为什么理由不能改变你的道德决定?因为它们不够有说服力:对斯坦利等人(2018)的评论

IF 2.8 2区 心理学 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL European Journal of Social Psychology Pub Date : 2024-02-25 DOI:10.1002/ejsp.3053
Ruixiang Gao, Qikai Xiao, Shengqiao Huang, Zhuoyu Li, Lei Mo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

斯坦利等人(2018)发现,考虑理由很少会促使人们改变道德决定。我们对这篇文章提出了质疑,假设造成这种无效或微弱效果的原因是,为反对最初决定而提供的理由的说服力不够强。为了验证我们的假设,本研究采用了斯坦利等人(2018)的实验范式,并操纵了理由的说服力水平。结果发现:(1)不仅强烈的反对理由,而且微弱的肯定理由都能引起道德决策的改变,并在改变决策后增加决策信心;(2)决策信心弱的人倾向于在评估理由后改变最初的决策;(3)在考虑微弱的反对理由后维持决策的人增强了而不是降低了决策信心。总之,这些研究结果表明,道德决定的改变是理由类型、理由说服力和最初决定信心之间相互作用的综合结果,而低质量的论证对道德说服具有回旋效应。本研究重新提升了理性推理在道德决策和修正中的作用,从而对Stanley等人(2018)的研究结论提出了重要修正。
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Why cannot reasons change your moral decisions? Because they are not persuasive enough: A comment on Stanley et al. (2018)

Stanley et al. (2018) found that the consideration of reasons rarely induced people to change their moral decisions. We challenged this article by assuming what caused such a null or weak effect was that the persuasiveness of reasons provided to oppose the initial decisions was not strong enough. To verify our assumption, this study used Stanley et al.’s (2018) experimental paradigm and manipulated the levels of persuasiveness of reasons. The results revealed (1) that not only strong opposing reasons but also weak affirming reasons could induce changes in moral decision-making and increase decision confidence after altering the decisions; (2) that people with a weak decision confidence tended to change their initial decisions after evaluation of reasons; and (3) that people who maintained their decisions after considering weak opposing reasons enhanced rather than reduced their decision confidence. Overall, these findings demonstrated that moral decision change was a composite outcome of the interaction among reason type, reason persuasiveness and initial decision confidence and that low-quality argumentation had a boomerang effect on moral persuasion. This study re-lifted the role of rational reasoning in moral decision-making and revising, thus posing important amendments to Stanley et al.’s (2018) findings.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.10
自引率
7.70%
发文量
84
期刊介绍: Topics covered include, among others, intergroup relations, group processes, social cognition, attitudes, social influence and persuasion, self and identity, verbal and nonverbal communication, language and thought, affect and emotion, embodied and situated cognition and individual differences of social-psychological relevance. Together with original research articles, the European Journal of Social Psychology"s innovative and inclusive style is reflected in the variety of articles published: Research Article: Original articles that provide a significant contribution to the understanding of social phenomena, up to a maximum of 12,000 words in length.
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