关于采用 "承诺与审查 "谈判方式的气候协议的广度和深度

IF 5.5 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102952
Thomas Eichner, Mark Schopf
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了在动态博弈中部分合作对气候协议广度和深度的影响,在动态博弈中,各国排放、投资绿色技术、决定参加气候联盟,参与者就合同期限进行谈判。在选择减排量(承诺)时,联盟国采用 Harstad(2023a)的 "承诺-审查 "讨价还价法,并进行部分合作。我们将投资成本分为与存量无关的投资成本和与存量有关的投资成本。结果表明,对签署国而言,窄而深的协议可能比宽而浅的协议更具福利优势。此外,如果部分合作的程度足够高,则可以达成宽而深的协议,甚至是第一最佳协议。
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On breadth and depth of climate agreements with pledge-and-review bargaining

This paper analyzes the effects of partial cooperation on the breadth and depth of climate agreements in dynamic games in which countries emit, invest in green technology, decide to participate in a climate coalition and participants negotiate the contract duration. When choosing emissions reductions (pledges), coalition countries apply Harstad’s (2023a) pledge-and-review bargaining and partially cooperate. We distinguish between stock-independent and stock-dependent investment costs. It is shown that narrow-but-deep agreements may be welfare superior to broad-but-shallow agreements for signatories. In addition, if the degree of partial cooperation is sufficiently high, broad-and-deep agreements and even first best can be achieved.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
91
期刊介绍: The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.
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