Pub Date : 2026-02-03DOI: 10.1007/s11017-026-09742-9
Jeremy W Skrzypek
{"title":"Denial of benefits: reply to Cordeiro-Rodrigues.","authors":"Jeremy W Skrzypek","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09742-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-026-09742-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146115509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-10-15DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09731-4
Paul K J Han, Bjørn Hofmann
This paper critically analyzes the meaning of uncertainty tolerance (UT), a phenomenon of growing interest in healthcare. Medical practitioners, educators, and researchers have increasingly acknowledged the importance of UT for both clinicians and patients, and called for greater attention to improving it. However, we argue that the prevailing conception of UT is an inadequate normative ideal, due to its narrow understanding of uncertainty as exclusively an aversive state entailing negative outcomes, and of tolerance as merely the endurance of these outcomes. We show how this endurance-based, outcomes-focused conception of UT is both theoretically incoherent and practically unhelpful. We make the case for an alternative conception based not on endurance but adaptation, and focused not on outcomes but moral virtues, which we view as instrumental capacities that enable adaptation. We develop a provisional integrative taxonomy of these key virtues, discuss both the promises and challenges of this new adaptation-based, virtue-focused conception of UT, and identify fruitful directions for future work.
{"title":"Uncertainty tolerance in healthcare: towards a normative conception.","authors":"Paul K J Han, Bjørn Hofmann","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09731-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-025-09731-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper critically analyzes the meaning of uncertainty tolerance (UT), a phenomenon of growing interest in healthcare. Medical practitioners, educators, and researchers have increasingly acknowledged the importance of UT for both clinicians and patients, and called for greater attention to improving it. However, we argue that the prevailing conception of UT is an inadequate normative ideal, due to its narrow understanding of uncertainty as exclusively an aversive state entailing negative outcomes, and of tolerance as merely the endurance of these outcomes. We show how this endurance-based, outcomes-focused conception of UT is both theoretically incoherent and practically unhelpful. We make the case for an alternative conception based not on endurance but adaptation, and focused not on outcomes but moral virtues, which we view as instrumental capacities that enable adaptation. We develop a provisional integrative taxonomy of these key virtues, discuss both the promises and challenges of this new adaptation-based, virtue-focused conception of UT, and identify fruitful directions for future work.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"5-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12648382/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145305216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-10-06DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09733-2
Ngala Elvis Mbiydzenyuy, Mbawe Zulu
{"title":"Of rats and humans: rethinking physiological boundaries.","authors":"Ngala Elvis Mbiydzenyuy, Mbawe Zulu","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09733-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-025-09733-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"75-78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145234736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-12-10DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09737-y
Matthew Braddock
Is abortion homicide, the morally unjust killing of a person? Should it be illegal? There is widespread disagreement. However, there is a way through the impasse. It is not necessary to establish whether abortion is homicide, only whether it substantially risks homicide. If abortion presents this risk of harm, then lawmakers have a powerful reason to criminalize it. This paper defends The Prevention Argument: if abortion substantially risks committing homicide after 10 weeks' gestation, then lawmakers should criminalize such abortions to prevent the foreseeable harm of mass homicide. Why 10 weeks? Because it is plausible that abortions after 10 weeks endanger an innocent person's life and, if so, the harm preventive case for criminalizing them is strong. This argument deserves a hearing because it has a modest burden of proof and relies on accepted normative principles like the harm principle. It could also be extended to earlier abortions.
