非理想理论应该依赖理想理论吗?法兰克福学派的启示

IF 1.1 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI:10.1111/josp.12556
Kristina Lepold
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引用次数: 0

摘要

虽然理想理论告诉我们 "一个完全公正的社会会是什么样子"(Rawls, 1971, p.8),但我们当前的社会世界远非完全公正,我们显然想知道如何在这些并非完全公正或不公正的环境中定位自己并采取行动。这就是为什么当今许多政治哲学家1 都认为我们需要的是非理想理论。不过,在一个关键问题上存在分歧。有些人--其中最著名的是查尔斯-W-米尔斯(Charles W. Mills)和阿马蒂亚-森(Amartya Sen)--认为非理想理论不需要建立在理想理论的基础上,应该不需要理想理论,而另一些人则指出了理想理论对于非理想理论的必要性,认为理想理论不应该因为非理想理论的项目而被轻易否定。因此,核心问题是非理想理论是否应该依赖于理想理论。在下文中,我想讨论这个问题并提出一个答案。下面,我将讨论这个问题,并提出一个答案。我想以法兰克福学派为出发点,探讨非理想理论在理想理论的指导下,能否帮助社会成员理解不公正现象,从而促进他们的自我反思。非理想理论的倡导者应该关注非理想理论促进自我反思的能力,因为非理想理论能否成功地指导集体行动以克服不公正,取决于其促进自我反思的能力。换句话说,政治哲学的现实意义正是其关键所在。然而,正如我将要论证的那样,对理想理论的依赖使得非理想理论促进自我反思的能力变得不确定,因此纯粹是一个运气问题。因此,非理想理论成功指导行动的能力一直受到质疑。因此,我将在结论中提出,如果政治哲学想要具有现实意义,非理想理论就不应该依赖于理想理论。首先,我将解释我对理想理论和非理想理论的理解(第 1 节),然后讨论理想理论对非理想理论的作用(第 2 节)。然后,我将转向法兰克福学派,概述其处理不公正和一般社会问题的基本方法(第 3 节)。最后,我将探讨非理想理论的倡导者可以从法兰克福学派那里学到哪些经验教训,这也是本文的主要内容(第 4 节)。最后,我将对本文的论点进行总结。
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Should nonideal theory rely on ideal theory? Lessons from the Frankfurt School

While ideal theory tells us “what a perfectly just society would be like” (Rawls, 1971, p. 8), our current social world is far from perfectly just, and we clearly want to know how to orient ourselves and act in these less than perfectly just, or unjust, circumstances. This is why many political philosophers1 today agree that what is needed is nonideal theory. There is, however, disagreement on one key issue. While some—most notably Charles W. Mills and Amartya Sen—have argued that nonideal theory does not need to build on ideal theory and should do without it, others have pointed out ways in which ideal theory may still be necessary for doing nonideal theory, and that ideal theory should not be dismissed so easily for the project of nonideal theory. The central question, then, is whether nonideal theory should rely on ideal theory.

In what follows, I would like to take up this question and propose an answer to it. I will do so by considering a more specific question. Taking the Frankfurt School as my point of departure, I would like to examine whether nonideal theory, when guided by ideal theory, can help members of the social world to understand injustices and thus contribute to their self-reflection. Advocates of nonideal theory should be concerned about the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection, because whether it can successfully inform collective action to overcome injustice depends on its ability to contribute to self-reflection. In other words, what is at stake is nothing less than the practical relevance of political philosophy. As I will argue, however, reliance on ideal theory renders the ability of nonideal theory to contribute to self-reflection uncertain and therefore a matter of sheer luck. As a result, the ability of nonideal theory to successfully guide action is in constant doubt. I will therefore conclude by suggesting that if political philosophy wants to be practically relevant, nonideal theory should not rely on ideal theory.

My argument will involve four steps. First, I will explain my understanding of ideal and nonideal theory (Section 1), before addressing the debate about the role of ideal theory for nonideal theory (Section 2). I will then turn to the Frankfurt School and outline its basic approach to injustice and social problems in general (Section 3). Finally, I will examine what lessons advocates of nonideal theory can learn from the Frankfurt School, which is where the main action of this paper takes place (Section 4). I will conclude with a summary of the argument.

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2.20
自引率
12.50%
发文量
44
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