James Rachels and the morality of euthanasia.

My fundamental thesis is that Rachels dismisses the traditional Western account of the morality of killing without offering a viable replacement. In this regard, I will argue that the substitute account he offers is deficient in at least eight regards: (1) he fails to justify the foundational principle of utilitarianism, (2) he exposes preference utilitarianism to the same criticisms he lodges against classical utilitarianism, (3) he neglects to explain how precisely one performs the maximization procedure which preference utilitarianism requires, (4) his account of the sanctity of life is subject to the very criticism he levels against the traditional position, (5) he cannot justify the exceptions he makes to his interpretation of the sanctity of life, (6) his account could easily be used to justify murder, (7) his embrace of autonomy as an ethical principle undermines his preference utilitarianism, and (8) he cannot maintain the moral identification of acts of killing and letting die.