与有争议的政治人物建立联系的声誉成本:政治丑闻的证据

IF 2.2 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-02-06 DOI:10.1111/jbfa.12788
Susanne Preuss, Jacco L. Wielhouwer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们利用政治丑闻的外生性来检验竞选捐款形式的政治联系是否会使公司面临声誉风险。我们手工收集了 2000 年至 2019 年间发生的 218 起美国国会议员丑闻样本,并估算了丑闻首次出现在新闻中前后的异常回报。我们发现,在涉及公司或说客的腐败丑闻前后,有关联的公司会出现价值损失,其他政治活跃的公司也会出现价值损失,但程度较轻。这些损失会增加管理者从事不道德行为的倾向。此外,我们还发现,在此类腐败丑闻发生后,媒体会发布有关关联企业的负面消息,关联企业的股东更有可能提交有关披露政治献金的提案,关联企业也会减少政治支出。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,丑闻前后的损失是由声誉溢出效应和投资者更新其对政治献金风险的信念所驱动的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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The reputational costs of connections to controversial politicians: Evidence from political scandals

We use the exogenous nature of political scandals to test whether political connections in the form of campaign contributions expose firms to reputational risk. We hand-collect a sample of 218 scandals of members of the U.S. Congress that occurred between 2000 and 2019 and estimate the abnormal returns around the day a scandal first appeared in the news. We find that connected firms and to a lesser extent other politically active firms experience value losses around corruption scandals involving firms or lobbyists. These losses increase in managers’ propensity to engage in unethical behavior. Moreover, we find that following such corruption scandals, media sources release negative news about connected firms, shareholders of connected firms are more likely to submit proposals on the disclosure of political contributions, and connected firms reduce political spending. Overall, our results suggest that losses around scandals are driven by reputation spillover and investors updating their beliefs about the risks of political contributions.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
17.20%
发文量
70
期刊介绍: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting exists to publish high quality research papers in accounting, corporate finance, corporate governance and their interfaces. The interfaces are relevant in many areas such as financial reporting and communication, valuation, financial performance measurement and managerial reward and control structures. A feature of JBFA is that it recognises that informational problems are pervasive in financial markets and business organisations, and that accounting plays an important role in resolving such problems. JBFA welcomes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Nonetheless, theoretical papers should yield novel testable implications, and empirical papers should be theoretically well-motivated. The Editors view accounting and finance as being closely related to economics and, as a consequence, papers submitted will often have theoretical motivations that are grounded in economics. JBFA, however, also seeks papers that complement economics-based theorising with theoretical developments originating in other social science disciplines or traditions. While many papers in JBFA use econometric or related empirical methods, the Editors also welcome contributions that use other empirical research methods. Although the scope of JBFA is broad, it is not a suitable outlet for highly abstract mathematical papers, or empirical papers with inadequate theoretical motivation. Also, papers that study asset pricing, or the operations of financial markets, should have direct implications for one or more of preparers, regulators, users of financial statements, and corporate financial decision makers, or at least should have implications for the development of future research relevant to such users.
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