board monitoring. Specifically, the empirical results suggest that higher FIIs ownership leads to lower board size, busyness, network size, CEO power, CEO pay, and improved board diligence. However, we also document a negative link between FIIs’ ownership and board independence, indicating that FIIs do not view independent directors as effective monitors. In terms of implications, our results suggest that improved board monitoring, induced by higher FIIs’ ownership, leads to higher firm valuation and innovation activities.
期刊介绍:
International trade, financing and investments, and the related cash and credit transactions, have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years. The international monetary system has continued to evolve to accommodate the need for foreign-currency denominated transactions and in the process has provided opportunities for its ongoing observation and study. The purpose of the Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the international aspects of financial markets, institutions and money. Theoretical/conceptual and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • International financial markets • International securities markets • Foreign exchange markets • Eurocurrency markets • International syndications • Term structures of Eurocurrency rates • Determination of exchange rates • Information, speculation and parity • Forward rates and swaps • International payment mechanisms • International commercial banking; • International investment banking • Central bank intervention • International monetary systems • Balance of payments.