{"title":"采购卡特尔和打击（外部）贿赂","authors":"Roberto Burguet , Elisabetta Iossa , Giancarlo Spagnolo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among long-run (honest) firms alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest bureaucrats, generating a trade-off between collusion and corruption.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 102506"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing\",\"authors\":\"Roberto Burguet , Elisabetta Iossa , Giancarlo Spagnolo\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among long-run (honest) firms alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest bureaucrats, generating a trade-off between collusion and corruption.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51439,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Journal of Political Economy\",\"volume\":\"81 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102506\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Journal of Political Economy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000089\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Political Economy","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000089","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among long-run (honest) firms alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest bureaucrats, generating a trade-off between collusion and corruption.
期刊介绍：
The aim of the European Journal of Political Economy is to disseminate original theoretical and empirical research on economic phenomena within a scope that encompasses collective decision making, political behavior, and the role of institutions. Contributions are invited from the international community of researchers. Manuscripts must be published in English. Starting 2008, the European Journal of Political Economy is indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index published by Thomson Scientific (formerly ISI).
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