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引用次数: 0
摘要
摘要 本文研究了卖空对发现公司投资低效的信息量。新古典理论和代理理论认为，投资效率低下会将资源分配给价值较低的用途，从而破坏公司价值。本文发现，卖空者会在财务报表公布前调整其空头头寸，以利用其信息优势发现公司的投资低效。公司的空头头寸与其未来投资低效率之间的关系在统计和经济上都是显著的，并且对一系列控制变量都是稳健的。子样本分析表明，卖空头寸对未来投资低效率的信息影响主要集中在过度投资公司、董事会独立性较差的公司以及 CEO 激励薪酬较低的公司。
This paper investigates the informativeness of short sales on detecting firm investment inefficiency. Neoclassical and agency theory suggest that investment inefficiency destroys firm value by allocating resources to less-valued uses. This paper finds that short-sellers adjust their short positions before the announcement of a financial statement, to use their information advantage on firm investment inefficiency. The relation between the short positions in a firm and its future investment inefficiency is both statistically and economically significant, and robust to a broad set of control variables. Subsample analyses show that the informativeness of short sales positions about future investment inefficiency is concentrated on overinvestment firms, firms with little board independence, and firms with low CEO incentive pay.
期刊介绍：
The journal Financial Markets and Portfolio Management invites submissions of original research articles in all areas of finance, especially in – but not limited to – financial markets, portfolio choice and wealth management, asset pricing, risk management, and regulation. Its principal objective is to publish high-quality articles of innovative research and practical application. The readers of Financial Markets and Portfolio Management are academics and professionals in finance and economics, especially in the areas of asset management. FMPM publishes academic and applied research articles, shorter ''Perspectives'' and survey articles on current topics of interest to the financial community, as well as book reviews. All article submissions are subject to a double-blind peer review. http://www.fmpm.org
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