首次公开募股后主导风险投资公司的参与、与合并相关的诉讼和目标公司的估值

IF 4.5 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS British Journal of Management Pub Date : 2024-02-08 DOI:10.1111/1467-8551.12803
Anup Basnet, Thomas Walker
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引用次数: 0

摘要

风险投资公司(VC)为其资助的首次公开募股(IPO)公司提供认证和监督服务,这在学术文献中已有详细记载。然而,很少有研究探讨风险投资公司在 IPO 公司随后被收购时(尤其是在收购有法律争议的情况下)扮演什么角色(如果有的话)。利用 1996 年至 2018 年间公布的 721 份美国风险投资支持的 IPO 公司并购要约样本,我们发现,与牵头风险投资人已经退出的公司相比,牵头风险投资人在场的收购要约能获得更高的目标公司估值,而且受到法律质疑的可能性也更小。此外,领头风险投资人在场的公司在并购公告发布后会获得更高的股价回报。我们的研究结果提供了有关风险投资认证和监督的新证据,包括其在首次公开募股后的长期诉讼威慑作用。
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Post-IPO lead venture capital firm involvement, merger-related litigation and target firm valuation
Venture capital firms (VCs) provide certification and monitoring services to the initial public offering (IPO) companies they finance, as has been well documented in the academic literature. Yet, there are few studies that explore what role – if any – VCs play when an IPO company is subsequently acquired, particularly if that acquisition is legally contested. Using a sample of 721 merger and acquisition (M&A) offers for US VC-backed IPO companies, announced between 1996 and 2018, we find that a takeover bid that occurs in the presence of the lead VC commands a higher target firm valuation and is less likely to be legally contested than a bid for a company from which the lead VC has already exited. In addition, companies in which the lead VC is present enjoy higher stock-price returns in response to M&A announcements. Our results provide new evidence regarding VC certification and monitoring – including its role as a litigation deterrent – long after the IPO.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
12.50%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: The British Journal of Management provides a valuable outlet for research and scholarship on management-orientated themes and topics. It publishes articles of a multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary nature as well as empirical research from within traditional disciplines and managerial functions. With contributions from around the globe, the journal includes articles across the full range of business and management disciplines. A subscription to British Journal of Management includes International Journal of Management Reviews, also published on behalf of the British Academy of Management.
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