Le Trouble Dissociatif de l’Identité (TDI), du nouveau dans la division subjective ?

Objectives

The aim is to examine the psychopathological and sociocultural implications of DID (Dissociative Identity Disorder), in relation to the way in which the epidemic of “multiple personalities” had dissipated by the end of the 20th century.

Method

We begin by tracing the history of dissociative disorder, reviewing the diagnostic criteria of DID (DSM-5 and ICD-11) and comparing them with those of the former MPD (Multiple Personality Disorder) in DSM-III. We then return to the concept of “dissociation” in psychiatry, highlighting some translation difficulties and its plurivocity. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the issues involved in clinical practice with the patients concerned.

Results

The renaming of dissociative disorder (from MPD to DID) was a response to the forensic controversies of the 1990s. However, this new diagnostic label resolves neither the epistemological issues surrounding dissociation (around the neurosis/psychosis differential diagnosis), nor the question of therapeutic accompaniment. Today, DID is the subject of two opposing interpretations: the psychotraumatic model and the social-cognitive model. Although they present irreconcilable differences and conceptions of the dynamics of psychic disorders, they both emphasize many points in common with regard to DID. The possibility of the cohabitation of different consciousnesses, identities, or personalities is not called into question. Similarly, the issue of trauma is examined by proponents of both models.

Discussion

The success of the DID could thus be partly explained as a return to the initial thesis of subjective division (Freud, Lacan), incompatible with the idea of a strongly unified ego as an ideal of mental health. However, the “loop” logic inherent in the classification of psychological disorders means that DID can be seen as a way for patients to describe some of their symptoms. So, the question is not to determine the superiority of an “explanatory” model of DID, but to examine the dynamics that led the subject to be identified with this diagnosis. In the case presented here, DID is linked to the patient's psychotic experience.

Conclusion

The success of DID is contemporaneous with social questioning around questions of identity. However, the dynamics of the social bond, specific to the development of a new vocabulary, cannot eclipse a certain reality of suffering manifested through dissociative phenomena. The unconscious as an “autre scène” can shed light on the logic of these mechanisms, notably by drawing on the tools of structural diagnosis proposed by Lacanian psychoanalysis. These insights help to define the conditions under which transference-related disorders can be accepted and elaborated for the patients concerned.