LOTUS: A Scalable Framework to Lock Multimodule Designs With One-Time Self-Destructing Key

The involvement of external parties in integrated circuit (IC) supply chain has raised a number of security issues, such as the use of device cloning, overproduction, and unauthorized integration/activation. One potential solution to this problem, logic locking, restricts access to the hardware unless the correct key is provided. Existing locking methods target limited attacks and show scalability issues. In this letter we presents LOTUS, a scalable and multilayered locking framework that provides a solution for multimodule designs by employing pseudo-dynamic keys. An important aspect of this work is that it triggers an irreversible failure once an incorrect key is applied. This evaluation demonstrates this letter’s resiliency against various deobfuscation attacks like KC2, AppSAT, OMLA, SAIL, and SCOPE with low overhead. Due to its scalability, low overhead, and destructive-when-wrong structure, LOTUS is a practical solution for large, complex, and safety-critical designs.