Repression and growth in the periphery of Europe: The politics of changing growth regime in Turkey

This study shows that in peripheral economies that are linked into circuits of global capital on unequal terms, attempts to change the core features of an existing growth regime without broader political support intensify externally induced conflict among the ruling coalition. Under these circumstances, a transition to a new demand regime within a short time frame is more likely to take place via authoritarian intervention when the political cost of repression is lower than the cost of redistribution. In developing these points, the analysis builds on evidence from Turkey: following the 2008 global credit crunch, the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) domestic demand-led and credit-fueled growth under dependent financialization has experienced a major crisis. However, the subsequent push to replace this regime with a profit-led model with an emphasis on exports worsened the conflict among the political coalition supporting the party as their preferences over monetary policy began to diverge. A temporary resolution of this deepening rift has been possible by way of an authoritarian intervention under R. T. Erdogan’s presidential bid in 2017–18. By situating the debate on the relationship between growth regimes and political institutions, the study further unpacks the nexus between democratic backsliding, dominant social blocs, and economic growth in the periphery of Europe.