并购监管执法的威慑效应

IF 7.2 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-02-12 DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102559
Eric de Bodt , Jean-Gabriel Cousin , Micah S. Officer , Richard Roll
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引用次数: 0

摘要

经济、政治和公共政策的不确定性会影响并购活动。在本文中,我们利用司法部(DOJ)和联邦贸易委员会(FTC)对并购市场的干预来研究监管干预是否也有影响。我们的研究结果支持这一猜想。利用 Hoberg 和 Phillips(2010 年)的相似性评分来识别产品市场的竞争者,我们证实司法部/联邦贸易委员会的监管措施对未来的 M&A 交易活动有明显而显著的威慑作用,这一结果对许多替代规格都是稳健的。其他证据表明,这种威慑效应(至少部分)是由监管结果不确定性和监管干预概率渠道共同驱动的。我们的研究结果确定了影响并购活动的反托拉斯监管的(非)预期后果。
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The deterrence effect of M&A regulatory enforcements

Economic, political, and public policy uncertainty affect merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. In this paper, we use Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) interventions in the M&A market to investigate whether regulatory interventions also matter. Our results support this conjecture. Using the Hoberg and Phillips (2010) similarity scores to identify product market competitors, we confirm a clear and significant DOJ/FTC regulatory enforcements' deterrence effect on future M&A transaction activity, a result robust to many alternative specifications. Additional evidence indicates that this deterrence effect is (at least partly) driven by both regulatory outcome uncertainty and regulatory intervention probability channels. Our results identify an (un)intended consequence of antitrust regulation that affects M&A activity.

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来源期刊
Journal of Corporate Finance
Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
11.80
自引率
3.30%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.
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