死亡往事、临时性和僵尸

Ernesto Graziani
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引用次数: 0

摘要

时间的死亡过去生长块理论(Dead Past Growing Block Theory of Time-DPGB-theory)是一种形而上学观点,认为过去和现在无时无刻地存在着,而未来则不存在,只有现在承载着心态,而过去则缺乏心态,在这个意义上,过去是死亡的。支持这一观点的一个主要原因是,它不受 "现在-现在 "反对或认识论反对(其目的在于破坏在 A 理论宇宙中当前经历客观现在时间的确定性)的影响。在本文中,我研究了福雷斯特(P. Forrest)和福布斯(G. A. Forbes)为支持 DPGB 理论而提出的额外论据,并证明这些论据是行不通的。我还研究了一位匿名审稿人为本刊提出的拯救 DPGB 理论的建议,并认为该建议也行不通。此外,与布拉登-米切尔(D. Braddon-Mitchell)和福布斯(Forbes)的观点一致,我认为DPGB理论确实承诺了僵尸在过去的存在。由于DPGB理论是临时提出的,而且背负着一个非常奇怪和反直觉的本体论承诺,因此它变得相当不讨人喜欢。
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Dead Past, Ad hocness, and Zombies

The Dead Past Growing Block theory of time—DPGB-theory—is the metaphysical view that the past and the present tenselessly exist, whereas the future does not, and that only the present hosts mentality, whereas the past lacks it and is, in this sense, dead. One main reason in favour of this view is that it is immune to the now-now objection or epistemic objection (which aims at undermining the certainty, within an A-theoretical universe, of being currently experiencing the objective present time). In this paper, I examine the additional arguments offered by P. Forrest and G. A. Forbes to back the DPGB-theory and show that they do not work. I also examine a proposal to rescue the DPGB-theory suggested by an anonymous reviewer for this journal and argue that it does not work either. Moreover, in line with D. Braddon-Mitchell and against Forbes, I argue that the DPGB-theory is indeed committed to the existence of zombies in the past. Being ad hoc and burdened by a very odd and counterintuitive ontological commitment, the DPGB-theory turns out to be rather unpalatable.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
35
期刊介绍: Acta Analytica is an international journal for philosophy in the analytical tradition covering a variety of philosophical topics including philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Special attention is devoted to cognitive science. The journal aims to promote a rigorous, argument-based approach in philosophy. Acta Analytica is a peer reviewed journal, published quarterly, with authors from all over the world.
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