{"title":"If abortion substantially risks homicide, it should be illegal.","authors":"Matthew Braddock","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09737-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-025-09737-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Is abortion homicide, the morally unjust killing of a person? Should it be illegal? There is widespread disagreement. However, there is a way through the impasse. It is not necessary to establish whether abortion is homicide, only whether it substantially risks homicide. If abortion presents this risk of harm, then lawmakers have a powerful reason to criminalize it. This paper defends The Prevention Argument: if abortion substantially risks committing homicide after 10 weeks' gestation, then lawmakers should criminalize such abortions to prevent the foreseeable harm of mass homicide. Why 10 weeks? Because it is plausible that abortions after 10 weeks endanger an innocent person's life and, if so, the harm preventive case for criminalizing them is strong. This argument deserves a hearing because it has a modest burden of proof and relies on accepted normative principles like the harm principle. It could also be extended to earlier abortions.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"29-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12847071/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145717227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-08-21DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09725-2
Timothy Daly, Ignacio Mastroleo
{"title":"Use of unproven interventions in clinical practice in the Declaration of Helsinki 2024: building on welcome changes.","authors":"Timothy Daly, Ignacio Mastroleo","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09725-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-025-09725-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"71-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144984661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-12-06DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09736-z
Bruce P Blackshaw
The impairment argument aims to establish the immorality of abortion without relying on the fetus's moral status. Instead, it appeals to logical consistency in moral reasoning: if it is immoral to impair a fetus by causing injury, then it must be even more immoral to impair it by causing death. For this reasoning to succeed, all the morally relevant details between these impairments must be held constant, which the author of the argument, Perry Hendricks, refers to as the ceteris paribus requirement. This requirement has proven difficult to define, and in his latest work, Hendricks suggests a more precise explanation of the ceteris paribus clause based on the valuable goods that obtain from impairments. He also outlines a test to determine if the ceteris paribus clause is broken, thereby causing the impairment argument to fail. In this paper, I argue that this new formulation is too narrow, resulting in fatal counterexamples. Accordingly, I show that in addition to valuable goods, the harms of impairment must be considered, as well as the reasons why impairing a fetus is considered immoral. I demonstrate that these reasons ultimately rest on one's view of the fetus' moral status, rendering the impairment argument superfluous.
{"title":"Reconsidering the impairment argument against abortion.","authors":"Bruce P Blackshaw","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09736-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-025-09736-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The impairment argument aims to establish the immorality of abortion without relying on the fetus's moral status. Instead, it appeals to logical consistency in moral reasoning: if it is immoral to impair a fetus by causing injury, then it must be even more immoral to impair it by causing death. For this reasoning to succeed, all the morally relevant details between these impairments must be held constant, which the author of the argument, Perry Hendricks, refers to as the ceteris paribus requirement. This requirement has proven difficult to define, and in his latest work, Hendricks suggests a more precise explanation of the ceteris paribus clause based on the valuable goods that obtain from impairments. He also outlines a test to determine if the ceteris paribus clause is broken, thereby causing the impairment argument to fail. In this paper, I argue that this new formulation is too narrow, resulting in fatal counterexamples. Accordingly, I show that in addition to valuable goods, the harms of impairment must be considered, as well as the reasons why impairing a fetus is considered immoral. I demonstrate that these reasons ultimately rest on one's view of the fetus' moral status, rendering the impairment argument superfluous.</p>","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"59-70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145688880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-22DOI: 10.1007/s11017-026-09739-4
{"title":"Reviewers, 2025.","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11017-026-09739-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-026-09739-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146021000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-17DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09738-x
Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues
{"title":"Euthanasia in light of Epicurean ethics and metaphysics.","authors":"Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09738-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-025-09738-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145770112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09735-0
Silvia Ceruti
{"title":"McClimans, Leah M. Patient-centered measurement: ethics, epistemology, and dialogue in contemporary medicine. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024. ISBN: 9.780.197.572.078 (Hardback).","authors":"Silvia Ceruti","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09735-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-025-09735-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145656738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-08-31DOI: 10.1007/s11017-025-09727-0
Tyrel R Porter
{"title":"Reconsidering affective attitudes in constructivist accounts of moral death: the case of the decerebrate patient.","authors":"Tyrel R Porter","doi":"10.1007/s11017-025-09727-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-025-09727-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":94251,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical medicine and bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"507-508"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144984638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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