快还是慢?在出版频率上竞争

Lin Chen, Guillaume Roels
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引用次数: 0

摘要

问题的定义:对于许多信息产品来说,较长的出版周期(或批量信息)更经济,但往往导致信息的时效性降低,因此也降低了信息的价值。出版流程的数字化降低了固定出版成本,使得缩短出版周期在经济上更加可行,但相互竞争的公司却对出版周期做出了不同的调整:有些公司的出版频率更高,而有些公司的出版频率则更低。面对日益激烈的竞争和数字化,信息提供商应如何改变其出版频率策略?方法/结果:在本文中,我们建立了一个博弈论模型,以确定在双头垄断中信息提供商应如何设定其出版周期和价格。我们发现,与垄断环境相比,竞争会产生周期差异,并扩大产品种类。具体来说,当固定出版成本较高且内容具有高度共性时,竞争企业应在出版频率上寻求差异化,反之则不然。虽然固定出版成本的降低往往会缩短出版周期,但也会加剧竞争态势,导致企业在出版周期上进一步差异化,从而损害消费者剩余。不过,这可能只是暂时的,因为企业最终可能会在出版周期的选择上趋同。对管理的影响:出版流程的数字化正在颠覆许多信息提供行业(如新闻、天气、金融)。我们的研究表明,随着出版流程的数字化,参与竞争的企业应该预见到其出版策略的非单调性或突发性变化,而且在数字化过程中,企业和消费者都可能受到伤害:电子版附录见 https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0024 。
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Fast or Slow? Competing on Publication Frequency
Problem definition: For many information goods, longer publication cycles (or batches of information) are more economical, but often result in less timely—and, therefore, less valuable—information. Whereas the digitalization of publication processes has reduced fixed publication costs, making shorter publication cycles more economically viable, competing firms have adapted their publication cycles differently: some of them publish more frequently, whereas others publish less frequently. In the face of growing competition and digitalization, how should information providers change their publication frequency strategies? Methodology/results: In this paper, we build a game-theoretic model to determine how information providers should set their publication cycles and prices in a duopoly. We find that, compared with a monopolistic environment, competition gives rise to differentiation by cycles and expands product variety. Specifically, competing firms should seek to differentiate on their publication frequency when the fixed publication is high and their contents share a high degree of commonality, but not otherwise. Whereas a reduction in the fixed cost of publication tends to yield shorter publication cycles, it could also intensify the competitive dynamics, leading firms to further differentiate their publication cycles, hurting consumer surplus. However, this could be temporary, as firms may ultimately converge in their choices of publication cycles. Managerial implications: The digitalization of publication processes is disrupting many information provision industries (e.g., news, weather, financial). We show that competing firms should anticipate nonmonotone or abrupt changes in their publication strategy as their publication processes get digitalized and may actually be hurt—as well as consumers—in the process of digitalization.Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0024 .
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