管理层的自愿披露行为如何影响审计师的判断?

IF 4.9 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.12531
SEAN M. HILLISON, KAMBER D. VITTORI
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引用次数: 0

摘要

前瞻性信息通常被审计师用来评估复杂的估计,并形成有关持续经营审计报告修改的结论,美国上市公司通常会自愿披露前瞻性信息。我们通过实验研究了这种披露行为如何影响审计师对此类信息的怀疑态度。先前的研究表明,投资者和分析师经常将自愿披露的前瞻性信息解释为可信信息。我们的研究表明,与此相反,审计师对自愿披露的预测信息(相对于强制披露或私下持有的信息)表现出更大的怀疑态度,因为他们对管理层的信任度降低了,即使预测与上一年的趋势一致(相对于更乐观的预测)。我们的研究结果表明,管理者披露信息的决定,而不是披露内容本身,会导致审计师怀疑态度的增加。我们的研究结果不仅对审计结果有影响,而且对管理者的披露行为也有影响,因为审计师审查的增加可能会阻碍未来的自愿披露。
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How Does Management Voluntary Disclosure Behavior Influence Auditors’ Judgments?

Forward-looking information, often used by auditors to evaluate complex estimates and form conclusions about going-concern audit report modifications, is commonly disclosed voluntarily by U.S. public companies. We experimentally examine how this disclosure behavior affects auditors’ skepticism toward such information. Prior research has shown that investors and analysts frequently interpret voluntarily disclosed forward-looking information as credible. We demonstrate that auditors, in contrast, exhibit greater skepticism toward forecasted information that has been voluntarily disclosed (vs. mandatorily disclosed or held privately) because of their reduced trust in management, even when the forecasts align with prior year trends (vs. being more optimistic). Our results suggest that a manager's decision to disclose, rather than the disclosure content itself, leads to increased auditor skepticism. Our findings have implications not only for audit outcomes, but also for manager disclosure behavior, as increased auditor scrutiny could discourage future voluntary disclosure.

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来源期刊
Journal of Accounting Research
Journal of Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
6.80%
发文量
53
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting Research is a general-interest accounting journal. It publishes original research in all areas of accounting and related fields that utilizes tools from basic disciplines such as economics, statistics, psychology, and sociology. This research typically uses analytical, empirical archival, experimental, and field study methods and addresses economic questions, external and internal, in accounting, auditing, disclosure, financial reporting, taxation, and information as well as related fields such as corporate finance, investments, capital markets, law, contracting, and information economics.
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