气候政策融资的政治经济学--来自太阳能光伏补贴项目的证据

IF 2.6 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Resource and Energy Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101436
Olivier De Groote , Axel Gautier , Frank Verboven
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了慷慨的太阳能电池板补贴计划的政治影响。补贴远远超出了其社会效益,部分资金来自对采用者征收的新税和对所有消费者征收的电费附加。我们使用了比利时的地方面板数据,发现在采用率高的城市,政府政党的得票率有所下降。这表明,选民对高成本政策的惩罚超过了获得慷慨补贴的采用者的潜在回报。进一步的分析表明,惩罚主要来自非采用者,他们会将选票投向反建制政党。
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The political economy of financing climate policy — Evidence from the solar PV subsidy programs

We analyze the political impact of a generous solar panel subsidization program. Subsidies far exceeded their social benefit and were partly financed by new taxes on adopters and by electricity surcharges for all consumers. We use local panel data from Belgium and find a decrease in votes for government parties in municipalities with high adoption rates. This shows that the voters’ punishment for a costly policy exceeded the potential reward by adopters who received generous subsidies. Further analysis indicates that punishment mainly comes from non-adopters, who change their vote towards anti-establishment parties.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Resource and Energy Economics provides a forum for high level economic analysis of utilization and development of the earth natural resources. The subject matter encompasses questions of optimal production and consumption affecting energy, minerals, land, air and water, and includes analysis of firm and industry behavior, environmental issues and public policies. Implications for both developed and developing countries are of concern. The journal publishes high quality papers for an international audience. Innovative energy, resource and environmental analyses, including theoretical models and empirical studies are appropriate for publication in Resource and Energy Economics.
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